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Abstract 
How much do words matter? Is it necessary to examine what the terms “knowledge” 
and “terrorism” really mean in a philosophical debate about knowledge or terrorism?  
In this inquiry, I discuss how this question arises in a number of contexts 
such as the location problem for certain metaphysical and epistemological projects, 
the idea that changes in meaning change the subject under discussion, when evaluative 
terms like “terrorism” are contested and hinder normative debates, and when a 
dispute might be merely verbal.  
Views on the role of words in first-order debates fall roughly into two camps. 
Some philosophers acknowledge the need to examine the actual meaning of terms in 
order to settle the subject matter of an inquiry, and they do so by either conducting 
conceptual analysis or using empirical methods. Meanwhile, others claim that it is 
largely unnecessary to analyse the meaning of terms when we are interested in the 
nature of things. I argue that for all of the cases considered, an updated version of 
Carnap’s method of explication is the most promising method for settling the subject 
matter of inquiry. On this approach, we revise pre-theoretic terms guided by our aims. 
For a clearer view on what the subject matter of a debate is, I draw on David Lewis’s 
notion of the subject matter of a statement.  
My methodological approach has considerable advantages over traditional as 
well as more recent forms of conceptual analysis. Moreover, it promotes considering 
important terminological matters that are underrated by opponents of conceptual 
analysis. The upshot is that the ordinary meaning of words used in first-order inquiry 
does not matter much. The more important question is how to adjust and refine the 
meaning of these words in the light of our aims. How we decide this question has 
epistemic, ethical and pragmatic implications. 
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Introduction 
That someone is [...] conceptually muddled about truffles is a matter of the 
profoundest indifference, but failure to think clearly about ‘humanly 
important topics’ is precisely what makes for irrational policy and inhumane 
practice—political, legal, medical, and therapeutic—and that is another 
matter entirely.  
—Jay Rosenberg (1998, xvii)  
 
Klarheit! Klarheit! Klarheit!  
—Gottlob Frege (1906, 297) 
 
 
How much do words matter in philosophy? When studying philosophical 
topics such as causation, belief or justice, how important is it to examine the 
meaning of the words “causation”, “belief” and “justice”? Several decades ago, 
eminent analytic philosophers held the view that philosophical problems 
essentially are problems concerning language and careful attention to language 
will fully resolve them. Today, it is commonly agreed that this so-called 
linguistic turn was a wrong turning (see Williamson 2004, 106). What role is 
there left for the study of words in first-order inquiries? I will discuss how this 
question arises in a number of cases such as the location problem in the 
context of certain metaphysical and epistemological projects, contested 
evaluative terms like “terrorism” that hinder normative debates, and when 
disputes are suspected of being merely verbal. Views on the role of words in 
first-order debates fall roughly into two camps. Some philosophers 
acknowledge the need to examine the actual meaning of terms in order to 
settle the subject matter of an inquiry, either by doing conceptual analysis or 
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using empirical methods. Others argue that it is largely unnecessary to analyze 
the meaning of terms when we are interested in the nature of things. I will 
argue that, in all the cases considered, an updated version of Carnap’s method 
of explication is the most promising method to settle the subject matter of 
inquiry. On this approach, we revise pre-theoretic terms guided by our aims 
and informed by our findings. Moreover, I believe that much clarity can be 
gained by adopting a more systematic notion of subject matter than the 
intuitive notion in play. More particularly, I will draw on David Lewis’s notion 
of the subject matter of a statement. 
0.1  The Carnapian Pragmatism Defended in this Inquiry 
The main current views on the role of words in first-order debates fall roughly 
into two camps: those who think that examining the meaning of words is 
crucial and those who think that it is largely unnecessary. Those who maintain 
that words matter disagree on the best method to study their meaning. The 
traditional approach was to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions based on intuitions about whether the term applies to a 
number of actual and hypothetical cases. This approach had been condemned 
for quite some time when Frank Jackson ([1998] 2008) offered a detailed and 
enthusiastic defence of an updated form of conceptual analysis in From 
Metaphysics to Ethics. This form of analysis, which is sometimes also referred to 
as the Canberra Plan, is responsive to some of the attacks on its traditional 
forerunner and has inspired philosophers to reconsider the merits of 
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conceptual analysis. In his latest book Constructing the World, David Chalmers 
(2012) defends an epistemological thesis for which a form of analysis that is 
even weaker than Jackson’s is relevant. Moreover, a more traditional form of 
analysis is still commonly used in first-order debates in which a core term is 
unclear to an extent that hinders fruitful discussion. The debate about 
terrorism is a case in point that I will examine in some detail (Ch. 3). What 
proponents of some variant of analysis agree on is that it plays a modest role. 
It does not disclose the nature of things, but rather helps settle the subject 
matter of a substantive debate. The linguistic turn went too far, but it was not a 
wrong turning altogether.  
Those who reject conceptual analysis, but agree that examining the 
meaning of terms is important, defend the use of empirical methods instead. 
When doing conceptual analysis, philosophers rely on their own intuitive 
judgements on whether an actual or hypothetical case is a case of liberty or 
knowledge. Experimental philosophers of the relevant flavour promote the use 
of empirical methods in particular, surveys and argue that, in order to derive 
results about the meaning of a term in a shared language, we need to study a 
representative number of intuitive judgements. For example, Joshua Knobe 
(e.g. 2003) has done influential work of this sort.         
More analytic philosophers seem to be in the second camp. They 
maintain that it is not important what exactly speakers mean by “liberty” or 
“causation” when our aim is to gain more knowledge about the nature of 
liberty or causation. The phenomena determine the subject matter of inquiry 
 4 
rather than ordinary language. The linguistic turn was a wrong turning 
altogether. Philosophers in this camp disagree significantly on other issues. 
Timothy Williamson (2007), for example, claims that a priori reasoning plays 
an important part in philosophy1 whereas experimental philosophers of the 
relevant sort (a different faction from the one mentioned above) highlight the 
overwhelming significance of empirical methods (e.g. Kornblith 2002; for an 
overview, see e.g. Alexander and Weinberg 2007).  
I will be steering a middle ground between the two camps. I agree with 
the second camp that examining the current meaning of terms is of strictly 
limited importance. However, I agree with the first camp that settling our 
terminology plays an important role in settling the subject matter of inquiry. I 
will propose that an updated version of Carnap’s method of explication (in 
particular [1950] 1951, Ch. 1; 1963, 933–940) is the most promising method to 
settle terminological issues and thus the subject matter of first-order inquiry. 
The basic idea is that, in the course of inquiry, we revise pre-theoretic terms 
guided by our theoretical (and sometimes practical) aims and render them 
more suitable for these aims, for example, by making them more precise and 
let them trace the distinctions that are most significant for our interests. This 
involves epistemic, ethical and pragmatic considerations.  
The Carnapian method to settle our terminology has considerable 
advantages over traditional as well as more recent forms of conceptual analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that Williamson (2004) does acknowledge a role for language in philosophy, but a role 
that differs from the one this inquiry is concerned with.   
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It avoids, for instance, the often-criticised heavy reliance on intuitions and 
vulnerability to counterexamples and does not make philosophical theories 
hostage to pre-theoretic language. Moreover, it promotes considerations on 
important terminological matters that are underrated by opponents of 
conceptual analysis. Potential challenges to my approach will be addressed as 
well in particular that it merely changes the subject, turns substantive dispute 
into merely verbal ones, or fosters biased terminology.  
I will sometimes label the method “explication” to honour my source 
of inspiration. However, I will often call it “terminological revision” or 
“terminological improvement” instead, to avoid confusion with the wide range 
of things that are sometimes referred to as explications (e.g. explanations, 
clarifications, definitions etc.). 
Even though my approach is greatly indebted to Carnap’s account of 
explication, my aim is not exegetical. A number of philosophers have provided 
valuable discussions of how to best interpret Carnap’s account of explication 
in the context of his work and the work of his time (e.g. Carus 2007; Hanna 
1968; Maher 2007; Stein 1992; Wagner 2012).  I will not contribute to this 
debate, but use Carnap’s account of explication as a starting point. Carnap’s 
account remains quite sketchy and my aim will be to develop it in a way that is 
responsive to current themes and challenges.  
An important aspect of Carnap’s account that I retain is its pragmatism. 
How we refine our terms should ultimately depend on our theoretical or 
practical aims. However, I part company with Carnap where restrictions on 
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language pluralism are concerned. In his The Logical Syntax of Language, he 
(1937, §17) embraces a principle of tolerance according to which “in logic 
there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his 
own language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to 
discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead 
of philosophical arguments.” In contrast, I will argue (Chs. 3, 5) that there are 
certain limits to linguistic tolerance. Terminological refinements are only 
acceptable if they are guided by respectable aims and whether an aim is 
respectable depends on ethical, epistemic and pragmatic considerations. In this 
respect, my view might be reminiscent of the pragmatism of Charles Sanders 
Peirce who acknowledges an “ethics of terminology”.2 Moreover, my view will 
not be committed to Carnap’s semantic internalism or the metaphysical anti-
realism often ascribed to him (see e.g. Eklund 2013).   
 Another core aspect of Carnap’s account that I retain is its naturalism. 
“Naturalism” is a fashionable term and nowadays many philosophers with 
vastly different views call their views naturalistic. That a view is naturalistic 
typically implies that it acknowledges a continuity of philosophy with the 
sciences. At any rate, this is the sense in which the Carnapian view that I will 
defend is naturalistic. If I am right, it promotes a certain methodological 
continuity of philosophy with the sciences. For Carnap, philosophy is mainly 
philosophy of science and many of his examples are explications of scientific 
terms such as “temperature” or “probability”. I agree with Carnap that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an illuminating presentation of Peirce’s ethics of terminology see Haack (2009). 
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explication or something akin to it is commonly used in the sciences. 
Economists use notions of poverty that are more specific than the everyday 
notion. They distinguish, for example, between absolute and relative poverty 
and attempt to render poverty measurable. In physics, “mass” is used with 
several and much more precise meanings than in everyday life. Economists and 
physicists have revised the ordinary terms for the purpose of their inquiries. If 
this is on the right track and explication is widely used in the sciences, to 
recommend its use in philosophy is to recommend a certain methodological 
continuity with the sciences. 
 Besides my historical source of inspiration, I should also mention 
current philosophers who can be seen as my allies as far as the use of 
Carnapian explication in philosophy is concerned. Philip Kitcher (e.g. 2007; 
2008) defends explications of the concept of race and a number of concepts in 
the philosophy of biology like the concept of a species. I have mentioned that 
Chalmers (2012) argues for a thesis that involves a certain weak form of 
conceptual analysis. Chalmers also notes his sympathy for Carnap’s method of 
explication. I will argue (Ch. 2) that the form of explication that I develop is 
compatible with Chalmers’s weak form of analysis and a fruitful addition to his 
framework. Moreover, in the area of moral and political philosophy, James 
Griffin (2008) has recently defended a notion of human rights that he claims to 
be an explication of the ordinary notion in a broadly Carnapian sense. These 
philosophers do not provide a detailed account of explication or defend its 
 8 
advantages over currently available methods. I hope that my inquiry will fill in 
this gap.  
 Another important source of inspiration for my inquiry is David 
Lewis’s (1988) account of the subject matter of a statement. At the heart of my 
inquiry are confusions regarding the subject matter of debates such as failures 
to address the subject matter at issue, highly contested evaluative terms, and 
parties to a dispute talking past each other. Subject matter is a somewhat 
neglected topic in philosophy. However, a few proposals have been made. As I 
will argue (Ch. 1), the most promising of the few extant accounts is Lewis’s 
(1988) account of the subject matter of a statement. I will draw on this account 
in order to clarify what the subject matter of a debate is.  
Concerning the core question addressed in this inquiry, an important 
issue is whether to focus on words or concepts, on language or mind. I will 
focus on words. A frequently cited reason (e.g. Kingsbury and McKeown-
Green 2009, 176–181) to focus on concepts is that the focus on words limits 
us to a particular language (e.g. English) and a particular linguistic community 
(e.g. English speakers) whereas the focus on concepts does not (see 
Williamson 2007, 13–14). However, it is not obvious that words in different 
languages cannot have the same meaning; in particular, words that are used in 
international debates. Moreover, it is not obvious that a focus on concepts 
avoids such potential restrictions. Recent empirical findings might suggest that 
concepts are tied to a cultural or socio-economic background (see e.g. Nichols, 
Stich and Weinberg 2003). Hence, our current state of knowledge does not 
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seem to allow for a clear decision on whether the focus on words or concepts 
is less restricted.  
My reason for choosing to focus on words is that this sits more 
comfortably with my methodological view. The method that I am going to 
defend can clearly be applied to words and, as I will argue, it is compatible with 
a range of semantic views. By contrast, it is not clear whether it can be applied 
to concepts if we adopt any of the most common views on the nature of 
concepts.  
What is the scope of my claim in this inquiry? When do terms require 
our attention even if they are not the primary focus? When do their 
shortcomings render the subject matter unclear? The considerations in this 
inquiry suggest that the problem is not so much that we have an insufficient 
understanding of what such terms as “knowledge” or “terrorism” actually 
mean in ordinary or pre-theoretic language. Rather, these terms require special 
attention because they are not well suited to the aims of an inquiry, that is, to 
the questions we hope to address and the issues we hope to resolve. There can 
be different reasons for this, such as that a term is too indeterminate, 
contested, ambiguous or does not trace the distinctions that are most relevant 
for our aims. Some of the subject matter related problems these shortcomings 
raise are unclear entailments of claims, verbal disputes, failures to address the 
subject matter at issue, contested subject matters, and parties to a debate 
talking past one another.  
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What are the consequences of my methodological recommendation for 
philosophical practice? Counterexamples and intuitions about the application 
of a term to actual and hypothetical cases play a much more modest role than 
they currently do. By contrast, considerations about respectable aims such as 
the relative significance of theoretical questions or the legitimacy of practical 
endeavours gain in importance.  Moreover, definitions in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions come within reach. 
 It should be clear from the considerations thus far that 
metaphilosophical—in particular, methodological—issues are core to this 
inquiry. However, methodology without awareness of first-order debates is 
empty and first-order debates without any awareness of methodology is blind.3 
Hence, I will use examples from different areas of philosophy to illustrate my 
considerations. Moreover, some issues in the philosophy of language (such as 
the subject matter of statements and disagreement) and in metaethics (such as 
essentially contested concepts and disagreement) will also be discussed and I 
will take at least a glance at some metaphysical and epistemological questions. 
Each chapter focuses on a different problem regarding the subject matter of a 
debate or inquiry that raises questions about the need to examine the meaning 
of terms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I am liberally borrowing from Immanuel Kant (CPR, A51, B76). 
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0.2  Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 addresses what I will call the subject change thesis: If the meaning of 
a core term changes, the subject matter under discussion changes. This thesis is 
sometimes invoked to support the need for conceptual analysis or empirical 
research into the actual meaning of terms. We need to study the actual 
meaning of “pain” in order to settle the subject matter of an inquiry into pain 
(see e.g. Jackson [1998] 2008, 30, 38, 48, 118; Alexander and Weinberg 2007, 
58). Moreover, it is sometimes used to criticize an account that seems 
revisionary. Someone who addresses a question about race in the ordinary 
sense of “race”, and answers using a quite different technical notion, merely 
changes the subject (see e.g. Haslanger 2006, 106). In both contexts, subject 
change appears as a bad thing.  
 I argue that even though two clarified variants of the subject change 
thesis can be vindicated, subject change is not always a bad thing. There is an 
important beneficial form of subject change due to meaning change, namely, 
when we improve the meaning of terms in the light of our aims. Subject 
change due to terminological improvement is beneficial because it brings into 
focus the subject matter that we should be focusing on given the aims we hope 
to attain. The method of terminological improvement that I develop is an 
updated version of Carnap’s method of explication. Moreover, I use Lewis’s 
account of the subject matter of statements in order to clarify what the subject 
matter of a debate is.  
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The upshot of Chapter 1 is that attention to words is required in order 
to settle the subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that we need to examine the current meaning of terms. It can 
be beneficial to revise the meaning of terms and thus the subject matter under 
discussion.  
  Chapter 2 is concerned with what Jackson ([1998] 2008, 2–5) has 
termed the location problem. The problem arises in the context of a 
metaphysical or epistemological project. The basic idea underlying the 
metaphysical project is that a complete description of reality does not need to 
mention everything. It is, for instance, not necessary to mention water as well 
as H2O. Such a project raises the problem of how we can move from findings 
in terms of a basic vocabulary (for example, findings about H2O) to claims in 
terms of a non-basic vocabulary (for example, claims about water). This 
matters because we care about a lot of things that are not mentioned in the 
basic description of reality or in the class of basic truths like water, pain, liberty 
or probability.  
I will steer a middle ground between those like Jackson who defend the 
use of conceptual analysis and those who argue that special attention to 
language is not required at all and empirical research into the relevant 
phenomena suffices (e.g. Block and Stalnaker 1999; Kornblith 2002; Schroeter 
2006). I will argue that terminological revision in the Carnapian sense 
developed in Chapter 1 is the most promising method to clarify non-basic 
terms and thus mediate between the subject matter described in basic terms 
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and its description in non-basic terms. I will also show how this method is 
compatible with the weak form of conceptual analysis Chalmers (2012) uses in 
his scrutability framework, an epistemological project that raises a location 
problem. What is more, it appears to be a fruitful addition to it.  
Considerations in Chapter 2 lend further support to the view that 
emerged in Chapter 1. Attention to words is required in order to settle the 
subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, to examine the current meaning 
of terms is not always the best way to do so. As regards the location problem, 
it is more fruitful to revise ordinary or pre-theoretic terminology in light of our 
aims and findings and thus determine the subject matter we ought to focus on. 
Moreover, considerations in Chapter 2 situate my view in relation to a range of 
alternative approaches.  
 Chapter 3 discusses the problem that arises when evaluative terms in 
normative inquiry are contested. The main example to illustrate my 
considerations will be the term “terrorism”. The failure to disagree on a 
definition of terrorism inside and outside philosophy hinders discussions about 
moral as well as political and legal issues. The question is whether settling the 
subject matter of this debate involves examining what we mean by “terrorism”.  
The standard approach is to clarify contested evaluative terms by 
providing a traditional conceptual analysis. I will not rehearse notorious 
objections against traditional conceptual analysis in any detail. Instead, I will 
argue that the Carnapian form of terminological revision developed in previous 
chapters avoids these objections. Moreover, I will address the concern that this 
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method fosters terms that are biased towards certain interests and refine my 
account accordingly. I will also provide reason to think that the claim to study 
phenomena rather than terms, made, for example, by proponents of the “jazz 
account of meaning” (e.g. Haslanger 2010; Schroeter and Schroeter 2009), does 
not avoid terminological issues, but supports the need for terminological 
revision instead.  
The upshot will be that the view developed in previous chapters applies 
in the context of normative inquiry as well. The most promising method to 
clarify contested evaluative terms and to thus settle the subject matter of 
normative inquiry is a Carnapian form of terminologocal revision rather than 
conceptual analysis. What matters is not so much the meaning these terms 
currently have, but the meaning they ought to be given in light of our 
theoretical (and sometimes practical) aims. This raises very general questions 
about the relative significance and respectability of our aims. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 are about merely verbal disputes and how to resolve 
them. That disputes can be merely verbal has sparked some recent interest in 
philosophy and numerous philosophical disputes have at some point been 
suspected of being merely verbal when properly understood (see Chalmers 
2011, 517; Sidelle 2007, 83). Roughly, a dispute is verbal when parties do not 
actually disagree on a substantive issue, but merely talk past one another due to 
some linguistic confusion. The appropriate treatment for such pointless 
disputes is to smooth them out and focus on the actual, substantive issues (if 
any) that remain.  
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Verbal disputes are another phenomenon that raises the question of 
how important it is to examine the meaning of terms in first-order inquiry. 
After all, an obvious suggestion is to clarify the meaning of the terms used in 
order to resolve a verbal dispute. I will propose a view on verbal disputes and 
how to resolve them that is informed by my broadly Carnapian methodology 
and the Lewisian notion of subject matter developed in earlier chapters. The 
upshot will be that even if certain philosophical disputes share the core 
features of merely verbal disputes, this does not automatically warrant the 
common belittling attitude. Something important can and often does depend 
on the linguistic confusion involved, namely, how to delineate the subject 
matters of a more general debate to which the verbal dispute in question 
belongs. Where this is the case, the dispute is more accurately described as a 
vital verbal dispute. I will also argue that, even though Chalmers’s (2011) 
method of elimination, provided certain weaknesses are fixed, is a more 
suitable method to resolve verbal disputes than conceptual analysis, it does not 
fully resolve vital verbal disputes. The more promising method to resolve vital 
verbal disputes is the Carnapian method to clarify terms developed in earlier 
chapters.  
Again it appears that attention to words is important in order to settle 
the subject matter of first-order inquiry. Moreover, in a number of 
philosophically important cases, including vital verbal disputes, it is more 
promising to revise terms in light of our aims than to analyse their current 
meaning. 
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The last section of Chapter 5 will be an addendum that deals with a 
common objection to my methodological recommendation in this inquiry. 
Thus, if we accept the Carnapian views it involves, many substantive disputes 
come out as merely verbal.  
0.3 Historical Background 
As outlined above, I take my inquiry to be well motivated in the context of 
current debates. The historical background adds a further dimension to this 
motivation. It traces how the question and its significance have arisen in its 
current form. The distinction between analytic and continental philosophy is 
questionable. Nevertheless, there is a fairly uncontentious conception of 
analytic philosophy as a cluster of issues, approaches and maybe also values. 
My inquiry stands in the analytic tradition in this sense. It engages with a 
certain ideal of clarity that has always been a core value of analytic philosophy. 
As William D. Hart (1990, 197) puts it: “Praise for clarity and, perhaps even 
more, condemnation for its opposed vices have been perceived as 
characteristic of philosophy done in analytic style.”  
The relevant ideal of clarity goes back at least as far as the early modern 
ages. At the heart of René Descartes’s rationalism is the idea that clarity is a 
mark of truth. At the beginning of the Third Meditation, he ([1641] 1992) 
claims that whatever we perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. At the end 
of the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders Peirce ([1878] 1992) criticises 
Descartes’s conception of clarity and proposes a pragmatist account of how to 
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make our ideas clear. The view that I defend in this inquiry agrees with Peirce’s 
view in so far as pragmatic considerations should guide our clarifications. 
Another historical development that is particularly relevant to this inquiry is 
the linguistic turn in the first half of the twentieth century. The label “linguistic 
turn” has arguably been given currency by a volume edited by Richard Rorty in 
1967 entitled The Linguistic Turn. It is commonly applied to a range of loosely 
related developments in philosophy. Rorty describes the one that is relevant to 
my inquiry as follows: 
The purpose of the present volume is to provide materials for reflection on 
the most recent philosophical revolution, that of linguistic philosophy. I shall 
mean by “linguistic philosophy” the view that philosophical problems are 
problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or 
by understanding more about the language we presently use. (Rorty 1967, 3)   
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the leaders of this revolution. In his 
Philosophical Investigations, he proclaims that “philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” ([1953] 1999, §109) and 
adds later that “the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear” 
([1953] 1999, §133). Thus, philosophical problems arise only due to linguistic 
confusions and are to be fully resolved by examining language. Other 
philosophers’ views are somewhat less extreme, but they share the assumption 
that studying language is necessary and sufficient to solve philosophical 
problems. Terminological clarity is a core part of this program. In order to 
answer philosophical questions about the nature of causation or pain, we are 
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required to settle what “causation” and “pain” mean. This is supposed to fully 
answer or resolve the question. 
 The form of clarity promoted by the linguistic turn is a thorough 
understanding of what the terms we use really mean. Doubts about the 
importance of this form of clarity arose towards the mid-twentieth century and 
found expression in the dictum “Clarity is not enough”. H. H. Price (1945, 1) 
points out: “For it is felt by quite a number of people, rightly or wrongly, that 
during the twenty years between the two wars philosophy had somehow taken 
the wrong turning.” In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, 
this uneasiness develops into a new self-image of philosophy in which the 
study of concepts and terms plays a bit part. Thus, examining the meaning of 
the terms “pain” and “causation” does not answer or resolve questions about 
the nature of pain and causation.  
In From Metaphysics to Ethics, Jackson reconsiders the importance of the 
form of clarity promoted by the linguistic turn. It is by no means a linguistic re-
turn. In his view, conceptual analysis does not fully answer philosophical 
questions about the nature of things. Nevertheless, he argues that it is a 
necessary first step in a larger metaphysical project concerned with the nature 
of reality. Hence, he revives the idea that close attention to what our terms 
actually mean is indispensable.  
I am doubtful that this form of clarity is crucial. However, I agree with 
Jackson that terminological clarity of some form is important and more 
important than opponents of conceptual analysis typically acknowledge. In my 
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view, the form of clarity that matters is the clarity that we attain when we 
improve our terms in light of our aims and based on our findings. Somewhat 
paradoxically, this form of terminological clarity is not a merely terminological 
issue; it is influenced by substantive claims and answerable to not only 
pragmatic, but also ethical and epistemic considerations. Nevertheless, like 
Jackson, I do not recommend a linguistic re-turn. The form of terminological 
clarity that I promote settles the subject matter of first-order inquiry, but it 
does not answer the questions it addresses. 
In order to bring out the difference between the form of clarity 
promoted by Jackson and the form of clarity that I advocate, consider an 
ambiguity besetting philosophers’ talk of clarity. As Lewis ([1973] 2005, 91) 
puts it, “‘unclear’ is unclear: does it mean ‘ill-understood’ or does it mean 
‘vague’?” Both ways to use “(un)clear” are common in philosophy. This 
suggests a distinction between two forms of clarity; call them descriptive and 
revisionary clarity. Descriptive clarification is what we do when a term is 
unclear in the sense of ill-understood. What we improve is our understanding of 
the term while the term itself remains the same. Revisionary clarification is 
what we do when something is unclear in the sense Lewis describes as vague. 
Thus, we not only  improve our understanding of a term, we improve the term 
itself by rendering it more precise.4 Jackson’s view supports the need for 
descriptive clarity in order to settle the subject matter of philosophical inquiry 
whereas I claim that revisionary clarity is needed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This presupposes that we do not adopt an epistemic theory of vagueness.  
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0.4 The Broader Significance of this Inquiry 
I should briefly sketch what the broader significance of this inquiry could be. 
As noted earlier, I believe that the Carnapian method of terminological 
revision defended in this inquiry is used in the sciences as well. Moreover, I 
think that a similar method is commonly used to define legal terms and thus 
influences political debates. If this is right, this inquiry suggests refinements for 
these practices. Furthermore, the problems discussed in Chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5 
occur outside philosophy as well. That the term “terrorism” is contested poses 
as much a problem for international politics as it does for philosophy, and 
political as well as everyday disputes can be merely verbal. My methodological 
recommendation applies in these cases as well. Thus, a Carnapian form of 
terminological revision is a promising method to settle the subject matter of a 
political or legal debate about terrorism in a way that is sensitive to ethical and 
pragmatic aspects.   
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Chapter 1 
Changing the Meaning and Changing the Subject 
When studying causation, knowledge or race, is it necessary to study what the 
terms “causation”, “knowledge” and “race” mean? This chapter is concerned 
with a first idea that raises this question. I will call it the subject change thesis: 
if the meaning of a term changes, the subject matter that is being addressed 
changes. This thesis suggests an affirmative answer to the question. 
 The subject change thesis is sometimes invoked to support the need to 
analyze the meaning of the core terms of an inquiry into the nature of things. 
We need to study the actual meaning of “pain” or “morally responsible” in 
order to settle the subject matter of an inquiry into pain or moral responsibility 
(see e.g. Jackson [1998] 2008, 30, 38, 48, 118; Alexander and Weinberg 2007, 
58). 
Moreover, the subject change thesis is sometimes used to criticize an 
account that seems revisionary. Someone who addresses a question about race 
in the ordinary sense of “race” and answers using a technical notion of “race” 
that is quite different from the ordinary notion seems to be merely changing 
the subject (see e.g. Haslanger 2006, 106). He does not tell us whether 
discrimination based on race is widespread in academia, but whether 
discrimination based on race* is widespread. In both contexts, subject change 
appears as a bad thing.  
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 The aim of this chapter is to argue that there is an important beneficial 
form of subject change via meaning change.  I will start by spelling out 
different variants of the subject change thesis. For a clearer understanding of 
what the subject matter of a debate is, I will draw on David Lewis’s (1988) 
notion of the subject matter of a statement and explain why this notion of 
subject matter is more promising than extant alternatives. It will appear that 
meaning change is, indeed, sufficient for subject change. However, as I will go 
on to argue, subject change is not always a bad thing. There is an important 
beneficial form of subject change due to meaning change. It occurs when we 
improve the meaning of terms in the light of our aims. The account of 
terminological revision or improvement that I will develop is a version of 
Carnap’s method of explication, updated in order to accommodate current 
themes and challenges. Such terminological improvements change the subject 
matter in a beneficial way because they adapt it to our aims. They do not 
provide a better understanding of the (potentially confused) subject matter that 
is being debated, but specify the subject matter that we should be focusing on 
given the aims we hope to attain.  
This conclusion casts doubt on how the subject change thesis is used 
to defend conceptual analysis or empirical research into the current meaning of 
terms and to criticize revisionary accounts. The question is not so much 
whether an account is changing the subject, but whether there is good reason 
for the suggested change. As a result, attention to words is required in order to 
settle the subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, this does not 
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necessarily mean that we need to examine the current meaning of terms. It can 
be beneficial to revise the meaning of terms and thus the subject matter of 
inquiry.  
In the last section, I will consider a potential concern with the Lewisian 
notion of subject matter. This notion is formulated in the framework of 
possible world semantics and is therefore liable to a number of difficulties that 
go under the heading of “hyperintensionality”. Roughly, the question is 
whether the notion is fine-grained enough to account for certain differences in 
subject matter for example, between necessarily true statements.  
1.1  The Subject Change Thesis 
The aim of this section is to clarify the subject change thesis and set forth 
different possible interpretations. Here are some recent manifestations of the 
subject change thesis. In his defence of conceptual analysis, Frank Jackson 
urges:5  
As Lewis Carroll said through the character of Humpty Dumpty, we are 
entitled to mean what we like by our words. But if we wish to address the 
concerns of our fellows when we discuss the matter—and if we don’t we will 
not have much of an audience—we had better mean what they mean. We had better, 
that is, identify our subject matter via the folk theory of rightness, wrongness, goodness, 
badness, and so on. (Jackson [1998] 2008, 118, my emphasis; see also [1998] 
2008, 30, 38, 48) 
 
Haslanger defends her account of race as follows: 
 
I will argue, first, that the constructionist is not changing the subject, or changing our 
language [...]. Second, I will argue that although the constructionist suggests 
that we come to a new understanding of our concepts, this does not require 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For a similar argument, see also Peter F. Strawson (1963, 504–505). 
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replacing our old concept with a new one, but understanding our original concept 
better. (Haslanger 2006, 106, my emphasis) 
 
Griffin identifies the following potential concern with his revision of the 
notion of a human right: 
And if a stipulation for the term ‘human right’ yields a very different 
extension from that in the Enlightenment, why think that it is the best 
stipulation? Why think even that it explains the term we set out to explain in 
the first place? Does it not just change the subject? (Griffin 2008, 28) 
 
In a survey paper on experimental philosophy, Joshua Alexander and Jonathan 
Weinberg identify essentially the same concern: 
Philosophical practice is not concerned with understanding the nature of 
knowledge (or belief, freedom, moral responsibility, etc.) in some technical 
sense, but of knowledge as the concept is ordinarily understood outside of 
strictly philosophical discourse and practice. If it were concerned only with 
the technical sense of the concept, it would be divorced from the concerns 
that led us to philosophical investigation of the concept in the first place and 
its verdicts would have little bearing on those initial concerns. As such, large 
and central swaths of philosophical practice must be concerned with the 
ordinary concepts. (Alexander and Weinberg 2007, 58) 
 
Two general variants of the subject change thesis emerge from these quotes: 
 
(1) The subject under discussion changes if the meaning of a core 
term changes.  
(2) The subject under discussion changes if a core concept is replaced.  
 
I will set aside variant (2) and its relation to variant (1) because this inquiry 
focuses on terms rather than concepts. Variant (1) can be interpreted in 
different ways depending on what semantic views we adopt. I will focus on 
two common views. We could adopt a semantic externalism on which the 
 25 
meaning of a term is nothing but the referent, understood as what a term 
applies to in the actual world and everything possible that has the same nature. 
On this view, the referent and thus the meaning of “water” is H2O. What 
competent speakers associate with water⎯for example, that it is the thirst-
quenching liquid in rivers and lakes⎯is not part of the meaning. The resulting 
thesis is the following: 
 
(1.1) The subject under discussion changes if what a core term refers to 
changes.  
 
According to this thesis, a change in what speakers associate with the referent 
alone would not effect a subject change. Alternatively, we can adopt a semantic 
internalism on which the meaning of a term is more than its referent. We could 
maintain that the properties or application conditions competent speakers 
associate with a term are part of its meaning, namely, its intension. The 
resulting subject change thesis is the following: 
 
(1.2) The subject under discussion changes if the intension of a core 
term changes, that is, the application conditions speakers associate 
with it. 
 
This thesis is stronger than the first one. What people associate with a term can 
change even if its referent does not change. A linguistic community can keep 
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referring to H2O with the term “water” even if the properties they associate 
with water change, for instance, from “the thirst-quenching liquid in wells” to 
“the thirst-quenching liquid that comes from taps”.   
 In order to further clarify these variants of the subject change thesis, it 
is important to spell out what a subject matter is such that it could change due 
to a change in meaning.  Subject matter is a somewhat neglected topic in 
philosophy, but a few interesting proposals have been made. An obvious idea, 
suggested by Gilbert Ryle (1933, 10–12), is that a statement is about the things 
it mentions, that is, the things the terms in it refer to. The statement “Billy goes 
to school” is, for example, about Billy and about school. Unfortunately, this 
proposal fails. As Nelson Goodman (1961, 4) has pointed out, statements are 
often about things they do not mention. “All children go to school” is also 
about Billy who is one of these children, but it does not mention him. As 
Goodman (1961, 4) goes on to argue, it does not help to suggest instead that a 
statement is about the things its entailments mention. This proposal allows us 
to say that “All children go to school” is about Billy because it entails “Billy 
goes to school”, which mentions Billy. However, the proposal leads to many 
unwanted subject matters as well. “Billy goes to school” entails “Billy goes to 
school or elephants can fly”. Hence, the statement “Billy goes to school” is 
about elephants. This is clearly an unwanted result. 
Lewis (1988, 11–14) has offered a more promising proposal. What do 
all statements about the same subject matter have in common? They obviously 
differ in content and truth-value. Moreover, they do not all mention the same 
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thing. However, their truth-value at a world supervenes on the same respects 
of this world. In consequence, when two worlds are exactly alike with respect 
to a certain subject matter, a statement about this subject matter has the same 
truth-value at both worlds.6 This suggests a simple test for what a statement is 
about. We simply ask what the respects are such that changes in these respects 
at a world might affect the truth-value of the statement at this world. The 
statement “Human rights are universal” is about human rights because changes 
in how things are at a world with respect to human rights might affect the 
truth-value of this statement at that world. For the same reason, the statement 
“Scepticism is mistaken” is about knowledge even though it does not mention 
it. Arguably, changes in how things are with respect to knowledge at a world 
might affect the truth-value of this statement at that world. Notably, a 
statement has always several subject matters in this sense. “Billy goes to 
school” is about Billy, but also about school, about who goes to school, about 
whether Billy goes to school etc.7  
What is the appeal of the framework of possible world semantics in 
this context? In such a framework, possible worlds are maximally specified 
ways the world might be. Using statements, we can communicate, amongst 
other things, what the world might be like in some respect or another. This is 
compatible with a whole range of ways the world might be like in all respects, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For the sake of simplicity, I focus on subject matters statements are entirely about. Lewis also 
discusses how statements can be partly about a subject matter, and things are more 
complicated in these cases.  
7 Yablo (2012, lecture 1) insists that a statement must have one unique subject matter. I do not 
share this impression. It seems quite natural to say that a statement has a number of more or 
less general subject matters. 
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that is, with a range of maximally specified ways the world might be. Hence, 
the content of a statement can be modelled as a set of possible worlds. “Billy 
goes to school” picks out the set of all possible worlds in which Billy goes to 
school. When evaluating its truth-value, we consider whether the actual world 
is among these worlds in which Billy goes to school. What the actual world is 
like in other respects and hence which of these worlds it is does not matter. 
On the Lewisian notion, the subject matter of a statement has to do 
with its content, that is, with what it represents the world as being like. When 
evaluating statements about a subject matter, we consider how the world might 
be with respect to the subject matter in question. We can lump together all 
possible worlds that are exactly alike with respect to that subject matter. That 
they differ in other respects is irrelevant because it is irrelevant for the truth-
value of statements about the subject matter at issue. As a result, a subject 
matter partitions logical space into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
regions. This is because “being exactly alike with respect to subject matter SM” 
is an equivalence relation; it is reflexive (every world is exactly alike to itself 
with respect to SM), symmetric (if world w1 is exactly alike to w2 with respect 
to SM, then w2 is exactly alike to w1 with respect to SM) and transitive (if w1 is 
exactly alike to w2 and w2 is exactly alike to w3 with respect to SM, then w1 is 
exactly alike to w3 with respect to SM).  
An important  specification concerns how we conceive of logical space, 
that is, in what sense of “possible” we talk about possible worlds. I will work 
with the assumption that epistemically possible worlds matter where subject 
 29 
matters are concerned. This means that we evaluate ways the world might be 
like for all we know. All possibilities we can conceive independently of what the 
world is actually like are relevant for the subject matter of statements. 
However, I will also discuss how a different decision on this matter would 
affect the argument. 
The subject change thesis concerns not so much the subject matter of 
individual statements, but the subject matter of a debate. Therefore, it is useful 
to point out that subject matters in the Lewisian sense cannot only be raised by 
making statements, but also by posing questions if we conceive of the content 
of questions in a certain, popular way. In this view, the content of a question is 
a partition of logical space into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
regions where the worlds in each region agree on the answer to the question.8 
The content of the question of whether Billy goes to school is a partition of 
logical space into two regions, into the worlds in which Billy goes to school 
and the worlds in which Billy does not go to school. This is the same partition 
that is invoked by the subject matter whether Billy goes to school. This is how 
a question raises a subject matter.  
How can we use the Lewisian notion of subject matter to assess 
whether the subject matter of a debate changes if the meaning of a core term 
changes? A subject matter in Lewis’s view attaches primarily to statements. As 
I have shown, we can easily extend the view such that questions raise subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Partition semantics for questions have been suggested by, e.g., Higginbotham and May (1981) 
and Belnap (1982). 
 30 
matters in this sense as well. I suggest the following way to test whether the 
subject matter of a debate changes due to meaning change. We assess whether 
statements that use the changed term address a subject matter raised by a 
question that contains the original term; that is, we assess whether these 
statements invoke the partition invoked by the question. Thus, we assess, for 
example, whether the statement “Discrimination based on race* is widespread” 
addresses the subject matter raised by the question “Is discrimination based on 
race widespread?”, posed before the change in meaning. 
1.2  Meaning Change Without Subject Change? 
The task for this section is to assess variants (1.1) and (1.2) of the subject 
change thesis. To begin with, note that these variants clearly do not state a 
necessary condition for subject change. Subject changes happen very often 
without changes in meaning; for example, when people talk first about the 
weather and then go on to discuss the upcoming elections. Hence, the question 
is whether variants of the subject change thesis state a sufficient condition for 
subject change.  
1.2.1 Assessing Variants of the Subject Change Thesis 
Let me start with the weaker variant (1.1): The subject under discussion 
changes if what a core term refers to changes. Take the notorious example 
“fish”. In the early nineteenth century, “fish” was still commonly applied to 
whales. Let us assume that what speakers associated with the term fish was 
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“animals with fins living in the water” and that the term actually applied to 
whales (people were not systematically mistaken in their application of the 
term to whales). Let us assume, furthermore, that scientific discoveries have 
induced a change in the meaning of “fish”. The properties associated with the 
new term “fish*” are “animals that live in the water and share certain 
biologically salient features”. Whales are not part of the extension of this term. 
Did this change in meaning effect a change in subject matter?  
 The test that I have suggested at the end of the previous section is to 
take a debated question that contains the original term and assess whether 
statements using the revised term address the subject matter it raises, that is, 
invoke the same partition. The question “Have some species of fish become 
extinct?” raises the subject matter whether some species of fish have become 
extinct. This subject matter partitions logical space into two regions, worlds in 
which this is the case and worlds in which it is not. Does a statement using the 
revised term fish* like “Some species of fish* have become extinct” address 
this subject matter? It does not because it invokes a different partition.  
Take two worlds w1 and w2 such that in w1 no species has ever become 
extinct and in w2 all and only species of whales have become extinct. These 
two worlds are in different regions of the partition invoked by the question; w1 
is in the regions with worlds in which no species of fish has become extinct 
and w2 is in the regions with worlds in which some species of fish have 
become extinct, namely, all species of whales. By contrast, these two worlds are 
in the same region of the partition invoked by the statement that contains the 
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revised term fish*. They are both in the region with worlds in which no species 
of fish have become extinct. This vindicates subject change thesis (1.1): The 
subject under discussion changes if what a core term refers to changes. 
How about the stronger thesis (1.2)? Does the subject under discussion 
change if the intension of a core term changes? Let us consider a case in which 
the intension but not the referent changes in order to keep this thesis separate 
from thesis (1.1). Suppose that, at some point in time, the intension of the 
term “water” was “the thirst-quenching liquid in wells”. At a later stage, when 
water wells were no longer used, this intension changed and what speakers 
came to associate with the term “water*” was “the thirst-quenching liquid that 
comes from taps”. It so happens that the thirst-quenching liquid in wells and 
the thirst-quenching liquid that comes from taps in the actual world is H2O. 
Hence, “water” and “water*” have the same referent, but different intensions. 
Is this change in intension alone sufficient for subject change?  
Take the question “Is there water on Earth?”, which raises the subject 
whether there is water on Earth. Does a statement using the revised term 
“water*” like “There is water* on Earth” address this subject? It does not if we 
take subject matters to partition epistemically possible worlds. For all speakers 
know a priori, there are possible worlds that are exactly alike with respect to 
whether there is water on Earth, but differ with respect to whether there is 
water* on Earth. Take two worlds w1 and w2 such that there is no H2O and 
nothing in the wells in either of these worlds. However, the thirst-quenching 
liquid XYZ is coming from taps in w2. These two worlds are in the same 
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region of the partition invoked by the question “Is there water on Earth?” 
because they are exactly alike with respect to the stuff in wells. But they are in 
different regions of the partition invoked by the statement “There is water* on 
Earth” because they differ with respect to the thirst-quenching liquid that 
comes from taps. The partitions invoked are not the same and hence the 
subject matter changes. This vindicates subject change thesis (1.2): The subject 
under discussion changes if the intension of a core term changes. 
Notably, it is possible to hold on to the claim that terms have 
intensions, but reject the stronger subject change thesis (1.2) and maintain that 
only (1.1) provides a sufficient condition for subject change, that is, that only a 
change in referent is sufficient and not a change in intension alone. However, 
this move is only available if we assume that only metaphysically possible 
worlds are relevant for subject matters and not the larger set of epistemically 
possible worlds. If we focus on metaphysically possible worlds alone, there are 
no possible worlds that are exactly alike with respect to water, but differ with 
respect to water*. These terms have the same referent H2O and, in all 
metaphysically possible worlds, the thirst-quenching liquid in wells and the 
thirst-quenching liquid that comes from taps is H2O. Therefore, metaphysically 
possible worlds cannot differ with respect to water without differing with 
respect to water*. The partitions invoked by the question “Is there water on 
Earth?” and the statement “There is water* on Earth” is the same; the subject 
matter does not change due to the change in intension because the referent 
remains the same. 
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The result of this assessment is that the weaker variant (1.1) of the 
subject change thesis has been vindicated; the subject under discussion changes 
if what a core term refers to changes. The stronger variant (1.1) can be 
confirmed if we grant that terms have intensions and that subject matters 
partition epistemically possible worlds. In this view, the subject under 
discussion changes even if only the intension of a core term changes. 
1.2.2  Precisification: A Borderline Case 
Are there not cases in which the referent changes to such a limited extent that 
the subject under discussion does not change? Sometimes we merely render a 
term more precise for the purpose of theorizing. Does this really change the 
subject? 
 An important question regarding human rights is whether some human 
rights are violated. In his recent book on human rights, James Griffin (2008, 2) 
highlights that the traditional term “human right” is too vague and addresses 
questions concerning human rights using a precisified term “human right*”. 
Does he address the questions that are under discussion or change the subject? 
 The question “Are some human rights violated?” raises the subject 
whether some human rights are violated. Since the ordinary term “human 
right” is vague, it is not entirely clear how this subject matter partitions logical 
space. When a term is vague, there are borderline cases such that it is not clear 
whether the term applies to them. The right to work is such a borderline case; 
it is not clear whether the traditional term “human right” applies to it. As a 
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result, it will be unclear for some pairs of worlds whether they are exactly alike 
with respect to whether some human rights are violated. Suppose that the only 
difference between worlds w1 and w2 that might be relevant to human rights is 
that in w1 all people are granted the right to work whereas in w2 only men are 
granted the right to work. Does this difference mean that the two worlds are in 
different regions of the partition invoked by the question or in the same 
region? Different precisifications of the term “human right” will yield different 
answers. One way to understand the partition invoked by the question that 
contains the vague term “human right” is as a set of closely similar partitions, 
corresponding to different precisifications of the term. 
Griffin (2008, 206) defines “human rights*” such that the right to work 
does not fall under it; other borderline cases are decided as well. Does the 
statement “Some human rights* are violated” address the subject matter raised 
by the question above? It is not entirely clear whether the result is that Griffin 
addresses the subject matter raised by the question or not. On the one hand, 
we could argue that this is not the case because a statement using his notion 
invokes one partition whereas the question invokes a whole set of partitions. 
On the other hand, the statement selects one partition of this set.  
In any case, the important points seems to be that, even if Griffin’s 
precisification changes the subject, this subject change does not seem to be on 
a par with the worrisome subject changes we had in mind. Rather, it might be a 
beneficial subject change; the subject that is now under discussion is more 
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precise. I will examine the idea that, more generally, subject change due to 
meaning change can be beneficial in the next section. 
1.3  A Beneficial Form of Subject Change 
The aim of this section is to argue that there is an important beneficial form of 
subject change due to meaning change. This change occurs when we improve 
our terminology in the light of our aims. This casts doubt on how the subject 
change thesis is used to defend conceptual analysis or empirical research into 
the current meaning of terms and to criticize revisionary accounts. The 
question is not so much whether an account is changing the subject, but 
whether there is good reason for the suggested change. 
1.3.1  Terminological Improvement: A Carnapian Account 
The account of terminological revision or improvement that I will develop is 
an updated version of Carnap’s method of explication. Philosophers who are 
sympathetic to terminological revision often simply refer back to Carnap’s 
account of explication (e.g. Chalmers 2011; Craig 1990; Griffin 2008; Justus 
2012; Kitcher 2007, 2008). However, his account (in particular Carnap [1950] 
1951, Ch. 1; 1963, 933–940) remains quite sketchy and, even though detailed 
interpretations that do Carnap justice and disclose the role of explication in the 
history of philosophy are on offer,9 more needs to be done in order to derive 
an account of terminological revision that is responsive to today’s themes and 
challenges. Carnap introduces the method of explication as follows:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 E.g. Carus 2007; Hanna 1968; Maher 2007; Stein 1992; Wagner 2012.   
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The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less inexact 
concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the second. We 
call the given concept (or the term used for it) the explicandum, and the exact 
concept proposed to take the place of the first (or the term proposed for it) 
the explicatum. The explicandum may belong to everyday language or to a 
previous stage in the development of scientific language. […] A concept must 
fulfil the following requirements in order to be an adequate explicatum for a 
given explicandum: (1) similarity to the explicandum, (2) exactness, (3) 
fruitfulness, (4) simplicity. (Carnap 1951, 3, 5) 
 
 
In this quote, Carnap talks about improving concepts. In other passages (e.g. 
1951, 3; 7–8), however, he talks about explicating general terms. I will focus on 
terms for the reasons set forth in the introduction. Thus, we improve terms 
that are already in use. Usually, we revise the meaning of these terms by 
stipulating criteria of application which determine how to sort hypothetical and 
actual cases. However, sometimes we change the label as well, that is, the 
sequence of sounds or letters that carry the meaning. This happens, for 
example, when we decide to split a term and want to avoid ambiguity. In such 
a case, we might choose to add a qualifying adjective like “propositional 
knowledge” and “non-propositional knowledge”. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to say that we improve terms and not just the meaning of terms. 
A remark regarding semantic commitments is in order. Carnap 
suggested the distinction between the extension and the intension of a term. 
Nevertheless, the account of terminological improvement or explication that I 
will develop remains neutral on the controversial question of whether terms 
have intensions as part of their meaning and whether speakers have a priori 
access to them. Since the aim is to improve a term, it is necessary to provide a 
basic understanding of the term to be improved. However, it suffices in 
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general to give a couple of examples, perhaps accompanied by some informal 
explanations in order to identify the term one attempts to improve. It is not 
necessary to spell out conditions that guide one’s application of the term. The 
aim is to give a sense of how the term is correctly applied. In his explication of 
the notion of a human right, Griffin (2008, 1–2, 9–14), for example, specifies 
that his main interest is in the notion of a human right as used in ethical 
assessments of our society (e.g. by the United Nations in its recent verdict that 
the United Kingdom breaches the human rights of prisoners by not allowing 
them to vote) and delineates its historical meaning as that of a right that we 
have simply by virtue of being human. In order to improve the term, we then 
go on to stipulate conditions on application. However, the idea that we can 
stipulate conditions on application does not presuppose that terms that have 
not been introduced explicitly have conditions on application as part of their 
meaning and that competent speakers grasp these.  
Once we have identified the term that we want to improve, what guides 
our revision? In the quote above, Carnap lists a couple of requirements that 
should be weighed against each other, namely, similarity, precision, fruitfulness 
and simplicity. I am inclined to think that there is no such list that fits all cases. 
Instead, I propose that the two main criteria guiding a revision are similarity 
and the aims that motivate the revision (this is in the vicinity of what Carnap 
calls “fruitfulness”). The result is a more pronouncedly pragmatic approach in 
which our aims play the key role. 
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Similarity matters because the aim is to improve a term that is being 
used rather than to introduce a new term. The relevant similarity has not 
received much attention in the Carnapian tradition. One helpful way to 
understand the required similarity is as an agreement to some extent in actual 
and hypothetical cases of application.10 Griffin (e.g. 2008, 2, 33), for example, 
defines the term “human right” as an entitlement required to protect our 
“normative agency”, that is, the distinctively human ability to choose and 
pursue a life one judges worthwhile. This explication retains the extension of 
the historical notion to a large, albeit not complete extent (Griffin 2008, 194, 
202).11  
What improvements are desirable and how much deviance from the 
initial term depends, I suggest, on the aims that motivate the revision. This 
criterion is in the vicinity of what Carnap calls fruitfulness. Carnap (1951, 7) 
claims that a term is more fruitful if it is more useful to formulate general 
statements. However, formulating many general statements is not the only use 
that we want to put a term to. Moreover, the suitability of a term to formulate 
general statements does not help decide between alternative explications of a 
term that are equally suitable to formulate general statements, but general 
statements about different issues. This will become clearer in due course. I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This idea occurs in Carnap’s (1951, 7) own account. However, I disagree with Carnap that it 
is the number of cases that matters, as will become clearer in due course (see also Goodman 
1977, 9). Another idea, which was not suggested by Carnap, is to state relations to other terms 
that should be retained. An explication of the term “knowledge” should arguably preserve 
certain relations to the term “truth”; for example, that everything that is known is true. 
11 Following Carnap, I use “explication” sometimes to talk about the process, sometimes to 
talk about the result.  
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suggest starting with the general idea that the aims that motivate the revision 
should guide it. The difficult task is then to specify these aims in a suitable way. 
In philosophy, the relevant aims are primarily of a theoretical nature 
and these will be my focus here; I will talk about the role of practical aims in 
Chapter 3. Theoretical aims have to do with providing a theory of something. 
Some suggest that we need to specify the (theoretical) role we want a term to 
play (e.g. Chalmers 2011, 538; Haslanger 2000, 33). But what does a theoretical 
role in the relevant sense consist of?  
One useful starting point is to identify the issues that we hope to 
address using the term in question.12 It seems that different issues can motivate 
different revisions because the distinctions that are salient for certain issues do 
not necessarily coincide with those that are salient for a different sort of issues. 
Take one rival explication of the notion of a human right. John Rawls’s (1999, 
§10) political notion has a considerably narrower extension than Griffin’s 
naturalistic notion; the list of human rights is considerably shorter. At least part 
of the reason is that they hope to answer different issues. Rawls’s aim is to 
address such political issues as to what extent the autonomy of other peoples 
should be respected and where to set the boundaries of international 
toleration. The distinctions that matter for this aim differ from those that 
matter for questions concerning the protection of fundamental human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Kitcher (2008, 115) makes a congenial suggestion. Importantly, the desired role of a term in 
a theory we are about to develop, which is what I am concerned with, must not be confused 
with the role identified by a conceptual analysis on Jackson’s ([1998] 2008) account. Roughly 
speaking, a conceptual analysis compiles all platitudes about some x of interest—e.g. belief or 
justice—and thus the role x plays in folk theory. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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interests. Rawls’s works, for example, with the distinction between decent and 
indecent peoples, whereas Griffin invokes the idea of normative agency as 
distinguished, for example, from rational agency.  
A problem arises if we use the very term we want to revise in order to 
frame our aims. We could suggest that Griffin’s revision of the notion of a 
human right is motivated and guided by the aim to address such issues as 
whether everyone should be granted human rights. The problem is that this 
aim does not rule out outlandish revisions because it changes together with the 
terminological revision. We could suggest to use “human rights” to refer to the 
right to access my house. This revision makes it very easy to attain our aim and 
determine whether everyone should be granted human rights (in this sense); of 
course not. However, it is clearly an unacceptable revision of the term “human 
right”; it has nothing to do whatsoever with the initial notion.  
It might be objected that such a revision is ruled out because it does 
not fulfil the requirement of similarity. This does not seem to be the best 
solution. We do not want to rule out the possibility that some aims might call 
for considerable deviance.  
A better solution is to adopt the general rule that we should not 
formulate the aims guiding a revision using the term that we attempt to 
revise.13 This notwithstanding, it can be helpful to mention the term, that is, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 What complicates matters somewhat is that terminological revisions are usually not done in 
isolation. Typically, we revise a family of interrelated core terms that are relevant for the 
theoretical aim at issue. This can make it more difficult to formulate a relevant subject matter 
without using a term that is being revised. 
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talk about the term rather than using it when stating the aims.14 An aim guiding 
Griffin’s explication could be to provide a term that refers to those rights in 
the vicinity of what we call  “human rights” that have a special moral 
significance as compared to other rights (recall that Griffin is interested in the 
notion as used in ethics). That this aim mentions the initial term “human right” 
ensures the desirable continuity with the initial terminology. Moreover, it 
renders the aim specific enough to be helpful. Note that if we formulate the 
aims in this way, we do not need to mention similarity as an additional 
requirement anymore and can focus on the aims alone as guiding a revision. 
What improvements do such aims motivate? One improvement, also 
cited by Carnap in the quote above, is to render a term more precise.15 
Theoretical aims typically require some degree of terminological precision. 
Vague terminology leads to vague claims or can even make it impossible to 
give a determinate answer to certain questions. If we understand precision like 
in section 1.2.2 above, we can say that an explication increases precision if it 
settles some actual and hypothetical borderline cases. Griffin (2008, 2) 
attempts explicitly to increase precision in this sense; his account should settle 
at least some of the notoriously contested cases of human rights.16 Such an 
increase in precision is often achieved by drawing on rather precise terms of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 On this use–mention distinction, see Quine ([1940] 1981, 23–26).  
15 I set aside epistemicism about vagueness. If we adopt such a view, to render a term more 
precise does not mean to change its meaning, but to change our understanding of it. 
16 Based on the idea that we care about relations between terms (see Fn. 6), we could also say 
that an explication renders a term more precise in that it determines some of its relations to 
other important terms. 
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theory into which the explication is introduced.17 It often takes the form of a 
definition, but, depending on how vague the initial term is or what the 
borderline cases are, something less ambitious—necessary conditions, a list of 
items in the extension, etc.—can suffice. 
Importantly, theoretical aims cannot only motivate terminological 
refinements. They can motivate more considerable terminological change. If 
Rawls and his followers are right, and the notion of a human right should play 
a key role in a debate about international toleration, then we need to redefine 
the notion of a human right in a way that differs significantly from the 
tradition. As noted earlier, in the context of this issue, the term needs to track 
other distinctions than the ones it tracks traditionally.  
Notably, to decide which distinctions a term should track in the 
context of a certain theoretical endeavour can involve considering empirical 
research. In the case of “fish” discussed earlier, the scientific endeavour 
motivated a redefinition based on empirical findings about the nature of 
whales. Hence, explication is not a distinctively a priori method. 
1.3.2  Beneficial Subject Change  
I have called attention to two ways in which the subject change thesis is used 
and, in both cases, subject change is supposed to be a bad thing. The aim of 
this subsection is to argue that, to the contrary, subject change due to meaning 
change can be beneficial. More specifically, I will argue that the Carnapian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This draws attention to the fact that explications often happen within a theoretical 
framework, which is potentially developed at the same time. 
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form of terminological improvement introduced in the last subsection changes 
the subject matter in a beneficial way. 
The relevant terminological improvements are motivated by our aims. 
If successful, they render our terminology suitable for the tasks that we hope 
to accomplish using them. They ensure that our terms track the distinctions 
that are salient in the context of our aims. As regards the subject matters under 
discussion, these terminological improvements do not provide a better 
understanding of the potentially confused subject matter that is initially raised 
in a debate. Instead, they adjust the subject matter that is being debated using 
the terminology in question to our aims; they help us raise the subject matter 
that we should be focusing on given the aims we hope to attain.  
Sometimes the terminological improvement is mainly a precisification. 
In this case, as highlighted earlier, we precisify the subject matter under 
discussion; we select one of a range of closely related partitions that were 
initially invoked. In other cases, the adjustment is more significant. In such a 
case, we introduce a partition that is quite different from the one initially 
invoked. In both cases, the terminological revision leads us to invoke a subject 
matter that is better adjusted to our aims, a partition that sorts possible worlds 
based on the distinctions that are most salient for our aims.  
When Griffin precisifies the notion of a human right for the purposes 
of addressing certain moral issues, he specifies the subject matter that we 
should focus on in the context of discussing these moral issues. When the term 
“fish” was revised for the purpose of addressing certain scientific issues, the 
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subject matter changed to the one that scientific inquiry concerned with these 
issues should focus on. 
 Not every terminological revision that serves some aim changes the 
subject in a beneficial way. As noted earlier, aims need to be formulated in the 
right way. An aim that motivates outlandish revisions leads to an outlandish 
subject change and not a beneficial one.  
 Moreover, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, not every aim is respectable. 
Some aims are less significant than others and some aims are morally dubious. 
A terminological revision that serves such an aim is dubious and does not 
change the subject in a beneficial way.  
Furthermore, an aim can be formulated in the right way and be 
perfectly respectable, but it might not be an aim that is best attained using the 
term in question. Some philosophers think that Rawls’s revision of the notion 
of a human right is motivated by an issue that should not be addressed using 
the notion of a human right. If these critics are right, the subject change 
effected by Rawls’s revision is not beneficial, but motivated by the wrong aims. 
That subject change can be beneficial casts doubt on how the subject 
change thesis is used to defend conceptual analysis or empirical research into 
the current meaning of terms and to criticize revisionary accounts. In both 
contexts, the tacit assumption is that subject change is a bad thing. We need do 
carefully analyze the current meaning of terms in order to settle what subject 
matter is debated using them and to avoid changing the subject. An account’s 
being revisionary speaks against it because this indicates that it does not 
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address what we have been discussing, but merely changes the subject. 
However, if subject change can be beneficial, these ways to argue are flawed. 
That an account is changing the subject is not a reason to reject it. The 
question is whether there is good reason for the suggested change.  
1.3.3  Weak Metaphysical Commitments  
What are the metaphysical costs of accepting the view that subject change can 
be beneficial? On the anti-realist view often ascribed to Carnap, the world is 
not objectively structured; we decide where to draw the lines. The Carnapian 
form of terminological improvement developed allows that we choose the 
distinctions our terms should track depending on our aims.18 This seems to 
suggest that this form of terminological improvement and beneficial subject 
change is only acceptable for metaphysical anti-realists. However, this is not 
the case. 
Take Theodor Sider (2011), whose metaphysical realist view that the 
world is structured in a certain objective way and whose claim that language 
should carve these “joints in nature” severely restricts the freedom to choose 
referents. Furthermore, Sider (e.g. 2011, Ch. 3.2) is inclined towards the 
semantic view that, even though our usage of terms is not always ideally joint-
carving, their meaning actually is, because objectively given kinds are more 
eligible as referents and this outweighs errors in usage (a currently popular view 
also referred to, by Sider and others, as “reference magnetism”). In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a recent discussion of different forms of language pluralism and their background 
metaphysical assumptions, see e.g. Eklund (2013). 
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combination, these views seems to render terminological improvement at best 
obsolete; there is nothing to improve because our terms already refer to the 
best candidates, they already track the joints in nature. The only improvement 
worth aspiring to is an improved understanding of the meaning of our terms. 
However, even a metaphysical realist like Sider can accept the 
possibility and usefulness of terminological improvement in some areas and to 
some extent. Thus, Sider (2011, Ch. 4.4) acknowledges that there are terms like 
“beautiful” whose meaning is arguably not joint-carving and where no more 
joint-carving candidate meaning is in the vicinity of how we use the term. In 
such a case, terminological improvement is possible and, according to Sider, is 
guided by our values. Moreover, Sider (e.g. 2011, Ch. 5.3) considers the 
possibility that our terminology in general might turn out not to be joint-
carving after all. In this case, he recommends terminological revision with the 
aim of rendering terms more joint-carving. Hence, the form of terminological 
improvement and beneficial subject change developed here is not tied to 
strong metaphysical commitments. 
1.4  A Hyperintensional Notion of Subject Matter? 
In this last section, I will explore some potential difficulties that arise for the 
Lewisian notion of subject matter. Being formulated in the framework of 
possible world semantics, the notion might be liable to a number of difficulties 
that go under the heading of “hyperintensionality”. Roughly, the question is 
whether the notion is fine-grained enough to account for certain differences in 
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subject matter for example, between necessarily true statements. I will not be 
able to resolve these intricate difficulties. My aim will be to specify what 
hyperintensionality-related difficulties might arise and sketch possible stances. 
One potential problem concerning hyperintensionality is the following. 
Some statements are true at the exact same worlds, but they cannot be replaced 
in every context without a change in truth-value. Suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that “extended” and “coloured” apply to the same things at every 
epistemically possible world.19 Take the statements S1 “Nothing extended is 
smaller than 10 cm” and S2 “Nothing coloured is smaller than 10 cm”. They 
have the same truth-value at every possible world. In consequence, they also 
share all subject matters in the Lewisian sense. On the Lewisian notion, 
something is the subject matter of a statement if the truth-value supervenes on 
it, that is, if it is not possible that the truth-value of this statement at a world 
changes while everything remains the same regarding this subject matter.  Take 
the subject matter of extended things. It invokes a partition such that the 
worlds in each region are exactly alike with respect to extended things. A 
statement like S1 has this subject matter because it has the same truth-value at 
all worlds that are in the same cell of this partition. This is also the case for S2 
because, as observed above, it is true at the same worlds as S1. Hence, it is not 
possible that the truth-value of S2 at a world changes while everything 
regarding the extended things remains the same at this world. As a result, the 
extended things are one of the subject matters of S2 “Nothing coloured is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I am borrowing this example from Yablo (2012, lecture 1). 
 49 
smaller than 10 cm”. This seems odd; it seems to suggest that the Lewisian 
notion of subject matter is not fine-grained enough to distinguish between the 
subject matters of S1 and S2..   
A similar situation arises for necessarily true statements. All necessarily 
true statements are true at the same worlds, namely, at all possible worlds. If 
we take the subject matter of a necessarily true statement that can be described 
as whether S, we get the limiting case of a partition with only one region. The 
statement “All vixens are female foxes” is necessarily true. The subject matter 
whether vixens are female foxes invokes a partition with only one region 
because all possible worlds are exactly alike with respect to whether vixens are 
female foxes; there is no possible world in which this is not the case. It is not 
clear whether we should call this a subject matter. If we do, then the oddity 
arises that it is a subject matter that is shared by all necessarily true statements. 
They all have a subject matter whether S that invokes this same limiting case of 
a partition with only one region. 
What is more, necessarily true statements do not only share their 
subject matter whether S, they share all subject matters—those that they 
intuitively have and those that they do not. This is because the Lewisian notion 
suggests that they are about every subject matter there is. Whatever partition 
we take, a necessarily true statement has always the same truth-value at the 
worlds in the same region, simply because it is true in every possible world. 
Therefore, every subject matter whatsoever passes the supervenience test and 
is thus a subject matter of a necessarily true statement.  The statement “Vixens 
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are female foxes” is not only about vixens, but also about whether it rains 
tomorrow.  
Alternatively, we could say that necessarily true statements have no 
subject matter. This seems prima facie odd. Is “vixens are female foxes” not 
about vixens? However, it might be the better option. After all, something that 
we cannot rationally disagree on is maybe not a real subject matter.  
In any case, it seems that we cannot resolve the problem without 
accepting some oddity or another. If we want to avoid all the oddities 
identified so far, we need to render the Lewisian notion of subject matter 
hyperintensional. This is likely to come with oddities as well.  
On a hyperintensional notion, statements that are true at the exact 
same possible worlds do not share all their subject matters. One potentially 
promising line of inquiry would be to consider introducing impossible worlds 
and to assume that not only possible but also impossible worlds belong to the 
logical space partitioned by a subject matter.20 Tentatively, on this approach, S2 
“Nothing coloured is smaller than 10 cm” does not have the subject matter of 
extended things because some impossible worlds that are exactly alike with 
respect to extended things and thus in the same cell of this partition are not 
exactly alike with respect to coloured things. As a result, S2 does not have the 
same truth-value at worlds within the same region of this partition.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Some philosophers have argued for the introduction of impossible worlds to interpret talk 
on counterpossibles. For an overview of the debate, see e.g. Berto 2012. 
21 For an alternative, see e.g. Yablo (2012, lecture 1). 
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The aim in this section was not to suggest that the Lewisian account of 
the subject matter of a statement fails. The aim was to draw attention to a 
difficulty that arises in some cases and that needs to be addressed. Notably, 
this difficulty arises for possible world semantics more generally and it is 
beyond the scope of this inquiry to resolve it. In any case, there are a number 
of possible approaches to the problems as they arise for the Lewisian notion of 
subject matter, but more work is necessary to assess them. 
Conclusion 
Do we need to study what our terms actually mean when we are examining the 
nature of things? This chapter was concerned with a first idea that raises this 
question, the subject change thesis: The subject matter under discussion 
changes if the meaning of a core term changes.  
This thesis is sometimes invoked in order to defend the need for 
conceptual analysis or empirical research into the actual meaning of terms. We 
need to study the actual meaning of “pain” or “morally responsible” in order 
to settle the subject matter of an inquiry into pain or moral responsibility 
Moreover, it is sometimes used to criticize an account that seems revisionary. 
Someone who addresses a question about race in the ordinary sense of “race” 
and answers using a technical notion of “race” that is quite different from the 
ordinary notion seems to be merely changing the subject. In both contexts, 
subject change appears as a bad thing.  
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 In this chapter, I have argued that even though two clarified variants of 
the subject change thesis can be vindicated, subject change is not always a bad 
thing. There is an important beneficial form of subject change due to meaning 
change, namely, when we improve the meaning of terms in the light of our 
aims. The method of terminological improvement that I have developed in the 
course of my argument is an updated version of Carnap’s method of 
explication. Moreover, I have used Lewis’s account of the subject matter of 
statements in order to clarify what the subject matter of a debate is. 
The relevant terminological improvements change the subject matter in 
a beneficial way because they adapt it to relevant aims. They do not provide a 
better understanding of the (potentially confused) subject matter that has been 
under discussion all along, but specify the subject matter that we should be 
focusing on given the aims we hope to attain. This result casts doubt on how 
the subject change thesis is used to defend conceptual analysis or empirical 
research into the current meaning of terms and to criticize revisionary 
accounts. The question is not so much whether an account is changing the 
subject, but whether there is good reason for the suggested change. 
The upshot of this chapter is that attention to words is required in 
order to settle the subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that we need to examine the current meaning of terms. It can 
be beneficial to revise the meaning of terms and thus the subject matter of 
inquiry. In subsequent chapters, I will go a step further. I will examine different 
cases in which the subject matter of inquiry needs to be settled and argue that 
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terminological revision is in these cases a more promising approach than extant 
alternatives. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Analysis and the Location Problem 
This chapter focuses on what Frank Jackson ([1998] 2008, 2–5) has termed the 
“location problem”, another problem that raises the question of how 
important it is to study the meaning of words in first-order inquiry. The 
location problem arises in the context of a metaphysical or epistemological 
project. The basic idea underlying the metaphysical project is that a complete 
description of reality does not need to mention everything. It is, for instance, 
not necessary to mention water as well as H2O. The question arises how we 
can move from findings in terms of a basic vocabulary (for example, findings 
about H2O) to claims in terms of a non-basic vocabulary (for example, claims 
about water). This matters because we care about a lot of things that are not 
mentioned in the basic description of reality or in the class of basic truths like 
water, pain, liberty or probability.   
Frank Jackson ([1998] 2008, Ch. 2) defends a certain form of 
conceptual analysis, sometimes called the Canberra Plan, as a solution to this 
problem. It is necessary to analyze the current meaning of “water” in order to 
be able to move from basic findings about H2O to claims about water; this is 
the only way to determine which subject matter in ordinary terms H2O 
findings are about. His opponents (e.g. Block and Stalnaker 1999; Kornblith 
2002; Schroeter 2006) argue that solving the location problem does not require 
conceptual analysis or, more generally, special attention to words.  
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I will be steering a middle ground between these views. I will argue that 
terminological revision in the Carnapian sense developed in Chapter 1 is the 
most promising method to clarify non-basic terms and mediate between the 
subject matter described in basic terms and its description in non-basic terms. 
It settles the subject matter of non-basic inquiry in a way that does not make it 
hostage to current terminology and avoids a number of difficulties with 
conceptual analysis. Moreover, I will argue that something important is lost if 
we neglect terminological issues altogether and that Carnapian revision might 
be an acceptable terminological endeavour for opponents of conceptual 
analysis. I will also outline how Carnapian revision is a natural and fruitful 
addition to David Chalmers’s (2012) scrutability framework even though this 
framework includes some form of conceptual analysis.  
These considerations lend further support to the view that emerged in 
Chapter 1. Attention to words is required in order to settle the subject matter 
of first-order inquiry. However, as far as the location problem is concerned, to 
examine the current meaning of terms is not the best way to do so. It is more 
fruitful to revise ordinary or pre-theoretic terminology in light of our aims and 
findings and thus determine the subject matter we ought to focus on. 
Moreover, considerations in this chapter situate my view in relation to a range 
of alternative approaches. 
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2.1 The Location Problem  
In its most general form, the location problem is the problem of how we can 
move from findings in terms of a preferred, basic vocabulary to claims in terms 
of a non-basic vocabulary (Jackson [1998] 2008, 2–5). This might include 
moving from findings about H2O to claims about water, from insights into 
brain states to claims about the mental, or from findings about non-normative 
reality to normative claims.  
The location problem typically occurs in the context of a larger 
metaphysical or epistemic project. It arises for the metaphysician who wonders 
what a description of the world would look like that is complete, but as sparse 
as possible. This description would only contain fundamental terms and 
concern fundamental reality; maybe micro-physical reality is fundamental or 
close to it. There is much to disagree on here, but it is uncontroversial that 
terms such as “liberty”, “water” or “knowledge” would not occur in this 
description. Of course, these non-fundamental phenomena would still matter 
to us. We would still care whether there is a climate change, whether there is 
enough water for everyone, or whether our beliefs amount to knowledge. The 
idea is that we can move from our description of fundamental reality to claims 
about the non-fundamental things that supervene on them. But, in order to do 
so, we need to solve the location problem; that is, we need to settle that 
findings about H2O (or something more fundamental) are the parts of the 
fundamental description that are relevant to water etc.  
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 The location problem also arises for the epistemologist who thinks 
that some kinds of truths are more basic than others and, if we knew these 
truths, we would be in a position to know the non-basic truths that depend on 
them. For example, truths about H2O are more basic than truths about water. 
The more basic truths employ a basic vocabulary and terms like “water” and 
“knowledge” do not seem to be among them. In order to move from basic 
truths to truths about water, we need to solve the location problem; that is, we 
need to settle that it is the H2O truths that are relevant to whether water covers 
most of the Earth or to whether there is enough water for everyone.  
The controversial issue this chapter is concerned with is how to solve 
the location problem and, in particular, whether this involves close attention to 
the meaning of terms.  
2.2 Jackson’s Solution: Conceptual Analysis Canberra-style  
Frank Jackson has not only coined the term “location problem”, he (e.g. 2010; 
2009; [1998] 2008; 2001a; 2001b; Chalmers and Jackson 2001) also advocates a 
method to solve it, a variant of conceptual analysis that avoids major 
objections against its traditional forerunner. This variant of analysis is 
sometimes also called the Canberra Plan. However, a variety of approaches go 
sometimes under this heading (see e.g. Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009) and 
my considerations will only apply to Jackson’s variant of conceptual analysis. 
The aim of this section is to present Jackson’s solution to the location problem 
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and highlight some of its strengths before turning to the difficulties in the 
following section.  
For Jackson, the location problem arises in the context of the 
metaphysical project outlined in the last section. In this context, the problem is 
that, given findings about basic reality stated in basic terms as part of a 
complete but sparse description of reality, how can we move to findings about 
non-basic phenomena stated in non-basic terms? For example, what can we 
say about water given a complete description of the world in a basic 
vocabulary? How do we determine that it is the H2O facts that are relevant 
such that we can move from the finding that H2O covers most of the Earth to 
the insight that water covers most of the Earth? H2O findings are presumably 
not among the most basic ones, but they are quite basic and for the purpose of 
illustration it will be helpful to treat them as basic.  
 Jackson’s solution (in particular [1998] 2008, Chs. 2, 5) involves two 
steps. The first step is a conceptual analysis that determines what we mean by 
“water” (in one sense of “mean” as will become clear in due course). The 
second step is to identify which of the basic things discovered by empirical 
research we thereby pick out. Let me spell out these steps in a bit more detail 
as it will be relevant for subsequent arguments. Moreover, it is important to 
highlight how this form of conceptual analysis differs from the traditional 
practice and thus avoids some notorious objections.  
 Jackson’s variant of conceptual analysis does not take the traditional 
form of a small set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, 
 59 
but the form of a Ramsey sentence.22 This avoids criticisms to the effect that 
our concepts or the meaning of our terms cannot be accurately captured by a 
small set of necessary and sufficient conditions.23 The basic idea is that the 
application conditions speakers associate with a term can be made explicit if 
we look at accepted statements in which the term occurs. Which statements 
Jackson takes to be relevant is not entirely clear. He ([1998] 2008, 31) notes 
that we need to appeal to “what seems to us most obvious and central”, to 
what comprises “our folk theory” of water, free will or pain. Canberra Planners 
often say that what matters are “the platitudes”, but this is somewhat 
misleading.  
Some of the non-fundamental terms we are analysing are part of a 
theory and the statements in which they occur are not platitudinous at all. 
More generally, what statements matter is a point of considerable disagreement 
among different Canberra Planners. Some include most of the accepted 
statements about an F in question (e.g. Nolan 2009). Jackson, it seems, needs 
to be more restrictive because he takes the analysis to reveal the meaning of a 
term. Hence, his analysis should be restricted to statements that only someone 
who does not fully grasp the term’s meaning would reject. As regards the term 
“water”, relevant statements could include “Water is thirst-quenching”, “Water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The method goes back to Ramsey (1931) and was further developed by Carnap (1963) and 
Lewis (e.g. 1970). For more recent developments, see e.g. Braddon-Mitchell and Nola (2009). 
23 This criticism is often based on empirical findings in cognitive psychology that suggest that 
concepts do not have such a structure; for an overview, see e.g. Laurence and Margolis 
(2003a), 190–195. Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 1999, §65–71) suggestion in the Philosophical 
Investigations that the things that fall under a concept are connected via family resemblances 
rather than sharing a small set of features can be seen as a forerunner.  
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is odourless and colourless unless it is polluted”, “Water is the stuff in rivers, 
lakes, ponds and fountains” etc. In order to derive the Ramsey sentence and 
thus the analysis of a term like “water”, we treat the folk theory as one long 
statement, a conjunction of all individual statements (see Jackson [1998] 2008, 
140–141). In this long statement, we replace all occurrences of “water” with a 
variable and quantify over it. The resulting Ramsey sentence for water is then 
something like “There is an x such that x is a thirst-quenching liquid and x is 
odourless and colourless and x is the stuff in rivers, lakes, ponds and fountains 
…” Based on the Ramsey sentence, we can derive application conditions for 
the term “water” of the form “x is water if and only if x is a thirst-quenching 
liquid, x is odourless and colourless … (i.e. satisfies the Ramsey sentence)”.  
 In order to arrive at such an analysis, we need to compile the 
statements that go into the Ramsey sentence. Jackson (e.g. [1998] 2008, 36, 38, 
64–65, 130) assumes that, even though competent speakers do not have an 
explicit grasp of most of these statements, they have at least an implicit grasp. 
This is what guides them in their application of the term. Therefore, we can 
rely on speakers’s intuitions about the application of a term to actual and 
hypothetical cases. As a result, a conceptual analysis is a priori rather than 
based on empirical research. A priority and reliance on intuitions are the core 
features that Jackson’s account shares with traditional accounts of conceptual 
analysis and what makes his method a form of conceptual analysis.  
 Importantly, unlike the traditional practice, Jackson’s approach does 
not require a complete, explicit analysis (Jackson [1998] 2008, 62–64; Chalmers 
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and Jackson 2001, 6–8). He acknowledges that explicit analyses are, as 
Edmund Gettier’s (1963) counterexamples to the traditional analysis of 
“knowledge” and the debate they have generated show, difficult to come by. 
Moreover, it might in some cases even be literally impossible to provide an 
explicit analysis because the Ramsey sentence would be infinite. What matters 
is that competent speakers can judge whether a term in question applies in an 
actual or hypothetical case described without using the term in question. Based 
on this conditional ability, we can provide an approximate explicit analysis and 
improve it continually. Note that this is precisely how the debate about 
Gettier’s counterexamples works.  
That Jackson’s variant of conceptual analysis does not require explicit, 
complete analyses avoids notorious arguments against traditional conceptual 
analysis to the effect that it is impossible to give explicit analyses, typically 
based on the observation that there does not seem to be any successful explicit 
conceptual analysis in the whole history of philosophy up until today.  
 Another strength of Jackson’s account of conceptual analysis is that it 
avoids certain powerful objections from semantic externalism. Hilary Putnam 
(1975) and Saul Kripke (1980) have argued that the meaning of terms is at least 
in part determined by factors external to speakers such as the world around 
them and the linguistic community that they are part of. This is often thought 
to speak against conceptual analysis because a priori conceptual analysis can 
only reveal what speakers grasp, but not what the world contributes. However, 
Jackson’s variant of conceptual analysis is perfectly compatible with Kripke’s 
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and Putnam’s considerations (Jackson [1998] 2008, 37–41). What is more, 
Jackson argues that Kripke and Putnam rely on conceptual analysis in some 
sense for their arguments.  
 On Jackson’s ([1998] 2008, 38–40) reconstruction, Putnam’s Twin 
Earth case relies on our intuitions about the application of “water” in different 
cases. More precisely, cases are evaluated in two different ways in that they are 
once considered as actual and once as counterfactual. When we evaluate cases 
as actual, we draw on our grasp of a term’s meaning alone and not on any 
knowledge we might (or might not) have about what the actual world is like. 
This is what a competent speaker must grasp and what, according to Jackson, 
plays a crucial role in communication. This is also what a conceptual analysis 
reveals because it is that aspect of the meaning that is known a priori. Jackson 
calls this the A-intension (“A” for actual) and what it picks out at every world 
is called the A-extension. The above analysis of “water” identifies “the thirst-
quenching liquid that is odourless and colourless etc.” as its A-intension. The 
A-extension of “water” at every world, including Twin Earth, is then the thirst-
quenching liquid that is odourless and colourless etc.  
 The second way to evaluate cases is as counterfactual. In order to do 
so, we draw on our knowledge about the nature of a term’s referent at the 
actual world. This requires knowledge about the actual world that is not 
required for competence with a term. Hence, it is not something that we can 
reveal by doing conceptual analysis. When evaluating the Twin Earth case in 
this way, we draw on our knowledge that “water” at the actual world refers to 
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H2O; this is the nature of what the A-intension picks out at the actual world. 
In this evaluation, nothing is counted as water that is not H2O. Hence, XYZ is 
not counted as water. Jackson (e.g. [1998] 2008, 47–49) calls this aspect of the 
meaning of a term its C-intension and C-extension (“C” for counterfactual).  
What Twin Earth shows, on Jackson’s reconstruction, is not that terms 
do not have an A-intension that determines the application at a world 
considered as actual. It shows, relying on our intuitions about the Twin Earth 
case and thus on the practice of conceptual analysis, that for terms like “water” 
the A-intension contains an indexical element that assigns the actual world a 
role in determining the referent. As a result, the analysis of “water” above 
needs to be amended along the following lines: “x is water if and only if x is 
the thirst-quenching, odourless, colourless stuff around here” (note how this is 
another step towards a better approximate explicit analysis).  
Let us now turn towards the second step of Jackson’s solution to the 
location problem. The first step was a conceptual analysis revealing what a 
term applies to at a world considered as actual, that is, it’s A-intension. The 
second step is to identify the C-intension, drawing on empirical findings as 
captured in a basic description of the world. Alternatively, Jackson (like his 
forerunners and other Canberra Planners) often says that the analysis identifies 
the role something like water plays, and the aim of the second step is to 
identify what on the basic level plays this role or realizes the relevant folk 
theory given by the Ramsey sentence. Several aspects of this second step will 
be discussed in more detail in what follows.  
 64 
But first let me state how the two steps together solve the location 
problem, that is, how they allow us to determine that, if we want to know 
something about water, it is the basic findings about H2O that we need to turn 
to. The first step allows us to determine a priori what we are concerned with 
when we are inquiring about water, the thirst-quenching stuff around here. The 
second step serves to identify the nature of what is at issue on the basic level 
(H2O). Hence, given a complete description in basic terms, we can work out all 
there is to know about less basic things a priori. The argument runs as follows: 
 
P1  X is water if and only if it is the thirst-quenching stuff around here. (a 
priori analysis) 
P2 H2O is the thirst-quenching stuff around here. (a posteriori finding) 
C H2O is water. 
 
This allows us to a priori deduce non-basic truths from basic ones; for 
instance, that water covers most of the Earth, from the finding that H2O 
covers most of the Earth. I will now turn to the difficulties that arise for this 
solution to the location problem. 
2.3 Difficulties with Jackson’s Solution 
This section is concerned with difficulties that arise for Jackson’s solution to 
the location problem. The considerations will not amount to a knockdown 
argument, but identify considerable difficulties.  
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A first class of difficulties arises due to flaws of current folk theory. 
Plausibly, the application conditions underlying current practice with a term are 
not always well adapted to empirical findings on a basic level. Our current 
terms might be ambiguous, indeterminate or empty with respect to basic 
referents. This raises difficulties for Jackson’s solution to the location problem. 
In his view (Jackson [1998] 2008, 30, 38, 48, 118; see also Ch. 1) we must not 
change the A-intension of terms, that is, folk theories, because this would 
merely change the subject. We want to move from basic truths to truths about 
causation, water or knowledge in the ordinary sense of these terms. Hence, we 
must retain the current A-intensions of these terms even if they appear flawed 
in the light of empirical findings. I will criticize Jackson’s strategy to invoke 
“mature folk theory” in due course.  
 Suppose we want to know whether the claim S1 “Water covers most of 
the Earth” is supported by the basic findings, that is, whether our basic 
description of the world a priori entails S1. As Jackson, in a paper with 
Chalmers, (2001, 23–24) grants, it might well have turned out that the term 
“water” has two referents on the basic level, H2O and XYZ. However, he does 
not explain how his solution to the location problem deals with such a case. 
Suppose each of the two kinds plays part of the water role; H2O is the stuff in 
our rivers and lakes whereas the stuff that comes from taps and fountains is 
XYZ.24 Moreover, let us assume the basic finding that H2O covers most of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Block and Stalnaker (1999, 16–23) consider such a possibility, but construe it somewhat 
differently such that two kinds both play the whole water role.   
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Earth. The term “water” is then either ambiguous or has disjunctive meaning. 
In any case, in Jackson’s view, we must not change its meaning because this 
would merely change the subject. Therefore, we cannot split the term “water” 
into two terms that refer to H2O and XYZ respectively. As a result, it is not 
clear whether the basic description confirms or disconfirms S1.  
If we assume that “water” has disjunctive meaning and has H2O ∨ 
XYZ as a referent, S1 comes out true. If we treat “water” as ambiguous, we 
need an additional claim about ambiguity in order to determine whether S1 is 
true. If we adopt the view that an ambiguous claim is true if it is true on at least 
one interpretation, S1 comes out true. Other views on ambiguity could be 
adopted.  Hence, we would need to provide a story about how the theory of 
ambiguity fits into our description of the world. We could argue that it is 
entailed by the basic findings or that it is a priori and independent of our basic 
empirical findings.  
In any case, Jackson’s solution to the location problem is at least 
incomplete. Moreover, as I will argue in the next section, even if we can 
confirm or disconfirm S1 once we have enriched the framework, this solution 
to the location problem is not the best solution given how our theoretical 
interests are likely to develop in such a case.   
  A related problem arises for vague non-basic terms. As Jackson 
([1998] 2008, 22) notes himself, there is bound to be considerable vagueness 
on the non-basic level. His treatment of this issue is nevertheless remarkably 
short. If I understand him correctly, he suggests that in these cases the basic 
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findings entail that it is indeterminate whether a non-basic statement is true. 
For example, basic findings that entail the exact number of hairs on John’s 
head, who is a borderline case of “bald”, entail that it is indeterminate whether 
or not John is bald. However, it remains unclear what this means. Does it 
mean that the statement “John is bald” has no truth-value? Or that it has a 
truth-value between true and false? In order to answer this question, a theory 
of vagueness is required and a story about how it fits into our complete 
description of the world. 
Another case of multiple realizers occurs when several kinds play the 
role determined by folk theory quite well. Suppose we want to know whether 
our complete, basic description of the world supports the claim S2 “More than 
10,000 species live on the Great Barrier Reef”. The folk theory of species 
could include assumptions like “Organisms of the same genus can be divided 
into different species”, “Animals of the same species share certain biologically 
significant features”, and “The number of species living in an area is a measure 
of biodiversity”.  
There are multiple accounts of species that seem to identify different 
realizers that play the species role identified by folk theory quite well. These 
accounts mainly disagree on the significant features members of a species 
share. On one account, species are groups of organisms that are reproductively 
isolated. On other accounts, species are groups of organisms that occupy the 
same ecological niche or have a shared common ancestry. Each account has its 
advantages and disadvantages and is better suited to some purposes than 
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others. Moreover, none of the identified realizers appears to be more natural 
or objective than the others.  
Whether S2 is true might change depending on which realizer we take 
to be the referent of “species”. As a result, whether the complete, basic 
description of the world entails S2 is not clear. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
a theory of ambiguity would help in this case because the different referents 
are in some sense rivals rather than being picked out by different, but equally 
accepted ways to use the term “species”.  
 Next, take a case where we have no basic realizer rather than several. 
Suppose that we want to know whether S3 “Discrimination based on race is 
widespread” is entailed by our complete and basic description of the world. 
Plausibly, the application of the term “race” was for a long time guided by the 
assumption that members of a race share certain important biological traits 
that they do not share with members of other races. Maybe an additional 
assumption guiding the application was that these traits manifest themselves in 
superficial features such as skin colour. Empirical findings suggest that there 
are no deep biological differences. If this is the case, the term “race” in its 
ordinary meaning—if reconstructed as suggested above—is not instantiated; 
hence, there is no realizer in the basic structure of the world. Therefore, the 
basic description of the world entails that S3 is false; that is, it entails that it is 
not the case that discrimination based on race is widespread. It appears that, 
on Jackson’s approach, the only option is eliminativism about race.  
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However, it is not obvious that this is the best option. Given the aim 
to fight racism, it might be more advantageous to hold on to the claim that 
discrimination based on race is widespread and revise instead the meaning of 
“race” in order to capture a phenomenon that actually exists. Sally Haslanger 
(2006), for example, suggests that “race” has a social kind as referent, roughly: 
groups of people who share certain social features such as being discriminated 
against based on superficial traits. If the idea that the members of a race share 
fundamental traits was indeed initially part of the A-intension of “race”, to 
adopt such a description would in Jackson’s view change the meaning of 
“race” and thus be ruled out. Our terminology and claims would be hostage to 
current terminology.  
Anticipating such difficulties, Jackson ([1998] 2008, 44–45, 133–135; 
2001a, 618) grants that current folk theory might not have a perfect realizer in 
many cases. He highlights that what matters therefore is “mature folk theory”, 
that is, an idealized version of current folk theory or what current folk theory 
eventually evolves into when all flaws are straightened out. Adopting this 
strategy, we could insist that the mature folk theory of water or of a species 
would not be ambiguous and the mature folk theory of race would not be 
empty. However, it is doubtful whether this strategy can succeed.  
Firstly, it remains unclear how to a priori discover mature folk theory. 
Testing our intuitions reveals current folk theory. Even if done carefully and 
over a longer period, we can at most eliminate flaws that are due to our 
insufficient understanding of our current practice. I take it that, in Jackson’s 
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view, this is the role of Gettier’s counterexamples and Putnam’s Twin Earth. 
They do not help folk theory mature, but help us discover what our current 
folk theory actually is. However, testing our intuitions when presented with a 
variety of cases will not reveal mature folk theory in the sense of a theory that 
eliminates the flaws that emerge once we make empirical discoveries about the 
realizers of folk theory. Therefore, the most promising strategy seems to 
construct mature folk theory once we have made the relevant empirical 
discoveries. However, it remains utterly unclear why we should believe this to 
be what folk theory would have evolved into. In the absence of a strong 
argument, it seems much more plausible to assume that this is a revision of 
current folk theory in light of empirical findings.  
 Secondly, as Francois Schroeter and Laura Schroeter (2009, 9–10) 
admonish, the strategy of invoking mature folk theory commits us to the claim 
that a term’s A-intension is an idealized version of what current speakers grasp. 
As a result, competent speakers would not fully grasp a term’s A-intension, not 
even implicitly. This would undermine the vital role they play in 
communication in Jackson’s view. The idea is (e.g. Jackson 2004, 266) that, 
using language, we can communicate views about what our world might be 
like. This does not require knowledge about what the world is actually like, but 
only linguistic competence. What speakers must know is how the words they 
use represent the world as being like. Hence, there has to be an aspect of the 
meaning of words that speakers know even if they do not know what the 
world is actually like. This is the role of A-intensions. This role is undermined 
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by the idea that A-intensions are mature, idealized versions of what speakers 
actually grasp. As a result, the idea of mature folk theory cannot save Jackson’s 
solution to the location problem from the difficulties set forth above that arise 
due to flawed folk theories. 
Another difficulty with Jackson’s solution to the location problem 
arises from the heavy reliance on intuitions. Jackson’s conceptual analysis does 
not share many of the problematic features of traditional conceptual analysis. 
However, it also relies on intuitions about whether a term applies to various 
actual and hypothetical cases. Proponents of so-called experimental philosophy 
have criticised this practice. I will not rehearse these notorious objections in 
any detail or take a stance on whether they are conclusive. I only want to point 
out that given how influential these objections have been, they need to be 
addressed or avoided. I will choose the second option.  
The relevant objections fall into roughly two groups (for an overview, 
see Alexander and Weinberg 2007). Objections in the first group cite empirical 
studies suggesting that intuitions are unreliable as evidence. They are found to 
be unstable and vary systematically with factors that are irrelevant to the 
classified cases such as the socioeconomic status of the intuiter, their cultural 
background or whether they consider other examples first (e.g. Nichols, Stich, 
and Weinberg 2001; Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg 2008).  
Objections in the second group do not cast doubt on the evidential 
status of intuitions, but on the way proponents of conceptual analysis collect 
intuitive evidence. Proponents of conceptual analysis like Jackson rely on their 
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own intuitions as well as on the intuitions of fellow philosophers. Proponents 
of the second objection criticise that these intuitions are not representative and 
hence cannot reveal the folk theory of causation, belief or marriage. In 
consequence, we need to do empirical research on what the folk’s intuitions 
are rather than a priori reflection on our own intuitions (e.g. Knobe 2003; 
Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner 2005).    
Jackson has not answered these objections in any detail,25 but others 
have defended the traditional use of intuitions. In answer to the first objection, 
it has been argued, for example, that the surveys used by experimental 
philosophers often do not reflect a subject’s intuitions and hence do not 
vindicate any claims about their evidential status (Bengson 2013). In answer to 
the second objection, it has been suggested, for example, that philosophers are 
better intuiters because they have been trained to distinguish between relevant 
and irrelevant aspects of cases etc. (e.g. Williamson 2011).   
    The last disadvantage of Jackson’s solution to the location problem 
that I should mention is its—unsurprising—commitment to the view that 
terms have in general A-intensions that are a priori accessible to speakers. This 
semantic internalist view is highly controversial.26 Therefore, an advantage of 
the solution that I will now propose is that it remains neutral on whether terms 
have A-intensions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Jackson considers the issue briefly in ([1998] 2008, 36–37; 2010, 184–185). 
26 Bigelow and Schroeter (2009) argue, for example, that this view relies on implausible 
psychological assumptions. Laurence and Margolis (2003b) criticize that A-intensions are not a 
priori accessible. 
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2.4 The Advantages of Terminological Revision 
In this section, I hope to show that the broadly Carnapian form of 
terminological revision developed in the last chapter is a more promising 
method to solve the location problem. 
 How can we solve the location problem using this method? The story 
will be somewhat different for different kinds of terms, but take again the 
simple example that we wish to know whether S1 “Water covers most of the 
Earth” is supported by findings on a (more) basic level. The revisionist does 
not start with a conceptual analysis, but with a more or less rough 
understanding of our current term “water”. A few examples and informal 
explanations will often suffice.27  
The next step is to identify what potential referents on the more basic 
level are in the vicinity of what we ordinarily call water. Suppose again that 
there are two kinds, H2O and XYZ. The revisionist reacts by improving the 
current term “water” in light of these findings and guided by her aims; for 
example, the very general aim to provide an empirically informed theory of 
water detailing its distribution on Earth etc. She thus introduces two terms, “so 
and so water” and “such and such water” that are stipulated to refer to H2O 
and XYZ respectively. She then goes on to use these terms instead of the 
ordinary term for her theory of water including such a claims as S1* “Such and 
such water covers most of the Earth.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This first step agrees with what other opponents of conceptual analysis recommend as a 
starting point (e.g. Kornblith 2002, 18; Laurence and Margolis 2003b). 
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 A legitimate concern is that this does not really solve the location 
problem. We have not been able to determine whether S1 concerning water in 
the ordinary sense is supported by our basic findings. All we have shown is 
that S1* concerning water in a different sense is supported by our basic 
findings. We have changed the subject. However, drawing on considerations in 
Chapter 1 regarding beneficial subject changes, we can argue that 
terminological revision provides the answer to a question in the close vicinity 
to our initial question that is for most purposes more interesting. Thus, it is 
very likely that once we discover that there are two basic kinds that play each 
part of the water role, our interests shift somewhat. We are no longer 
interested whether water in its ordinary and as it turns out ambiguous sense 
covers most of the Earth. Rather, we refine our question and ask whether so 
and so water or such and such water covers most of the Earth. That S1* “Such 
and such water covers most of the Earth” is supported by our basic findings 
addresses this refined question. Moreover, we can offer a story about how 
water so and so and water such and such relate to ordinary water and hence to 
our initial question in ordinary water terms. In addition, we can motivate the 
shift in questions and point out that this question makes more sense if we 
hope to provide an empirically informed theory of water. 
Admittedly, our interests need not shift in this way. Someone could 
insist that they wish to know whether the fundamental findings support S1 
“Water covers most of the Earth” where water retains its original meaning. 
Terminological revision does not provide an answer to this question. My point 
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is that this interest is quite peculiar, especially compared to the interest that we 
might take in the newly discovered kinds of water. Nevertheless, we sometimes 
have peculiar interests and it is therefore in order to concede that 
terminological revision gets us most, but not all, we might want when solving a 
location problem. 
 An important aspect of Jackson’s solution is that the move from basic 
to non-basic truths is a priori. Once all basic truths are discovered, everything 
else can be known a priori, drawing alone on our grasp of the meaning of 
terms. When revising terms in order to solve a location problem, this aspect is 
retained. Given the relevant basic truths, we can move to S1* a priori, drawing 
alone on our grasp of the meaning of “water so and so”. The only difference is 
that the meaning of “water so and so” has been stipulated beforehand whereas 
the meaning of “water” has not. The stipulation was sensitive to empirical 
findings, but this does not change the fact that, once we have settled on a 
terminology, we can move from basic empirical findings to the truth of S1* 
without additional empirical information.  
 Having said how terminological revision can solve the location 
problem, let us turn to the difficulties with Jackson’s solution and how 
terminological revision avoids them. It avoids all difficulties that arise from 
flaws in current folk theory that emerge when we make empirical discoveries. 
It is precisely part of the project to refine the current meaning of terms in light 
of empirical findings and our aims. I have already examined the water case and 
thus cases of ambiguity. The case of a species would be handled analogously. 
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We would ask what we need the notion of a species for and which referent is 
the most interesting one given a certain aim. This presumably would lead us to 
introduce several refined notions of a species that serve different purposes. 
Part of this could also be to discuss the relative significance of different aims; I 
will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter. Regarding the term “race”, 
eliminativism would not be our only option. If we decided that this would 
benefit our fight against racism, we could instead introduce a concept of race 
that is not empty but refers, for example, to people who are discriminated 
against based on superficial traits. 
 Moreover, terminological revision does not rely heavily on intuitions 
and hence largely avoids objections against the use of intuitions as evidence. 
Intuitions play a very modest role when we revise terms. We typically draw on 
intuitions to begin with and in order to roughly identify the terms we hope to 
improve. But as we go along, we should be prepared to give up any intuition 
about the applicability of a term if this renders the term more suitable for our 
aims. Thus, faced with a Gettier case showing that knowledge in the ordinary 
sense is not justified, true belief, the important question is whether retaining 
this definition of “knowledge” or refining it by adding further conditions is 
more suitable for our epistemological aims.  
 Furthermore, my account of terminological revision, as highlighted in 
Chapter 1, remains neutral on the controversial issue of whether terms have A-
intensions that speakers can access a priori.  
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The last advantage arises from the conjuncture, noted in the last 
section, that we can typically not give complete, explicit analyses of the current 
meaning of terms. By contrast, when revising terms, we can always be given an 
explicit and complete account; if we choose to, we can even give a revisionary 
definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This has certain 
advantages; for example, that it avoids undetected variations in meaning 
between different speakers and confusions that arise from it. One possible 
kind of confusion, verbal disputes, will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
A legitimate question is whether terminological revision is the more 
promising approach to the location problem in all cases. After all, some non-
basic terms might be in good shape such that no refinements are required in 
the light of empirical findings. However, we do not know whether this is the 
case until we have assessed the case at issue. Therefore, I suggest approaching 
every case as a case of terminological revision. The cases in which no 
refinement is actually necessary will be limiting cases in which the attempt to 
revise only reveals a term’s current meaning. Treating it as a case of 
terminological revision will at least confirm that they are well suited to our 
purposes. Note that it will presumably be difficult to determine whether some 
case is a limiting case because giving a complete, explicit analysis is difficult.   
2.5 Methodological Naturalism and Why Words Matter 
Opponents of conceptual analysis are methodological naturalists of a certain 
flavour. They reject the use of conceptual analysis in order to solve the location 
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problem and argue that empirical research is all we need. There are two 
influential camps. On the one hand, there are those who agree that close 
attention to the current meaning of terms is required, but claim that we need to 
do empirical research instead of relying on our own intuitions and those of our 
colleagues. On the other hand, there are those who argue that attention to 
terms is not required at all. 
 I will not discuss the first camp.28 The core of my argument against 
conceptual analysis as a solution to the location problem is that what our terms 
currently mean does not matter much. This speaks likewise against the need 
for empirical research into the current meaning of terms in order to solve the 
location problem. Note that this remains neutral on the aptness of such a 
project in other contexts; for example, where language is itself the subject 
matter.   
 Proponents of the second camp argue that reductive explanation of 
water facts in terms of H2O facts via the a posteriori identification water=H2O 
does not require conceptual analysis (e.g. Block and Stalnker 1999, 13–23; 
Schroeter 2006; Kornblith 2002, 18). I will not take a stance on whether the 
objections to conceptual analysis provided in this context are successful. My 
aim is to argue that they do not apply to terminological revision as a solution to 
the location problem. Moreover, terminological revision provides something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Views in this camp are defended, e.g., by Knobe (2003) or Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, 
and Turner (2005). For an overview, see e.g. Alexander and Weinberg (2007, 61–62). 
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proponents of this camp neglect, namely, an alternative way to attend to our 
terms.  
 Proponents of the second camp reject Jackson’s semantic internalism 
and the view that terms have A-intensions that speakers grasp a priori and that 
can be made explicit by conceptual analysis. The common core of their 
arguments against the view that reductive explanation requires conceptual 
analysis is reminiscent of Willard V. O. Quine’s (1951a) arguments in Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism. It goes as follows.  
The a posteriori identification water=H2O does not involve a priori 
knowledge of semantic facts, namely, the grasp of application conditions or A-
intensions that are spelled out or drawn upon when doing conceptual analysis. 
The reason is that whatever we ascribe to or associate with a referent, including 
the most central and obvious aspects––what Jackson calls a folk theory––we 
are ready to revise it if we make relevant empirical discoveries. Hence, these 
ascriptions do not constitute conceptual truths that are justified a priori, but 
empirical assumptions that are revised as we go along. Put differently, they do 
not capture a part of the meaning of our terms—what Jackson calls A-
intensions—but our empirical assumptions prior to more thorough empirical 
investigation.  
Moreover, when we revise these assumptions due to empirical findings, 
we typically do not change the meaning of a term, precisely because these 
assumptions do not capture an aspect of the meaning. Meaning, thus the 
externalist assumption, depends on the referent and the referent remains the 
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same, whether we describe it as H2O or water. Put differently, speakers can be 
presented with actual and hypothetical cases and judge whether a term applies 
as Jackson claims. But their judgement does not reflect an a priori knowledge 
based on linguistic competence. In light of relevant empirical findings, speakers 
might revise their judgement. This typically does not indicate a change in 
meaning; rather, what speakers are revising is their a posteriori theory of the 
phenomenon in question. 
 Proponents of this camp also provide an alternative story of what 
happens when we develop reductive explanations (Block and Stalnaker 1999, 
8–9).29 Thus, we start with some paradigmatic case of water in order to identify 
the phenomenon we are interested in. However, we are prepared to revise even 
these initial judgements regarding paradigmatic cases. We then go on to do 
empirical research into the nature of the phenomenon we are interested in and 
end up concluding that the phenomenon we ordinarily call water is identical to 
the phenomenon we describe as H2O in a scientific context, that is, water= 
H2O. 
  Terminological revision as a solution to the location problem is not 
liable to the core argument against conceptual analysis because it remains 
neutral on whether terms have A-intensions that speakers grasp a priori. On 
the part of speakers, it only requires that they can give some examples and 
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29 Schroeter (2006) provides a more detailed story that includes a certain semantic view, the 
“jazz” or “improvisational” account of meaning (see Ch. 3 below). However, whether we 
adopt this more elaborate story does not affect my argument here. 
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given up in the course of a revision (see also Ch. 1). As noted above, the 
opponents of conceptual analysis grant this much. Moreover, terminological 
revision presupposes that we can introduce conditions on application by 
stipulation for a given context. That we do this all the time in science, 
philosophy, the law and elsewhere should not be too controversial, especially 
once we see that we can treat these conditions on application as capturing the 
referent (or the C-intension) rather than suggesting an A-intension and that 
these stipulations are not arbitrary, but typically influenced by empirical 
findings as well as our aims. 
 My view is in tension with the methodological naturalism at issue here 
as regards the view that changes in judgements of actual and hypothetical cases 
in the context of reductive explanation typically do not indicate a change in 
meaning. This methodological naturalism assumes that we focus on the same 
referent or phenomenon throughout and work towards a description of it in 
more basic terms. Together with the externalist assumption that the referent is 
all there is to the meaning of a term, this implies that there is typically no 
change in meaning. What changes in most cases is only our theory of the 
phenomenon in question as we learn more about it.  
However, if my considerations in section 2.3 are on the right track, 
there are a significant number of cases in which this argument does not apply. 
These are the cases in which the referent changes because we discover, for 
example, that there are two phenomena rather than one in the vicinity of how 
we apply an ordinary term like water. I have argued above that, if we do not 
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have a special interest in ordinary terms, the most natural reaction in such a 
case would be to introduce two new water terms that are stipulated to refer to 
the two newly discovered kinds. Once we acknowledge this possibility, a need 
to care for terms emerges that is independent of the need to analyse folk or 
pre-theoretic terms. Rather, the question is how to adapt our non-basic terms 
in the face of basic empirical discoveries. My account of terminological 
revision is a proposal on how to approach this question. How much this 
question and our approach to it matters will be discussed in more detail in 
subsequent chapters, especially Chapters 3 and 5. 
 Another tension between my approach and the methodological 
naturalism outlined above concerns the a priori. I have argued that if we do 
terminological revision in the context of reductive explanation, we retain an a 
priori aspect. Methodological naturalists reject the idea that any a priori aspect 
is involved together with the need for conceptual analysis. However, the a 
priori aspect that I acknowledge does not seem to be liable to their criticism. 
Their arguments are against a priori knowledge that draws on speakers’ grasp 
of a term’s A-intension. The a priori aspect that I acknowledge does not 
presuppose A-intensions. Rather, the idea is that once we explicitly introduce 
application conditions for a term within a context, we can move from basic 
findings to certain non-basic claims drawing on these application conditions 
alone and without further empirical support. 
 I should highlight that this section has focused on a specific form of 
methodological naturalism. There are other variants of methodological 
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naturalism at which my arguments are not directed. As noted in the 
introduction, my own approach is a form of methodological naturalism in the 
sense that something very similar to it is used in the sciences. 
2.6 Terminological Revision and Chalmers’s Scrutability Framework  
Earlier, I have outlined projects in which the location problem arises. David 
Chalmers’s scrutability framework, developed in Constructing the World (2012), is 
primarily a variant of the epistemological project. The location problem that 
arises in the context of this project is solved via a special form of conceptual 
analysis that is even weaker than Jackson’s. The aim of this section is to show 
that terminological revision is not only compatible with this solution to the 
location problem, but a natural addition to it that has the potential to 
strengthen the scrutability framework. In order to illustrate the last point, I will 
consider Chalmers’s (2005, 2012, ex. 15) anti-sceptical argument to the matrix 
scenario and argue that, if we adopt the tool of terminological revision into the 
scrutability framework, we can answer a quite natural objection to it.  
 The A Priori Scrutability Thesis is at the heart of the framework (2012, 
Ch. 4): There is a compact class of truths from which all truths are a priori 
scrutable. A sentence S (in non-basic terms) is a priori scrutable from C 
(conjunction of sentences in basic terms) for a subject s if s is in a position to a 
priori know the material conditional if C then S. 
 For my purposes, it will not be necessary to go into more detail about 
many intriguing aspects of this thesis—for example, what the compact truths 
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are or why we are talking about sentences rather than propositions. My focus 
will be on the role of conceptual analysis and how it solves the location 
problem. Jackson’s form of conceptual analysis is weaker than the traditional 
idea. It does not require that we can make the definition fully explicit; 
approximations suffice. Moreover, the definitions in questions are not 
supposed to take the form of a small number of individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions, but the form of a (potentially infinite) Ramsey 
sentence. The analysis that matters for a priori scrutability is even weaker. 
Definitions in any sense are not required; not even a bi-conditional is involved. 
Scrutability only requires that a competent speaker a priori knows material 
conditionals with a description of a scenario in non-F terms in the antecedent 
and a judgement on whether this would be a case of F in the antecedent. This 
is precisely the ability we rely on in attempts to develop explicit analyses or 
criticise them, for example, in the debate about Gettier cases (see Chalmers 
2012, Ch. 1.3). 
According to Chalmers (2012, Ch. 1.4), this conditional ability reflects a 
term’s primary intension, which shares certain important features with what 
Jackson calls a term’s A-intension. What matters in the given context is that 
primary intensions are not definitions or descriptions of any form, but 
functions from, roughly, epistemically possible scenarios (ways the world could 
be that we cannot rule out a priori) to extensions.  
This case-by-case conditional analysis solves the location problem in 
that it allows us to identify descriptions in a basic vocabulary as water 
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descriptions. How could this be compatible with my idea that we often revise 
terms in the course of solving the location problem? The answer to this 
question emerges from Chalmers’s (2012, ex. 9) answer to the objection that 
the scrutability framework cannot accommodate conceptual dynamics, that is, 
the way concepts or the meaning of terms develop and change over time. 
Thus, what matters for a priori scrutability is that, at any point in time, we can 
move from basic truths in the compact class to non-basic truths. For this aim, 
it suffices that at any given time, a competent speaker has the conditional 
ability to judge a priori whether a scenario described in non-F terms is a case of 
F. By contrast, it does not pose a problem if these judgements change over 
time due to terminological changes (or, for semantic externalists, changes in 
what a speaker associates with a referent). Terminological revision is simply an 
intentionally induced form of conceptual dynamic. The conditional ability 
required for a priori scrutability is preserved at any time. Before the revision, 
speakers rely on their grasp of the initial term and after the revision, they rely 
on explicitly stipulated application conditions. Notably, in a paper on verbal 
disputes that started as an additional chapter of Constructing the World, Chalmers 
(2011, 564) mentions explicitly that some of his considerations support the use 
of Carnap’s method of explication, the traditional forerunner of my method of 
terminological revision.30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 He makes further remarks pointing in this direction in Constructing the World (e.g. 2012, Ch. 
8.2, ex. 9). 
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 Terminological revision is not only compatible with the scrutability 
framework, it might even prove to be a fruitful addition to it. In order to 
support this suspicion, I will consider Chalmers’s (2005, 2012, ex. 15) 
argument against the sceptical Matrix Hypothesis and show how the idea that 
it can be fruitful to revise terms in the course of inquiry allows us to answer a 
natural objection to it.  
 The Matrix Hypothesis is in effect a version of the well-known 
sceptical hypothesis that I might be a brain in a vat, shown in colourful detail 
in the film The Matrix. If the Matrix Hypothesis turns out to be true, I am and 
always have been in a matrix; my brain receives inputs from and sends outputs 
to a computer system that simulates everything I see, feel and experience, 
including my body. This is commonly seen as a sceptical scenario because it 
seems that, if it turned out to be actual, I would be massively deluded; most of 
my beliefs about the world including myself would be false. I would not have a 
body, I would not be going to the office, I would not be drinking juice, sitting 
in the sun etc. Instead, I would be a brain in a lab connected to the matrix. 
 Chalmers (2005, 4–13) argues that the Matrix Hypothesis is not a 
sceptical hypothesis at all but instead a metaphysical hypothesis about the 
underlying nature of reality. If I came to accept this hypothesis, I should not 
conclude that I do not have hands or that I am not sitting in the sun. Instead, I 
should conclude that the world around me including my own body has a very 
different nature from what I thought. The statement “I have hands” would not 
be false; the referent of “hands” would just be very different in nature from 
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what we thought. After all, we have discovered many surprising things about 
the nature of reality around us: for example, that material objects are 
composed of tiny particles like atoms and molecules, and none of it has led us 
to conclude that all these things were illusions; we have simply acquired more 
knowledge and corrected our mistaken views about their nature. The Matrix 
Hypothesis is comparable to these cases, only larger in scale.  
 A quite natural objection to this argument is to insist that if the Matrix 
Hypothesis is true, I do not have hands, at least not in the ordinary sense of 
“having hands”. We can hold on to the statement “I have hands” as true, but 
only if we accept that this statement means something else than it normally 
does. We are, in some sense, changing the subject.  
 For semantic externalists, it seems easy to resist this objection. They 
can simply highlight that the meaning does not change so long as the referent 
remains the same. In the case at issue, the referent of “having hands” remains 
the same before and after the discovery. All that changes is what speakers think 
about the referent, the properties they associate with it.   
 However, this answer is less convincing if we accept primary intensions 
as part of the meaning of an expression that is a priori accessible to speakers. If 
we accept this assumption, the meaning changes even if the primary intension 
alone changes without a change in referent. That “having hands” undergoes a 
change in meaning of this sort in the matrix scenario cannot clearly be ruled 
out. It is not entirely clear whether the matrix scenario actually conflicts with 
part of the primary intension of “having hands”, that is, with how speakers 
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judge scenarios they cannot rule out a priori. However, we cannot clearly rule 
out that this is the case. If it was the case, we could only hold on to the claim 
“I have hands” as true on pain of changing its meaning, namely, its primary 
intension.  
In fact, Chalmers (2012, Ch. 5.5–5.7) provides a test for changes of 
meaning, that is, primary intension, across time. In my view, this test cannot 
clearly rule out the possibility that if we hold on to the claim “I have hands” as 
true on the supposition that the Matrix Hypothesis is true, the primary 
intension of this sentence changes. Chalmers’s test goes as follows (I simplify 
somewhat). The initial assumption is that the intension of a sentence S is true 
at a scenario w for a subject s if s’s conditional credence in S given D (a 
canonical specification of w) is 1. We can then formulate the following 
criterion for a change in meaning: A subject s’s intension for S changes 
between t1 and t2 if and only if there is a scenario w with canonical 
specification D such that s’s credence in S given D changes from 1 to 0 or vice 
versa. Let us apply this test to the case at hand. Take the statement “I have 
hands” and your credence in this statement given a description of the matrix 
scenario when it was first introduced. Most people’s credence seems to be low; 
they are inclined to think that if this scenario is actual, I do not have hands. 
The scenario strikes them as sceptical. Now compare this to your credence in 
the statement S given a description of the matrix scenario after you have 
decided, as per instruction, to hold on to this statement as true. Your credence 
will now be high. This change from low to high indicates a change in meaning.  
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 Chalmers’s answer to this objection (in conversation) was that our 
initial intuitive judgements are not always right; we sometimes make up our 
mind upon reflection. His anti-sceptical argument and his analogies are 
supposed to enable such reflection. This reflection should lead us to have a 
high credence in S given D to begin with, that is, at t1. 
 I am not sure how convincing I find this answer. However, this does 
not matter very much. If we allow for terminological revision in the light of 
new findings, we have an alternative answer to fall back on. We simply accept 
that, after confirming the Matrix Hypothesis, we can hold true “I have hands” 
only if we revise the meaning of “having hands”. “Having hands” now means 
to receive certain simulations from the matrix. This might involve a subject 
change in the sense developed in Chapter 1. However, it would be a beneficial 
subject change. The change in meaning would be well motivated by our 
findings. Moreover, we would not lose anything we really care about.31 After 
all, the matrix scenario is qualitatively indistinguishable from my present 
situation. I would just as well use my hands to write this chapter, stroke my 
dog’s soft fur or make handstands and it would not feel or look any different 
to me.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Chalmers (2012, Ch. 8.2) himself makes a similar point regarding the potential use of 
revisionary definitions. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on what Frank Jackson ([1998] 2008, 2–5) has termed 
the location problem, another problem that raises the question of how 
important it is to study the meaning of words in first-order inquiry.  
The location problem concerns the question of how we can move 
from claims in a preferred, basic vocabulary to claims regarding the macro-
phenomena that often interest us in philosophy like liberty, causation or 
knowledge. This problem arises in the broader context of an attempt to give a 
complete, but sparse description of reality or to identify a class of compact 
truths that put us in a position to know all other truths.  
I have identified difficulties with Jackson’s solution via a certain form 
of conceptual analysis and I have argued for the advantages of terminological 
revision. In answer to opponents of conceptual analysis who claim that special 
attention to language is not required in order to solve the location problem, I 
have suggested that they neglect important terminological issues. Moreover, 
terminological revision of the form I advocate might be an acceptable 
terminological endeavour for them. Finally, I have explained how the solution 
I recommend is compatible with and even a fruitful addition to Chalmers’s 
scrutability framework even if this framework includes a form of conceptual 
analysis. In order to illustrate my point, I have argued that Chalmers’s 
argument against a sceptical reading of the Matrix Hypothesis can be defended 
against a natural objection if we allow for terminological revision in the course 
of philosophical inquiry. 
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These considerations provide further support for the view that 
emerged in Chapter 1. Attention to words is required in order to settle the 
subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, to analyze the current meaning 
of terms is not the best way to do so. It is more fruitful to revise ordinary or 
pre-theoretic terminology in light of our aims and findings and thus determine 
the subject matter we ought to focus on.  
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Chapter 3 
Clarifying Evaluative Terms: The Case of Terrorism 
Normative inquiry is often not about words; it is about liberty or justice rather 
than “liberty” or “justice”. However, when the terms used in these inquiries are 
unclear to an extent that hinders fruitful debate, they seem to require attention. 
In this chapter, I take up the methodological challenge posed by these terms as 
another case that raises the question of how much words matter in first-order 
inquiry.  
Like in the other chapters, my focus is terms rather than concepts. 
However, since many relevant discussions refer to concepts—for example, 
discussions about “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1956)—I will 
sometimes refer to “concepts” for the sake of terminological continuity.  
The main example to illustrate my considerations will be “terrorism”, 
which has been said to be “one of the most contested concepts” (Held 2004b, 
62).32 The standard approach to clarify this and other evaluative concepts or 
terms is traditional conceptual analysis or a cognate descriptive method. Thus, 
the aim is to provide an account that captures the actual meaning of the term 
based on intuitions about its application to actual and hypothetical cases. The 
qualification “traditional” should mark the difference to the more recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Coady (2004b, 37, Fn 1) cites a source from 1984 that estimates over one hundred 
definitions.   
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variants of conceptual analysis defended by Frank Jackson and David 
Chalmers as discussed in Chapter 2.  
I will not rehearse notorious objections against traditional conceptual 
analysis in any detail. Instead, I will present the Carnapian form of 
terminological revision developed in earlier chapters as an alternative way to 
clarify evaluative terms that avoids these objections; in particular, objections 
concerning the reliance on intuitions as evidence and the vulnerability to 
counterexamples. This approach is revisionary rather than descriptive. The 
core question is not so much what terms like “terrorism”, “liberty” or 
“discrimination” really mean, but what they ought to mean given certain 
aims.33 Some of the considerations in this part of the chapter will be familiar 
from Chapter 2 and I will simply apply them to the special case at hand.  
As noted in previous chapters, my revisionary approach admits of 
language pluralism to some extent, namely, where different aims require 
different revisions of the same initial term. Nevertheless, as I will argue, it does 
not vindicate the idea that some evaluative concepts are “essentially contested” 
(Gallie 1956). 
A further advantage of my revisionary approach is that it provides 
terms that are better suited for our aims. This advantage is prima facie also 
reason for serious concern, namely, that terminological revision violates an 
uncontroversial requirement of neutrality. My approach seems to promote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Even though a descriptive approach to evaluative terms is the standard, revisions of some 
evaluative terms have recently been defended. For example, James Griffin (2008) proposes a 
revision of the notion of a human right and Philip Kitcher (2007) suggests a revision of the 
notion of race.  
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terms that are biased towards certain aims and hence lends itself to opportunist 
exploitation. I attempt to answer this concern and refine the account of 
terminological revision developed in previous chapters in a way that is 
responsive to the concern at hand. Thus, the real problem does not seem to be 
a lack of neutrality, but potential dubious aims and a lack of transparency. The 
resolution of the first problem ultimately depends on the very general issue of 
how to assess the respectability and significance of theoretical aims and 
practical endeavours. 
I will also provide reason to think that the idea to study the 
phenomenon rather than the words we use to talk about it, advocated for 
example by proponents of the “jazz account of meaning” (e.g. Haslanger 2010; 
Schroeter and Schroeter 2009), will in the cases at issue not avoid 
terminological issues, but support the need for terminological revision instead.  
The focus of this chapter is evaluative terms. The class of what I call 
evaluative terms does not have very clear boundaries. What I have in mind are 
terms that carry a positive or negative assessment like the terms “liberty”, 
“beauty”, “peaceful”, “murder”, “cruel”, “discrimination”. Whether they are 
thin or thick⎯purely evaluative or with descriptive aspects⎯does not matter 
for my purposes. Moreover, I will not take a stance on whether the evaluative 
aspect is part of their semantics or pragmatics. What motivates my 
classification is that the clarification of these terms seems to raise some worries 
that do not arise in the same way for non-evaluative terms. 
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 When is an evaluative term unclear to such an extent that it requires 
special attention?  Terminological clarity is a matter of degree and there is most 
likely not a clear-cut boundary. Tentatively, an evaluative term is unclear to an 
extent that hinders fruitful debate when it is either highly indeterminate or 
contested. I will assume that a term is indeterminate when there are cases for 
which it is not determined whether the term applies. I will say that a term is 
contested when several accounts are on offer that propose conflicting 
conditions on application.  
The upshot in this chapter will be that the view developed in previous 
chapters applies to the case of contested evaluative terms as well. Attention to 
words can be required in order to settle the subject matter of first-order 
inquiry. However, it is more promising to revise terms in light of our aims than 
to analyze their current meaning. 
3.1 Clarifying the Concept of Terrorism: Revision Instead of Analysis 
The term “terrorism” is evaluative in the sense outlined above; it carries a 
negative assessment of cases thus classified. Moreover, it is unclear to such an 
extent that it is a hindrance to fruitful debate and therefore requires 
consideration. As Tony Coady (2004a, 3) puts it, “too many debates about 
terrorism are at cross-purposes because of radical confusions about exactly 
what is being discussed”. Take, for example, the UN's “Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism” that has been under negotiation for 
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many years, and the debate is deadlocked; one of the main obstacles appears to 
be an agreed definition of terrorism (see e.g. Deen 2005).  
Despite their differences, parties share at least a rough understanding 
of what the term in need of clarification means. They agree on some 
paradigmatic cases like the events of 11 September in New York or the 2006 
train bombings in Mumbai. A fairly innocuous informal characterization might 
be that terrorism is the “use of violence and intimidation, especially for 
political purposes” (Oxford Student’s Dictionary). What parties disagree on is 
how to further clarify the meaning of this term.  
In this section, I will introduce two widely differing accounts of 
terrorism—Tony Coady’s and Virginia Held’s—that are both intended to be 
largely descriptive, and show how they can be reconstructed in the context of a 
revisionary approach. The task for subsequent sections will be to argue that 
this reconstruction provides a way out of the impasse the current debate has 
reached.  
Coady defends a rather narrow account drawing on just war theory. 
According to him, terrorism is “the organised use of violence to attack non-
combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or their property for political 
purposes” (Coady 2004b, 38). Held (2004b, 68), in contrast, defends a wider 
account of terrorism as “political violence that usually spreads fear beyond 
those attacked, as others recognize themselves as potential targets”.  
Coady and Held are not entirely explicit about their methodology, but 
they seem to adopt the standard approach and aim for a conceptual analysis of 
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the term based on intuitions about whether actual and hypothetical cases 
classify as terrorism. Coady (2004a, 3–4) notes that “there are certain contours 
to the confused public outcry about terrorism that can give purchase for 
conceptual analysis” and demands that “the success of any such analysis must 
be judged […] by its degree of fit with such contours”. Held (2004b, 64) 
criticises definitions that treat the targeting of non-combatants as a necessary 
condition on the grounds that some incidents “would not be instances of 
terrorism, and yet they are routinely described as examples”. One of the 
intuitive counterexamples she mentions is that the 9/11 attacks on the 
Pentagon, in contrast to the attacks on the World Trade Centre, would not be 
a case of terrorism on such an account. The two accounts are thus attempts to 
better understand what the term actually means in the hope that this resolves 
indeterminacy and contestation to a sufficient extent. 
Alison Jaggar (2005, 205) formulates the standard approach more 
generally in terms of a desideratum of conservativism according to which “a 
good account [of terrorism] disturbs existing usage as little as possible”. 
Admittedly, some philosophers including Coady acknowledge the need 
for “a dose of stipulation” (Coady 2004a, 3; Jaggar 2005, 205). Others, like 
Held (2004b, 68), admit at least that their account deviates from current usage 
in some cases. However, this is typically seen as an unavoidable concession due 
to ideological, political, and polemical distortions of current usage (see e.g. 
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Coady 2004a, 3; Rodin 2004, 752–753; Scheffler 2006, 1). The aim remains 
descriptive.34  
The approach that I will put forth conceives of the problem differently. 
In order to clarify the meaning of “terrorism”, we need to revise it in a suitable 
way. Hence, indeterminate and contested cases are decided based on 
considerations other than fit with intuitions and current usage. As a result, the 
revisionary approach avoids notorious objections to conceptual analysis, 
namely, regarding its reliance on intuitions and a vulnerability to 
counterexamples, and has further advantages. Hence, it opens up new, fruitful 
ways to defend and criticize different accounts of terrorism and thus provides 
a way out of the current impasse. 
On the revisionary approach developed in earlier chapters, the crucial 
question is how we should revise a term’s current meaning. What motivates 
and guides terminological revision is the aims one hopes to attain using the 
term in question. Hence, the first task is to formulate the relevant aims. This 
then allows us to identify desirable terminological improvements. Philosophers 
in the debate about terrorism agree what work they want to put the term to. 
Coady summarizes:  
There are two central philosophical questions about terrorism: What is it? 
And what, if anything, is wrong with it? Here I propose to deal with the first 
question, but I do so because of the importance of the second. (Coady 2004a, 
3) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 An exception is Reitan (2010) who considers the possibility of terminological revision for 
the limited purpose of policy making.  
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Thus, the general aim that could guide a philosophical revision of the term 
“terrorism” is, tentatively, the theoretical aim to address moral issues regarding 
terrorism such as whether it can ever be morally justified.  
The aim guiding a revision or aspects of it can be implicit in (part of) 
the current use of the term in question; thus, the term “terrorism” is already 
used in moral inquiry, but it proves to be too unclear for this endeavour. In 
other cases, a term is put to new work. I discussed an example of this in 
Chapter 1, namely, John Rawls’s (1999) use of the notion of a human right to 
answer the question of when it is in order for a state to interfere in the political 
affairs of another. The notion of a human right had not been used before in 
attempts to answer this question.  
At any rate, special care is required in formulating the aims that guide 
terminological revision (see also Ch. 1). The tentative aim, as I have formulated 
it, is problematic because it would justify outlandish revisions. Take an account 
that defines terrorism as the infliction of pain on a person as an unavoidable 
part in the process of healing them. This revision would plausibly help us attain 
our aim. For example, the answer to the crucial question of whether terrorism 
is ever morally justified is obviously yes. But this revision is certainly 
unacceptable. What the revised term picks out has nothing to do whatsoever 
with what we currently classify as terrorism. Adopting this terminology would 
change the subject matter radically and randomly. A subject change due to 
meaning change is only acceptable if it is well motivated. 
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As suggested in Chapter 1, a simple move to avoid outlandish revisions 
is to formulate the aims without using the very term we want to revise. 
However, it can be helpful to mention the term in order to highlight the 
desired continuity with our current way of speaking and make the aim specific 
enough to be helpful. Another helpful way to foster this continuity is to 
identify the relevant genus; that is, in this case, forms of politically motivated 
violence. As a result, our aim could be to provide a term that facilitates an 
assessment of the moral status of that form of politically motivated violence 
that is somewhere in the vicinity of what we ordinarily call terrorism.35 As we 
will see later, not only the more formal aspects of the aims guiding 
terminological revision require careful attention. The aim that we hope to 
attain using the term “terrorism” seems perfectly respectable, but not every 
aim is. 
What terminological improvements does the specified aim call for? 
Generally put, we need to draw a clearer boundary between terrorism and 
other forms of political violence such as war or political assassination. This is 
an improvement descriptive approaches hope to attain as well (e.g. Coady 
2004a, 3; Jaggar 2005, 205). After all, what motivated a terminological 
endeavour in the first place was the extent to which the current term is 
indeterminate and contested. What distinguishes the revisionary from the 
descriptive approach is how we hope to attain this improvement. On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Even though this aim should be fairly uncontroversial, some would object that terrorism is a 
form of violence, but should not be subsumed under forms of politically motivated violence 
(e.g. Jaggar 2005, 206). I will neglect this complication because it does not affect my overall 
argument. 
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descriptive approach, the hope is that a better understanding of the current 
meaning suffices (maybe together with a minimal dose of stipulation). On the 
revisionary approach, to give the meaning of the term clearer contours is part 
of the more general aim to render the term more suitable for moral inquiry. In 
consequence, it allows for a stipulative decision on how to draw a clearer 
boundary based on what distinctions are taken to be morally salient.36 The core 
question is then not so much what the term really refers to and which 
distinctions it actually tracks, but whether there is a referent with distinctive 
moral features in the vicinity that the term should pick out in order to facilitate 
moral inquiry. The idea is that a clear boundary in terms of morally salient 
distinctions rather than in terms of whatever distinctions the current term 
happens to track makes it much easier to assess the moral status of terrorism. 
What revision we recommend depends on which distinctions we take 
to be morally relevant in the cases at issue; for example, whether we accept that 
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in the sense of just 
war theory is a morally relevant distinction in general and applicable in 
paradigmatic cases of terrorism in particular. If we use Coady’s and Held’s 
considerations as a basis for the task of revising our current term in the light of 
the specified aim, we arrive at radically different proposals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I will not take a stance on the issue of whether there are any moral properties or the issue of 
whether moral terms can be fully analysed in non-moral terms. I count any distinction or 
feature as “morally salient” or “morally relevant” if the moral status of the phenomenon in 
question supervenes on it. I will sometimes also talk of a “distinct moral profile” and mean a 
characterization in terms of morally salient distinctions that distinguishes terrorism from other 
phenomena in its vicinity.   
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Coady’s considerations suggest that there is a form of political violence 
with a distinct moral profile in the vicinity of what is ordinarily called 
terrorism: roughly, political violence directed at non-combatants in the sense 
of just war theory. If he is right, this is what our revised notion of terrorism 
should pick out. To this aim, we could put forth his account as a revision and 
defend it on the grounds that it better tracks the distinct moral category in the 
vicinity of what we ordinarily call terrorism and is thus more suitable for moral 
theory. This revised notion of terrorism would allow for a straightforward 
assessment of the moral status of this form of political violence based on its 
distinct moral profile.  
Held’s considerations, on the other hand, suggest that there is no form 
of politically motivated violence with a distinct moral profile in the vicinity of 
what we currently call terrorism. She claims explicitly that “rather than being 
uniquely atrocious, terrorism most resembles small war” (Held 2004b, 59) and 
that the difference between terrorism and war is a matter of scale. If Held is 
right, this leaves us with two options for a revisionary approach. One option is 
to reject the possibility of providing a revision that is better suited for moral 
inquiry on the grounds that there is no morally distinct referent in the vicinity 
of our current notion of terrorism. If we want to provide a term that picks out 
a category with a distinct moral profile, it would have to be more 
encompassing. Moral inquiry would then discuss terrorism as a subcategory of 
a more encompassing category of political violence whose members share the 
morally salient features.  
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The other option is to insist that even though there is no referent with 
a distinct moral profile, there are morally salient gradual distinctions between 
terrorism and other forms of political violence that spread fear beyond those 
attacked. If this view can be vindicated, we could provide a revised term for 
moral inquiry that picks out a distinct moral category, namely, violence that 
spreads fear beyond those attacked of a certain, morally distinct scale.  
Moreover, it has been argued that the core feature of Held’s account—
spreading fear beyond those attacked—is, pace Held, a morally salient feature 
that gives terrorism a distinct moral profile (e.g. Goodin 2006; Scheffler 2006; 
Waldron 2004). If this is right, we could propose Held’s account without 
additional clause as a revision.  
The revisionary approach admits of a language pluralism of some form. 
In particular, it admits that different aims might require different revisions of 
the same initial term. Philosophers use the term “terrorism” in moral inquiry. 
In contrast, legal theorists focus on legal issues such as how to deal with 
terrorism in international or national law. Other theoretical interests would be 
historical or sociological questions. These different theoretical interests might 
well call for somewhat different specifications of the phenomenon because the 
distinctions that are relevant for moral assessments do not necessarily coincide 
with those that are relevant for other theoretical concerns.37 A legal theorist 
might, for instance, place more emphasis on whether terrorism classifies as an 
ordinary crime, an organised crime or a war crime and whether a terrorist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Rodin (2004, 755) makes a congenial suggestion. 
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necessarily lacks remorse. More generally, this suggests a pluralism according 
to which there can be several theoretically interesting referents in the vicinity 
of a pre-theoretic term.38  
How far this “reasonable pluralism” goes depends on intricate semantic 
and metaphysical issues that cannot be discussed here.39 However, at least one 
important limitation on this language pluralism will become clearer in due 
course, namely, regarding respectable aims. Moreover, there might be a 
considerable practical pressure to agree on a revised term across different 
contexts; for example, different legal systems and maybe even across moral 
and legal contexts.  
This pluralism might appear to suggest an affinity to W. B. Gallie’s 
(1956) much debated idea of “essentially contested concepts”.40 According to 
Gallie, essentially contested concepts are moral concepts that do not have an 
agreed general use, but different uses that can be rationally defended. None of 
these uses should be ruled out according to Gallie because they reflect 
rationally defensible moral perspectives. Hence, it is not even desirable to 
“decontest” (Freeden [1996] 1998, 76) the concept. It has been repeatedly 
suggested that the concept of terrorism might be essentially contested in 
roughly this sense (Held 2004b, 62; Fletcher 2006, 911; Reitan 2010, 255).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Kitcher (e.g. 2008; 2007) defends such a pluralism about, among others, the concept of race. 
Furthermore, Chalmers (2011, 539) ponders such a pluralism about philosophical concepts 
more generally. 
39 Rawls ([1993] 2005, 54–58) has coined the term “reasonable pluralism” for cases in which 
there are several reasonable but irreconcilable moral views.  
40 For an overview of the debate, see e.g. Collier et al. (2006). 
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However, my account does not support the idea that the concept of 
terrorism or any other evaluative concept is essentially contested. The 
revisionary approach admits that different revisions of an initial concept can be 
rationally defensible if these serve different respectable aims. But each of these 
concepts should be rather precise, consistent and uncontested. Thus, whereas 
my pluralism has the aim to resolve the tension, Gallie’s approach asks us to 
accept it. Whereas my pluralism aims for clarification, the concept remains 
messy on Gallie’s approach. My pluralism seeks decontestation without 
silencing respectable perspectives whereas Gallie rejects decontestation 
altogether.  
In the remainder of the chapter, I will argue for the advantages of the 
revisionary approach over a largely descriptive one and defend it against the 
concern that it violates the uncontroversial requirement of neutrality. This will 
also accentuate the differences between these two approaches to clarify 
evaluative concepts or terms. 
3.2 The Advantages of Terminological Revision 
The first advantage of the revisionary approach is that it is not liable to 
notorious objections to conceptual analysis, namely, objections concerning the 
reliance on intuitions as evidence and the vulnerability to counterexamples. 
This advantage has been discussed as a general advantage of my 
methodological approach over traditional and updated forms of conceptual 
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analysis in Chapter 2. I will briefly recap the points that are relevant to the 
particular case at issue here.  
One of the objections concerns the heavy reliance on intuitions as 
evidence. Conceptual analysis relies on intuitions about whether a term applies 
to actual and hypothetical cases. I will not take a stance on whether the 
arguments against the use of intuitions as evidence are sound. My point is that, 
given how influential they have been, it is an advantage of the revisionary 
approach that it largely avoids the problems they might raise. Particularly 
relevant to the cases at issue here are empirical studies suggesting that 
intuitions are unreliable as evidence. They are found to be unstable and vary 
systematically with factors that are irrelevant to the classified cases such as 
socioeconomic status, cultural background or whether someone considers 
other examples first (for an overview, see Alexander and Weinberg 2007). In 
the case of terrorism, this problem, if it actually obtains, is likely to be quite 
pronounced since, as Waldron (2004, 34) highlights, “linguistic intuitions are 
entangled with political prejudices”.  
The revisionary approach is not liable to this problem because it does 
not place much weight on intuitions. Unlike conceptual analysis, terminological 
revision does not capture the current meaning of a term, but provides a 
successor that only has some continuity with the current term. As a 
consequence, intuitions about actual and hypothetical cases play at most a very 
modest role. Intuitive counterexamples can only cast doubt on a revision if it 
cannot be justified by reference to our aims. Suppose that some account of 
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terrorism applies to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, but not to 
the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon. This seems counterintuitive. However, this 
would not necessarily speak against the account understood as a revision of the 
current term, namely, if it turned out that the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre share morally distinct features with other cases of terrorism whereas the 
attack on the Pentagon lacks some of these features. Re-drawing the 
distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence, even 
though counterintuitive, would be advantageous for moral inquiry in this case 
because it would classify cases of political violence together that actually share 
morally distinct features.  
Another notorious objection against conceptual analysis is that it is a 
hopeless endeavour because we can find some counterexample to every 
analysis. Jeremy Waldron (2004, 6) therefore cautions that “it would be wrong 
to hold out much hope that philosophical inquiry might yield a canonical 
definition of the term, one that would be generally accepted”. The course of 
the current debate about terrorism supports this pessimism. Waldron (2004, 7) 
therefore decides to discuss definitional issues, but without the aim of actually 
arriving at a definition. However, this pessimism loses much of its bite if we 
aim for a revisionary definition (or a revision of a less ambitious form). As 
highlighted above, counterexamples do not speak against a revision as long as 
they can be justified in terms of desirable improvements.  
Admittedly, we can also avoid the objection if we settle for a messy, 
disjunctive analysis that tracks every intuitive judgement. However, a revision 
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has a crucial advantage over any messy analysis, namely, that it is more suitable 
for our theoretical purposes.  
Firstly, a revision, being designed to serve theoretical aims, is likely to 
be simple and non-disjunctive and therefore more suitable for our theoretical 
aims. Secondly, a messy analysis is likely to provide less determinate and 
consistent application conditions than a revision that is designed to render the 
term more determinate and consistent. Thirdly, a revision is likely to put us in a 
better position to attain our aims—for example, the aim to assess the moral 
status of terrorism. This is precisely what it is designed for. By contrast, a 
messy analysis that reflects current usage is likely to assemble morally salient as 
well as not morally salient features and maybe even a variety of morally salient 
features that do not admit of a unified assessment. This makes it much more 
difficult to assess the moral status of the phenomenon thus picked out.  
At this point, it might be interjected that there is a descriptive approach 
that does not have the noted disadvantages. This approach aims to describe the 
phenomenon rather than the meaning of the terms we use to describe it. The 
important question is what terrorism really is and whether it really has morally 
distinct features (e.g. Scheffler 2006). The mistake was to focus on language at 
all. However, if my suspicion can be vindicated and there actually are several 
theoretically interesting referents in the vicinity of what we currently call 
terrorism, the question of which of them terrorism really is would seem 
misguided. Moreover, even if we could establish what terrorism really is, we 
would still have the terminological problem this chapter is concerned with. We 
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would still need to agree on a terminology for future debates about terrorism 
in order to avoid confusion. We would have two options; either we claim that 
the phenomenon we have identified is what the term “terrorism” should refer 
to or we argue that it is what we have been referring to all along.  
A more general proposal in metaethics that supports the latter option 
has gained some influence recently. It is based on the so-called 
“improvisational” or “jazz” account of meaning (e.g. Haslanger 2010; 
Schroeter and Schroeter 2009). I will not discuss this proposal and its semantic 
underpinnings in detail. Instead, I will cast some doubt on the support it can 
lend to a descriptive approach to evaluative terms.  
The proposal agrees with Scheffler (2006) that we need to focus on 
phenomena rather than concepts or terms. In addition, proponents claim that 
findings about the relevant phenomenon are findings about what we have been 
referring to all along. The relevant semantic assumptions in the background are 
(e.g. Haslanger 2010, 178–181; Schroeter and Schroeter 2009, 15–18) that the 
referent is all there is to the meaning of a term and that reference is established 
not via a fixed description shared by all speakers, but via a shared practice 
where everyone has the intention to coordinate with others and with past 
practice. This bears some resemblance to how the members of a jazz quartet 
achieve musical coordination when they improvise; hence the label “jazz” or 
“improvisational” account of meaning. They do not rely on a common score 
but on a shared commitment to incorporate everyone’s individual contribution 
into a coherent musical structure (see Schroeter and Schroeter 2009, 16). In 
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this view, the properties speakers associate with a referent are not part of the 
meaning and evolve with the effort to coordinate with others and as we gain 
knowledge about the referent. An account of terrorism on this view would be 
descriptive, but arguably not messy as it would not capture our flawed, shifting 
and potentially distorted usage, but the underlying phenomenon that we are 
co-referring to. Gaining knowledge of the actual referent would then 
presumably resolve linguistic confusions.  
My considerations thus far are compatible with the semantic 
assumptions of the proposal, but they cast doubt on the idea that this proposal 
supports a descriptive approach to evaluative terms. Our practice with the 
term “terrorism” is beset by indeterminacy and disagreement to a considerable 
extent. If I am right, there is more than one interesting referent in the vicinity. 
Which one is the target of our shared intention to co-refer? Plausibly, our 
shared practice does not determine reference unambiguously. It seems that 
once we have discovered several interesting referents, we should disambiguate 
our notion of terrorism. This would presumably be a quite natural part of our 
shared effort to make best sense of our past and present practice as well as of 
new findings. In this case, we would not be merely discovering what we have 
been referring to all along. Note that this even holds if we adopt a strict 
externalism and claim that there is nothing else to the meaning of a term than 
its referent because the referent of the term changes. As a result, the 
improvisational proposal does not support an alternative descriptive approach 
to evaluative terms. To the contrary, it seems to be perfectly compatible with 
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the idea that we need to revise contested or highly indeterminate evaluative 
terms.  
The main aim of this section was to argue for the advantages of the 
revisionary approach over a descriptive approach to evaluative terms. 
However, the revisionary approach is not without problems. The task for the 
next section will be to answer what I take to be the most serious objection.  
3.3 From Neutrality to Transparency: A Concern Answered 
The advantage that terminological revision fosters our aims is prima facie also 
cause for serious concern. Revising evaluative terms seems to violate an 
uncontroversial requirement of neutrality. A revised term is geared towards an 
aim and hence does not provide a neutral basis for debates about substantive 
issues. The aim of this section is to answer this concern. 
The demand for neutrality manifests itself in different ways. One 
manifestation is the widespread agreement that how we conceive of terrorism 
should not foreclose an answer to moral issues (see e.g. Honderich [2002] 
2004, 96; Coady 2004b, 41; Meisels 2009, 347; Rodin 2004, 753). Held is 
particularly insistent: 
 
A way in which usage and much popular and some academic discussion have 
been unhelpful in illuminating the topic of terrorism is that they have 
frequently built a judgement of immorality or non-justifiability into the 
definition of terrorism, making it impossible even to question whether given 
acts of terrorism might be justified. (Held 2004a, 65)  
 
 The demand for neutrality also finds expression in the uncontested 
assumption that practical—in particular, political—aims should not influence a 
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philosophical account of terrorism. No philosophical account is defended on 
the grounds that it fosters certain political aims, and philosophical accounts are 
sometimes criticised as fostering a more or less hidden political “agenda”. 
Coady frames the problem in a quite general way and admonishes (2004b, 37) 
that “much discourse employing the term is highly polemical so that the act of 
defining becomes a move in a campaign rather than an aid to thought”. Meisels 
(2009, 335) admonishes that a more inclusive term like Held’s fosters the 
political aim to excuse terrorist acts in a narrower sense—e.g. Palestinian 
suicide bombings of Israeli buses—because it suggests that there is no morally 
relevant difference to other acts of political violence—e.g. military action of 
the Israeli State against Palestinians in Gaza. In return, a common charge 
against narrower accounts is, as Scheffler (2006, 2) puts it, “that it may seem 
that reliance on a narrow definition would unwittingly import an uncritical pro-
state bias”. Jaggar (2005, 205) formulates more generally a desideratum of 
impartiality; thus, any account should resist “moral arbitrariness and bias” and 
should be “impartial in the sense of not begging moral and political questions”. 
The requirement of neutrality that emerges from these manifestations 
demands in its most general form that terminological clarification should not 
be geared towards any prior substantive—for instance, moral or political—
claim. The underlying idea is that terminological clarification is prior to any 
debate about relevant substantive issues. Igor Primoratz (2004, x) states that 
the “conceptual question [of what terrorism is] is preliminary to any discussion 
of terrorism, whether in philosophy itself, in any other scholarly discipline, or 
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in public debates” (see also Coady 2004c, 772). We can then justify the 
requirement of neutrality and argue that terminological clarification only 
provides a fair basis for substantive debate if the resulting term is not distorted 
by any prior substantive claim. To use a familiar imagery, terms or concepts are 
our “reasoning instruments” (Williamson 2007, 6) and we need to sharpen 
them before putting them to work in reasoning about substantive issues—but 
certainly without bending them in such a way as to manipulate the outcome.  
 A revision of the notion of terrorism violates this requirement of 
neutrality because it reflects certain substantive decisions, namely, on what 
work to put a term to and on what the significant distinctions are that it should 
capture. It might not be obvious that the decision to revise a term for the aim 
of addressing moral issues threatens neutrality. However, if the language 
pluralism pondered above is right, and different theoretical aims require 
different revisions, then the terms we propose reflect a substantive decision on 
which things we care to investigate.41 This does violate neutrality in some way. 
That a revised term reflects a substantive view on which distinctions are salient 
is a more obvious violation of neutrality. In the case of terrorism, a revised 
term will reflect a view on such contested substantive issues as whether the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants or between states and 
non-state groups matter where terrorism is concerned.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This insight is inspired by Kitcher’s pragmatic realism about scientific categories (see e.g. 
Kitcher [2001] 2003, 46–52; 2008).  
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 Can neutrality at least be respected as regards practical, for instance, 
political, concerns? This is in principle possible so long as we have theoretical 
aims to guide our revision. However, to abstain from any practical 
considerations that influence the revision does not seem advisable. This is 
clearly the case where we aim to provide an improved term for political 
debates. Some political aims might be respectable; for instance, the aim of 
developing a coordinated international strategy against terrorism that does not 
in general favour certain states over others or states over non-state groups. 
Our revision of the term “terrorism” for the political debate should be 
designed for these aims if we want to be in a better position to attain them.  
It is debatable whether philosophers should provide a term for the 
political debate. However, there is in any case a minimal way in which a 
philosophical revision should be influenced by practical considerations. To 
classify someone as a terrorist can have severe practical consequences 
depending on who issues this classification and on who is classified—
observation, prosecution, detention etc.42 Even if philosophers do not intend 
their proposed notion of terrorism to be used in political contexts as such, it is 
very well possible that their suggestion will influence the notion used outside 
academia in some way or another. In consequence, when revising the notion of 
terrorism, philosophers should at least consider what practical consequences 
adopting their notion could have and whether that might speak against it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See e.g. also Kitcher (2003, 52–53) and Chalmers (2011, 516) who highlight that our 
classifications can have important practical consequences.  
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To sum up, any revision of an evaluative term like “terrorism” violates 
the requirement of neutrality. It reflects selective theoretical interests or 
practical endeavours and substantive assumptions on which distinctions are 
salient in light of these interests or endeavours.   
In order to defend terminological revision against this objection, let me 
first cast doubt on whether the requirement of neutrality in its most general 
form can be met at all, even if we adopt a descriptive approach. Firstly, as 
several philosophers have pointed out (see section 3.1), current usage is likely 
to be distorted by political prejudice. A descriptive approach is likely to capture 
these distortions (in particular current descriptive approaches that rely heavily 
on our intuitions) and it is therefore likely not to be neutral. Moreover, even if 
there is an undistorted meaning behind current usage and the descriptivist is 
able to capture it, it is unclear whether this meaning would be neutral in the 
most general sense. The current notion seems to come at least with the moral 
assessment that terrorism is pro tanto wrong; this is what makes it an 
evaluative term. Thus, it would seem utterly strange to insist that an act of 
political violence amounts to terrorism, but nothing whatsoever is even prima 
facie morally wrong with it.  
As concerns terminological revision, I propose that the issue to worry 
about is not the lack of neutrality, but potential dubious aims and a lack of 
transparency. First, take the problem of potentially dubious aims. It does not 
seem objectionable per se to focus on certain theoretical aims rather than 
others and to pursue political aims. A problem arises where a revision fosters 
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aims that are not respectable. To use the imagery of terms or concepts as 
instruments again, it is useful to choose an instrument—for example, a knife 
that is suited to the task we want to accomplish; for instance, one with a 
serrated rather than a smooth blade (see Carnap 1963, 938–939). What matters 
is whether a task – like cutting vegetables or killing someone—is respectable. 
There are some political agendas that should certainly not guide our 
revision of the notion of terrorism; for instance, the aim to depict one’s 
enemies as particularly reprehensible in order to justify extreme actions against 
them. The same applies to theoretical aims even if this is less obvious. Not 
every issue is equally significant and not every issue that matters in some 
context matters in a different context. Even though this basic point raises 
many controversial issues, it does not seem controversial in and of itself (see 
Kitcher [2001] 2003, 65). Even though someone might take an interest in how 
many grains of sand there are on Earth, other issues are more significant 
because a number of other theoretical issues depend on them or because they 
have important practical applications. Thus, it can be necessary to account for 
the significance of those theoretical aims that influence a revision and it is 
possible to challenge them. Moreover, even if a theoretical issue is significant 
enough, it is not always obvious whether it should be attained using the term in 
question. Some doubt, for instance, that the boundaries of international 
toleration are best settled via the notion of a human right as Rawls suggests. 
In order to avoid this problem, we need to further restrict the aims that 
can guide terminological revision, namely, to respectable aims. This restriction 
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is not merely formal, but epistemological and moral in character. Note that this 
is where I part company with Carnap and his principle of tolerance (1937, 52) 
that “everyone is at liberty to build up […] his own form of language, as he 
wishes”. In my view, which I will discuss again in Chapter 5, linguistic 
tolerance has limits; in language, there are morals. To identify criteria for 
respectable theoretical aims and practical endeavours is, of course, a very 
general issue that concerns not only the revisionist, but to some extent 
everyone who pursues theoretical aims or practical endeavours.  
Next, take the problem that arises from a lack of transparency. Suppose 
the aim guiding a revision of the term “terrorism” is respectable like the aim in 
the context of moral inquiry identified above. Another issue that greatly 
influences the revision is what the morally salient distinctions are. This is a 
substantive question for moral theory and a revision will reflect the answer, 
that is, an aspect of the moral theory one adopts. However, it is not 
objectionable per se to adopt a moral theory. A problem arises when relevant 
moral assumptions are not made explicit and put up for debate. In order to 
avoid this problem, the revisionist should care about transparency regarding 
the aims guiding a revision as well as relevant substantive assumptions 
affecting it. 
 Let me briefly look at a more particular manifestation of the neutrality 
concern that might not seem to be covered by the answer given thus far:  The 
revisionist approach paves the way for what Charles Leslie Stevenson has 
termed a persuasive definition. According to Stevenson (e.g. 1938, 337), 
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someone gives a persuasive definition if they offer a definition that changes the 
vague meaning of a notion that has strong negative or positive connotations 
and claims that this is its real meaning with the primary intention to thus 
change what people condemn or praise.43 The notion “terrorism” is, as 
Waldron (2004, 33) emphasizes, susceptible to persuasive definitions. It has 
strong negative connotations, a vague meaning and the real meaning is under 
constant debate. When we revise this notion, we change what exactly it picks 
out to suit our aims. As a result, we change what exactly we judge as bad when 
we condemn terrorism in a way that suits our aims. Hence, the revisionist is 
effectively offering a persuasive definition. 
However, this argument disregards two crucial aspects of 
terminological revision. If these are taken into account, it becomes clear that 
terminological revision does not lead to persuasive definitions. The first aspect 
is that it does not make sense to claim that a revision discloses the real 
meaning of a notion. The strongest possible claim would be that a revision is 
the most suitable one to foster the most significant aim in a certain context. 
Hence, one ingredient for a persuasive definition is already missing. The 
second, less obvious aspect is that the aims guiding a revision are made explicit 
and put up for debate. I take it that an important part of giving a persuasive 
definition is to keep your aims hidden and pretend that your definition is 
disinterestedly representing the world. As a consequence of this difference, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Stevenson actually distinguishes between a conceptual meaning that is changed and an 
emotive meaning that remains the same. I formulate his consideration in a more neutral way 
because I think that it deserves attention even if we do not accept his emotivism.    
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revision, unlike a persuasive definition, does not tell us what we should truly 
condemn. Rather, it recommends what we should worry about if we have the 
proposed aims, which are negotiable.  
To close, let me address a last residual worry with the revisionist 
approach. As quoted above, Held (2004a, 65) criticises that “they [proponents 
in the debate about terrorism] have frequently built a judgement of immorality 
or non-justifiability into the definition of terrorism, making it impossible even 
to question whether given acts of terrorism might be justified”. Similarly, many 
worry that an account of terrorism might decide important moral issues “by 
definition” (Held 2004a, 66; see also Coady 2004b, 41; Jaggar 2005, 205; 
Meisels 2009, 335; Rodin 2004, 753). The residual worry emerging from these 
quotes is that even if we accept that a clarified notion of terrorism is influenced 
by certain moral assumptions, we should certainly avoid that crucial moral 
issues concerning terrorism be turned into merely verbal issues. Consider a 
revision that defines terrorism as that form of political violence that is never 
morally justified. The crucial issue of whether terrorism is ever morally justified 
is turned into a merely verbal issue. The answer follows directly from the 
revised term. As a result, the issue will not be a substantive, debatable issue for 
a theory that employs this term. The account of terminological revision given 
thus far does not preclude such a revision.44  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 A similar, more general objection, which I will discuss in Chapter 5, is that the revisionist 
turns substantive disputes into merely verbal disputes.  
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I do not think that we can exclude undesirable revisions of this form in 
general. However, note first that even if this revision seems undesirable, it does 
not actually trivialize the issue of whether terrorism is ever morally justified or 
decide it by stipulation. Terminological revision itself is not a trivial issue or a 
mere matter of stipulation. Defending a revision involves substantive questions 
and any revision can be criticised as being based on the wrong answers to these 
questions.  
Secondly, we can preclude such a revision in any particular case by 
formulating our aims accordingly. Thus, we could refine the aim guiding a 
revision of the term “terrorism” by adding the clause that the question of 
moral justifiability should not follow from the revised term. The undesirable 
revision could then be rejected because it does not serve our aim. 
Thirdly, even if we do not adjust our aim, we can reject the undesirable 
revision on the grounds that it does not serve our aim well enough. It does not 
draw a clearer boundary between terrorism and other forms of political 
violence because it provides a criterion that is itself unclear, namely, the 
criterion of moral justifiability. As a result, the undesirable revision merely 
shifts the problem from the contested issue of whether any instance of the 
term “terrorism” is morally justified to the equally contested issue of whether 
potential instances are morally justified and thus do not actually fall under the 
term. Even though this would make it easier to assess the moral status of 
terrorism in general, it would be even less clear than it is now which cases fall 
under the term and thus have this status.  
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Furthermore, the undesirable revision could be criticized on the 
grounds that it might have unacceptable practical consequences. The term 
“terrorism” is already used in politics and public debates. Suppose we adopt 
the undesirable revision and are therefore committed to the claim that 
terrorism in the sense of our theory is never morally justified.  It is conceivable 
that this claim would be cited in politics while the theoretic concept from 
which it follows would not be adopted. The problematic result would be that 
cases that classify as terrorism on the pre-theoretic notion are automatically 
judged as morally unjustifiable whereas this is only in order for cases falling 
under the theoretic notion.  
Conclusion  
I have defended a terminological endeavour that is important for normative 
inquiry even where words are not the primary focus. The need for it arises 
when an evaluative term is indeterminate or contested to an extent that hinders 
fruitful debate.  
I have argued for the advantages of terminological revision over 
traditional conceptual analysis, the standard approach in these cases. Some of 
the considerations were applications of considerations in Chapter 2 to the 
special case at hand. Thus, terminological revision avoids notorious objections 
against traditional conceptual analysis, namely, regarding its heavy reliance on 
intuitions and its vulnerability to counterexamples. Moreover, it renders the 
term in question more useful for our aims. Finally, I have answered the 
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concern that terminological revision violates an uncontroversial requirement of 
neutrality because it promotes terms that are biased towards certain 
viewpoints. The real problem does not seem to be a lack of neutrality, but the 
potential for dubious aims and a lack of transparency. The revisionist needs to 
and can avoid both problems. Note that the same problems arise for non-
evaluative terms even though it is less obvious. The considerations regarding 
this concern have led to important refinements of the account of 
terminological revision developed in previous chapters. 
 The upshot is that the view developed in previous chapters applies to 
the case of contested evaluative terms as well. Attention to words can be 
required in order to settle the subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, it 
is more promising to revise terms in light of our aims than to analyze their 
current meaning. 
Moreover, the considerations in this chapter disclose an important 
implication of my methodological view. Contrary to a common and natural 
enough assumption, terminological clarification and settling the subject matter 
of philosophical inquiry does not and need not happen prior to addressing any 
substantive issue. Rather, it happens in the course of and is influenced by 
substantive inquiry. 
 123 
Chapter 4 
Vital Verbal Disputes 
Some disputes are merely verbal. Take the following dispute between Peter and 
Paul. Peter: “Many students meet their supervisor very often. Most of them 
have supervision meetings biweekly.” Paul: “You are exaggerating. It’s not the 
case that most students have supervision meetings biweekly.” Let us assume 
that Peter and Paul both believe that most students have supervision meetings 
every other week. Intuitively, Peter and Paul do not disagree on the relevant 
issue, but merely talk past one another, helped by the ambiguity of “biweekly”; 
Peter uses “biweekly” in the sense of every other week whereas Paul uses it in 
the sense of twice a week. A merely verbal dispute has roughly two core 
features: (i) It arises due to some linguistic confusion such that (ii) parties do 
not actually disagree on the issue at hand, but merely appear to be disagreeing.  
That disputes can be merely verbal has sparked some recent interest in 
philosophy. Even though philosophical disputes are typically not obviously 
merely verbal like the dispute about supervision meetings, numerous 
philosophical disputes have at some point been suspected of being merely 
verbal when properly understood (see Chalmers 2011, 517; Sidelle 2007, 83). 
Disputes about the ontology of material objects are a case in point. For 
example, could the dispute between those who affirm that there are tables and 
those who object that there are no tables, only particles arranged tablewise, be 
merely verbal? The diagnosis of a dispute as merely verbal has important 
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methodological consequences. The appropriate treatment for such pointless 
disputes is to smooth them out and focus on the actual, substantive issues (if 
any) that remain.  
Verbal disputes are another phenomenon that raises the question of 
how important it is to examine the meaning of terms in first-order inquiry. 
After all, an obvious suggestion is to clarify the meaning of the terms used in 
order to resolve a verbal dispute. I will propose a view on verbal disputes and 
how to resolve them that is informed by my broadly Carnapian methodology 
and the Lewisian notion of subject matter developed in earlier chapters. The 
upshot will be that, even if certain philosophical disputes share the core 
features of merely verbal disputes, this does not automatically warrant the 
common belittling attitude. Something important can and often does depend 
on the linguistic confusion involved, namely, how to delineate the subject 
matters of a more general debate to which the verbal dispute in question 
belongs. Where this is the case, the dispute is more accurately described as a 
vital verbal dispute.  
I will also argue that, even though David Chalmers’s (2011) method of 
elimination provided certain weaknesses are fixed is a more suitable method to 
resolve verbal disputes than conceptual analysis, it does not fully resolve vital 
verbal disputes. The more promising method to resolve vital verbal disputes is 
the Carnapian method to clarify terms developed in earlier chapters.  
These considerations support once more the view of the role of words 
in first-order inquiry developed in earlier chapters. Attention to words is 
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important in order to settle the subject matter of first-order inquiry. However, 
as far as vital verbal disputes are concerned, it is more promising to revise 
terms in light of our aims than to analyze their current meaning. 
In the present chapter, I will discuss the two core features of merely 
verbal disputes and develop an account that avoids problems with extant 
suggestions. I will place more emphasis on the one that has been somewhat 
neglected in the recent debate: the lack of actual disagreement. This will 
provide the basis to explain what is special about verbal disputes in philosophy 
and support the idea that they are more accurately classified as vital verbal 
disputes. The task for the next chapter will be to discuss ways to resolve verbal 
disputes.   
4.1 Verbal Disputes: The Linguistic Confusion  
In this section, I will discuss accounts of the linguistic confusion that gives rise 
to a verbal dispute and identify problems with these accounts. I will propose 
an account that avoids these problems in section 4.2. Like others (Balcerak 
Jackson forthcoming, 3; Chalmers 2011, 522; Sider 2011, 46), I will focus on 
the simple case in which a dispute is about a statement S such that one party 
utters S and the other not S.45  
One initially plausible suggestion is that parties use some expression in 
the statement S with different meaning and hence merely talk past one another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 As Jenkins (forthcoming, 5) highlights, this simplification is not without problems. It is easy 
to imagine cases where it is unclear what the disputed statement is or where we have several 
ones. Nevertheless, it seems useful to try to start with the simpler cases and tackle more 
intricate cases once we have a better grasp of the basic features.  
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(see Chalmers 2011, 519). The dispute about the frequency of supervision 
meetings fits this account. Peter uses “biweekly” in the sense of every other 
week and Paul takes it to mean twice a week. As a result, Paul utters that p and 
Peter objects that not q where p and not q do not conflict; that is, they could 
both be true. 
However, as is commonly agreed, this account only captures merely 
verbal disputes in a narrow sense. In particular, it does not accommodate 
deferential cases; that is, verbal disputes in which the linguistic confusion is 
due to one party making a linguistic error (Balcerak Jackson forthcoming, 6; 
Chalmers 2011, 519–520; Hirsch 2009, 239–240; 2005, 70–72; Sidelle 2007, 
90). Take the following dispute as an example. Muriel, a German native 
speaker, tells her American friend Hanna that their friend John has bought a 
beamer. Hanna replies in disbelief: “That’s impossible! John certainly hasn’t 
bought a beamer.” Muriel insists, puzzled: “But John has bought a beamer. He 
showed it to me yesterday.” Let us assume that Muriel does not believe that 
John has bought a BMW, but a video projector. She simply makes a linguistic 
error, being misled by the Anglicism “beamer” that is used in German to refer 
to video projectors. However, this does not change the expression’s meaning 
in English. As a result, Muriel and Hanna do not use the expression with a 
different meaning and they do not simply assent to and deny different 
propositions. Muriel claims that p and Hanna objects that not p.  
There are two main proposals on how to specify the linguistic 
confusion that gives rise to a verbal dispute in order to include deferential 
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cases. The first one is in terms of charitable interpretations (see Hirsch 2009, 
239–240; 2005, 70–72; Sidelle 2007, 91). A charitable interpretation of a 
statement is, roughly, one under which it comes out true. Thus, the idea is to 
interpret the problematic expression that gives rise to a verbal dispute in such a 
way that the statement each party utters, S and not S respectively, comes out 
true. On this view, each party speaks the truth in their respective language 
(Hirsch 2005, 67). This proposal accommodates the deferential case. Muriel is 
strictly speaking making a mistake, but we could charitably interpret her as 
meaning video projector by “beamer” such that her statement comes out true 
and does not conflict with what Hanna states.  
What proponents of this proposal disagree on is how to settle the 
boundaries of charitable interpretations (see also Balcerak Jackson 
forthcoming, 11–12). We can always find a range of interpretations that make 
the uttered statements true, but most of them are downright unacceptable. 
Interpreting the sentence Muriel utters as meaning that John bought coffee 
might make it come out true, but this is certainly an inadmissible 
interpretation. However, I will not pursue this issue any further because I think 
that no proposal in terms of charitable interpretations will work. The reason is 
simply that it is irrelevant for the classification of a dispute as verbal whether 
the statements parties utter come out true. What matters is that parties do not 
actually disagree and this is possible even if both parties utter false statements 
in their own language. Suppose John has neither bought a BMW nor a video 
projector and Muriel’s claim is false no matter how charitably we interpret it. 
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This does not speak against the dispute with Hanna being merely verbal. What 
matters is whether Hanna would object once she understands what Muriel 
really wants to say. If she would accept Muriel’s (false) claim that John has 
bought a video projector, there would be no actual disagreement and the 
dispute would be merely verbal.  
Chalmers specifies the linguistic confusion at issue differently. He 
(2011, 522) proposes that a verbal dispute arises in virtue of parties having 
differing (tacit) beliefs about the meaning of one of the expressions involved. 
This proposal accommodates the deferential case as well. Even if “beamer” 
means the same in Muriel’s and Hanna’s mouth when they speak English, their 
(tacit) beliefs about the meaning differ. Muriel takes it to mean video projector 
while Hanna believes that it means BMW. Moreover, this specification avoids 
my objection to proposals in terms of charitable interpretations. The problem 
is that Chalmers’s account comes at the cost of controversial assumptions.  
Firstly, the account presupposes that speakers have (tacit) beliefs about 
the meaning of the terms they use. However, as Chalmers (2011, 523–524) 
concedes, the assumption that linguistic competence requires speakers to have 
(tacit) beliefs about the meaning of terms is questionable (see e.g. Pettit 2002).  
Secondly, even if we grant that speakers have (tacit) beliefs about the 
meaning of terms, it is questionable that they have the right sort of beliefs such 
that these diverge in all and only cases of verbal disputes. Beliefs about 
whether a term applies to a certain case would not suffice; too many disputes 
would come out as verbal. For example, a dispute in which parties agree that 
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“whale” applies to all and only animals with certain biological features, but 
disagree on whether the animal they see on the horizon is a whale, would come 
out as merely verbal. This seems to be the wrong result.  
Moreover, it does not help to ascribe to competent speakers beliefs of 
the form “x refers to such and such” where “such and such” describes the 
nature of the referent. The assumption that competence with a term requires 
such beliefs is implausibly strong. I do not need to know the biological features 
of whales or apples in order to be competent with the terms “whale” and 
“apple”. And even if we would grant this assumption, it would not lead to the 
right results. Too many disputes would classify as merely verbal on Chalmers’s 
account specified in this way. For example, if two speakers agree that “whale” 
applies to the animals biologists classify as whales, but not knowing the 
relevant features they have a dispute on whether these animals are mammals, 
this dispute would be classified as verbal. This seems to be the wrong result.  
A more promising option is to ascribe to speakers beliefs of the form 
“x refers to so and so” or “x means so and so” where “so and so” describes 
conditions that guide speakers in their application of the term. These 
conditions do not need to capture the nature of the referent. For the term 
“water”, it might be something like “the stuff in rivers and lakes that falls from 
the sky when it rains etc.” For the term “whale”, it could even be just “the 
huge animals living in the ocean that biologists classify as whales”.  
Importantly, we would need to assume that these conditions capture 
part of the meaning of the term. Otherwise, the relevant beliefs would not be 
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beliefs about its meaning. Hence, this option is committed to the internalist 
assumption that the meaning of a term is more than its referent. As a result, 
Chalmers’s account of verbal disputes, thus specified, makes another 
controversial assumption.  
If we grant, however, that speakers have such beliefs, a difficulty 
remains regarding the postulated discrepancy between the semantic beliefs of 
parties to a merely verbal dispute. What are the conditions for disagreement 
over meaning? It seems that not every divergence should suffice for 
disagreement. The whale specialist and I have presumably differing beliefs 
about the application conditions for “whale”, but we do not disagree over the 
meaning because I believe that the term applies to whatever the specialist 
identifies as whales.   
At any rate, Chalmers’s account of verbal disputes seems to be 
committed to a controversial assumption about what competence with a term 
requires. As I hope to show, we can account for the linguistic confusion that 
gives rise to verbal disputes without making this controversial assumption. My 
proposal will emerge from a discussion of the second core feature of verbal 
disputes: the lack of actual disagreement.    
4.2 Verbal Disputes: The Lack of Actual Disagreement 
The aim in this section is to provide an account of the second core feature of 
verbal disputes: the lack of actual disagreement. Even though this feature has 
received less attention in discussions of verbal disputes, disagreement is a 
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matter of much recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of language. As 
we will see, the lack of actual disagreement in verbal disputes bears some 
resemblance to an issue that currently concerns contextualists and relativists 
about judgments of taste.  
 Parties to a verbal dispute over a statement S appear to disagree 
because one utters S and the other objects not S. Peter claims that most 
students have supervision meetings biweekly and Paul objects that most 
students do not have supervision meetings biweekly. The considerations in the 
last section on how to interpret parties’ utterances suggest a first obvious 
account of the lack of actual disagreement. Thus, the content of parties’ 
utterances does not actually conflict. Peter and Paul are not actually expressing 
conflicting propositions. Peter claims that most students meet their supervisor 
every other week (p). Paul objects that most students do not meet their 
supervisor twice a week (not q). And p and not q do not exclude each other; 
they could both be true.  
 However, this first account does not accommodate deferential cases.  
In these cases, the contents of parties’ utterances actually conflict. Given what 
“beamer” means in American English, Muriel actually utters that John bought 
a BMW (p) whereupon Hanna objects that John did not buy a BMW (not p). 
Nevertheless, Muriel and Hanna are not actually disagreeing. Muriel simply 
makes a linguistic error with the effect that Hanna misunderstands her. By 
hypothesis, Hanna would not object if she understood what Muriel actually 
wants to say, namely, that John bought a video projector.  
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 The problem we are now faced with is the opposite of a challenge to 
contextualism about judgements of taste. Roughly, relativists criticise that 
contextualists cannot account for disagreement about matters of taste.46 Take, 
for example, a dispute in which Peter claims “This is tasty!” and Paul objects 
“This is not tasty at all!”. On a contextualist account, Peter, in fact, claims that 
this food is tasty for Peter, and Paul that it is not tasty at all for Paul. These 
claims do not actually conflict; Peter and Paul are not actually disagreeing. This 
appears to be the wrong result; actual disagreement about mattes of taste 
seems possible. Hence, contextualists must explain how far parties actually 
disagree even though, on a contextualist interpretation, they do not seem to 
disagree. The problem that I am faced with is the contrary. Parties to a verbal 
dispute appear to disagree; they sometimes even utter conflicting propositions. 
We need to explain how far they, nevertheless, do not actually disagree. 
 It has been argued (e.g. Huvenes 2012) that it is not even necessary for 
actual disagreement that parties utter conflicting propositions; instead, they 
could express conflicting attitudes. Deferential cases of verbal disputes suggest 
that it is not sufficient for actual disagreement that parties utter conflicting 
propositions. Jenkins (forthcoming, 6) proposes that disagreement “has more 
to do with what the parties believe […] than what their utterances mean in any 
shared public language”. This thought provides a promising starting point; 
whether a dispute is verbal depends on whether parties’ beliefs conflict rather 
than whether the propositions they utter conflict. The challenge is then to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For a conspicuous presentation of the challenge at issue, see e.g. MacFarlane 2007. 
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identify the relevant beliefs. Parties to a verbal dispute could have all sorts of 
conflicting beliefs that are irrelevant to the status of their dispute over S. 
Whether Paul and Peter have conflicting beliefs about who Hanna’s supervisor 
is is irrelevant to the status of their dispute about whether most students meet 
their supervisor biweekly. Jenkins’s account solves the problem by invoking 
the subject matters of a dispute. She (forthcoming, 12–13) contends that a 
dispute is only verbal if parties do not disagree on the subject matters of their 
dispute. In this view, we can identify the relevant beliefs—those that should 
not conflict for the dispute to be verbal—as parties’ beliefs about the subject 
matters of their dispute. This leaves open what the subject matters of a dispute 
are. 
Brendan Balcerak Jackson’s (forthcoming, 15) proposal can be read as 
a possible refinement. Thus, parties to a verbal dispute do not actually disagree 
on any question that both attempt to answer and disagree on. This refinement 
only works if we individuate questions in terms of their content. If we 
individuate questions via their linguistic form, we could say that there are 
questions that parties attempt to answer and disagree on. Muriel and Hanna 
disagree on whether John has bought a beamer; Peter and Paul disagree on 
whether most students have supervision meetings biweekly. If we take the 
content into account, we plausibly have two questions in each of these cases 
and parties do not disagree on either. Peter and Paul do not disagree on 
whether most students meet their supervisor every other week or on whether 
most meet their supervisor twice a week. 
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At any rate, we can, I contend, account for the lack of disagreement in 
verbal disputes without reference to the subject matter of a dispute. What we 
then need to explain in some other way, without reference to subject matters, 
is how far parties do not actually disagree even if they utter conflicting 
propositions like in the deferential case. When Jenkins proposes that the 
disagreement has more to do with what parties believe than with the content 
of their utterance, she (forthcoming, 6, Fn. 8) mentions in a footnote that it 
might have something to do with the utterer’s meaning in a Gricean sense. I 
think that this is the key to a simpler account of the lack of disagreement in 
verbal disputes. Moreover, this account points towards an alternative 
understanding of the linguistic confusion involved. As a first attempt, we could 
suggest that parties A and B to a verbal dispute about a statement S do not 
actually disagree in so far as, even though what S means when A utters it might 
conflict with what not S means when B utters it, what A means by uttering S 
does not conflict with what B means by uttering not S.  
The distinction invoked here is Grice’s (1957; 1968; 1969) distinction 
between utterer’s occasion meaning (for simplicity henceforth called utterer’s 
meaning) and applied timeless utterance-type meaning (henceforth called 
utterance meaning). A simplified account of this distinction should suffice for 
my purpose. The utterer’s meaning is analyzed in terms of the utterer’s 
intentions und using the scheme “by uttering S, A means that p”. Thus, 
roughly, by uttering “John bought a beamer”, Muriel means that John bought a 
video projector because Muriel meets the following conditions. By uttering 
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“John bought a beamer”, Muriel intends (i) that Hanna believes that John 
bought a video projector, (ii) that Hanna recognizes this intention, and (iii) that 
part of the reason why Hanna believes that John bought a video projector is 
her recognizing Muriel’s intention.47 Hanna, on her part, by uttering “John did 
not buy a beamer” means that John did not buy a BMW because of what she 
intends by uttering this statement. Note that these three conditions are the 
ones Grice suggested first (1957). Exactly what conditions need to be fulfilled 
remains controversial. I will not take a stance on this issue. My aim is to show 
that we can use a Gricean notion of utterer’s meaning for an account of verbal 
disputes and this is independent of how exactly we spell out the account.   
The utterance meaning is analyzed in terms of the utterer’s meanings 
that are standardly associated with an utterance-type in a linguistic community 
(members of this community have it in their “repertoire” to utter statements of 
some type with certain intentions) and using the scheme “When A uttered S, S 
meant on this occasion ‘…’”.  Importantly, utterance meaning in this sense can 
change from one occasion to the other. Thus, when uttered by Peter, the 
statement “Most students meet their supervisor biweekly” meant “Most 
students meet their supervisor every other week”. When uttered by Paul, the 
statement “Most students do not meet their supervisor biweekly” meant “Most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This might sound problematic to someone who understands the content of mental states as 
closely tied to their description in a shared language. How can Muriel intend that Hanna 
believes that John bought a video projector if she does not know the expression “video 
projector”? However, on the Gricean account, the content of utterances is explained by 
reference to the content of speakers’ mental states and not vice versa. Hence, if we adopt this 
account, we should not understand mental content as tied too closely to their description in a 
shared language.   
 136 
students do not meet their supervisor twice a week”.  However, in deferential 
cases of verbal disputes, the utterance meaning does not change. When uttered 
by Muriel, “John bought a beamer” meant “John bought a BMW”. When 
uttered by Hanna, “John did not buy a beamer” meant “John did not buy a 
BMW”. This is why we need to resort to the more basic utterer’s meaning in 
order to account for the lack of disagreement in verbal disputes.    
The resulting account of the lack of disagreement characteristic of 
verbal disputes goes as follows. In a verbal dispute, A and B use the same 
utterance-type with different utterer’s meaning such that what they intend to 
convey does not actually conflict. By uttering S, A means that p and by uttering 
not S, B means that not q where p and not q are compatible; they could both 
be true. 
This account needs a further twist because it does not distinguish 
between what Chalmers calls wholly and partly verbal disputes. To retain this 
distinction is important since only wholly verbal disputes are merely verbal 
disputes in the sense that they are pointless and nothing is really at issue. The 
idea is, very roughly, that a wholly verbal dispute is resolved once we have 
cleared up the linguistic confusion that gave rise to it, whereas, in partly verbal 
disputes, a residual disagreement remains (Chalmers 2011, 525–526). The 
dispute between Peter and Paul is wholly verbal if, for example, once Paul 
realizes what Peter actually means, he exclaims: “Oh, you mean that most 
students have supervision meetings fortnightly. In that case, you might be 
right.”	   The dispute is only partly verbal if Paul says instead: “Oh, you mean 
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that most students have supervision meetings fortnightly. But I think even this 
is exaggerated.”  
The Gricean account of the lack of disagreement suggested above does 
not distinguish between wholly and partly verbal disputes because it leaves 
open whether parties have a belief that conflicts with what the other party 
means by their utterance; that is, the utterer’s meaning. The account only 
requires that what Peter and Paul mean by their utterances does not conflict; 
that is, that most students meet their supervisor every week (p) and that most 
students do not meet their supervisor twice a week (not q). This leaves open 
whether Paul has a belief that conflicts with what Peter means by his utterance, 
namely, the belief that (p) most students do not meet their supervisor every 
other week. In consequence, the dispute could be wholly or partly verbal; both 
of the possible developments sketched above are possible.  
In order to capture the lack of disagreement characteristic of wholly 
verbal disputes, the Gricean account can be amended as follows. Parties A and 
B to a wholly verbal dispute about a statement S do not actually disagree in so 
far as what A means by uttering S does not conflict with what B means by 
uttering not S, and A and B do not have beliefs that conflict with what the 
other one means. By uttering S, A means that p and by uttering not S, B means 
that not q such that possibly p and not q. Moreover, A does not hold beliefs 
whose joint contents could not be true if not q and B does not hold beliefs 
whose joint contents could not be true if p.  
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Importantly, this account does not require that parties agree on what 
the other party means. It is quite possible that one party has never thought 
about what the other party means and hence has no belief about it. Suppose 
Hanna, who has the firm belief that John has not bought a BMW, has never 
thought about John buying a video projector. Once she realizes that this is 
what Muriel is telling her, she might say: “Oh, really? I didn’t know that.” To 
say that Hanna agrees with Muriel that John has bought a video projector 
seems to be an odd way to describe the situation. Rather, Hanna is about to 
learn something that she did not have any prior opinion about. Nevertheless, 
the dispute is clearly wholly verbal. 
It might be objected that my account misclassifies certain cases as 
partly verbal that should come out as wholly verbal. Muriel believes that John 
has bought a video projector (p); this is what she intends to convey. Suppose 
that, in addition, she believes that John has bought a BMW (q); that is, she 
holds a belief that conflicts with what Hanna intends to express, namely, that 
John has not bought a BMW (not q). 
I acknowledge an intuitive difference between this case and the case of 
a partly verbal dispute discussed above. In the earlier case, the respondent 
disagrees with what the person initiating the discussion intends to express. By 
contrast, in the case at issue here, there is no disagreement on the issue the 
person initiating the discussion intended to raise, but only on the issue that the 
respondent thought to be under discussion. However, I do not see a good 
reason to classify the first but not the second case as only partly verbal. In both 
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cases, a substantive disagreement on an issue raised by some party is involved. 
To illustrate the point, it is quite possible that something like the following 
happens in the second case. Once Hanna realizes that Muriel was talking about 
a video projector, she might say: “Oh, that’s what you mean! Then you might 
be right. I thought you were talking about a BMW!” To this, Muriel could 
reply: “Actually, now that you bring it up, I think that John has bought a BMW 
as well.” 
 The Gricean approach to the lack of disagreement points towards an 
alternative way to explain the linguistic confusion that gives rise to verbal 
disputes. The linguistic confusion concerns in the first place a certain 
expression E in S. In his later papers on the topic, Grice attempts to provide 
an account of how the meaning of complex utterance-types is composed of the 
meaning of simpler utterance-types. Based on this, we can suggest that parties 
to a verbal dispute mean different things by uttering E (utterer’s meaning). 
Importantly, this leaves open whether E means the same when uttered by 
either party (utterance meaning).  
I will not take a stance on whether my account of the two core features 
of verbal disputes taken together amount to an account of verbal disputes that 
captures all relevant distinctions. But at any rate, an account of verbal disputes 
along those lines has considerable advantages over extant accounts.  
Firstly, such an account does not require that what parties mean by 
uttering a statement is true, and hence avoids the problem with accounts in 
terms of charitable interpretations.  
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Secondly, in contrast to Chalmers’s account, my account remains 
neutral on the controversial issue of whether speakers have in general (tacit) 
beliefs of any sort about the meaning of the expressions they use. Admittedly, 
my account has its own, albeit somewhat less controversial commitment, 
namely, some form of metasemantic internalism. Thus, speakers’ mental states 
give rise to the content of utterances. Even though this commitment is 
somewhat less controversial, certain issues remain to be clarified. Thus, it can 
be difficult to identify the relevant intentions and hence the utterer’s meaning. 
This can pose problems when assessing the status of a dispute.  
Thirdly, in contrast to Chalmers’s account, my account does not make 
reference to an in-virtue-of relation that remains difficult to specify. On 
Chalmers’s (2011, 522) account, a wholly verbal dispute over a statement S 
arises “wholly in virtue of” a disagreement over the meaning of a term T in S. 
The specification “wholly in virtue of” is required in order to exclude relevant 
disagreements other than the disagreement about the meaning of T which 
would render the dispute partly verbal. Chalmers (2011, 523–524) makes 
interesting observations concerning the relevant in-virtue-of relation (e.g. that 
it is an explanatory relation) and provides a helpful counterfactual gloss. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the relation remains to some extent unclear. My 
account gets by without reference to such a relation because it captures the 
lack of relevant disagreement directly by identifying the relevant beliefs that do 
not conflict, namely, those that give rise to the utterer’s meaning. 
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To close, note an important feature that an account along the lines that 
I propose shares with other accounts: it depends to some extent on the context 
whether a dispute over some statement S is verbal. On my account, this is 
because whether a dispute is verbal depends on what the utterers mean by 
uttering S. Hence, we need to be careful when claiming that disputes over 
certain statements are in general merely verbal as it is usually done when 
philosophical disputes are diagnosed as merely verbal. Whether they actually 
are merely verbal depends on what utterer’s meanings are in play and this 
might be different in different contexts.  
4.3 Vital Verbal Disputes: Subject Matters under Consideration  
The considerations in previous sections prima facie support the belittling 
adverb “merely” and the deflationary attitude with which disputes are 
diagnosed as merely verbal. Parties do not actually disagree; they merely 
misunderstand what the other party is trying to get at. Such disputes seem, 
indeed, pointless. However, to diagnose a philosophical dispute as merely 
verbal and thereby denounce it as pointless is always highly controversial. This 
might be just because philosophers are reluctant to admit that some of their 
long-cherished disputes are pointless. However, as I attempt to show in this 
section, there is a more charitable explanation of what is different about verbal 
disputes in philosophy. I will argue that even though they are verbal, 
something important is at issue, namely, how to conceive of the subject matter 
of a more general debate and how to adapt our terminology accordingly. As a 
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result, such disputes are more accurately classified as vital verbal disputes. For 
my considerations, I will draw again on the Lewisian notion of subject matter 
used in previous chapters.  
Take a dispute between two philosophers about the statement S, “The 
victims of terrorism are always non-combatants”. Suppose that philosopher A, 
who claims that S, defends an account on which “terrorism” applies to 
violence against non-combatants for political purposes (henceforth called 
“terrorismA”). On philosopher B’s account, who claims that not S, “terrorism” 
applies to violence against some with the intent to spread fear in a wider 
community for political purposes (henceforth called “terrorismB”). Hence, A 
means by uttering S that the victims of terrorismA are always non-combatants 
(p) and B means by uttering not S that the victims of terrorismB are not always 
non-combatants (not q). Let us assume, moreover, that A and B are not 
actually disagreeing in the sense specified above. What they intend to convey, p 
and not q, does not conflict; they could both be true. In fact, p is necessarily 
true and not q seems highly plausible. In addition, B does not believe that the 
victims of terrorismA are not always non-combatants (not p) and A does not 
believe that the victims of terrorismB are always non-combatants (q).  
This dispute is fictitious, but it comes quite close to disputes about 
terrorism that philosophers are actually engaged in; terrorismA and terrorismB 
are simplified versions of two popular philosophical views on terrorism.48 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For an account of terrorism in the spirit of terrorismA, see e.g. Coady 2004a; for an account 
in the spirit of terrorismB, see e.g. Held 2004a. These account are discussed in Chapter 3 
above. 
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dispute shares the core features of verbal disputes discussed in previous 
sections, but to diagnose it as merely verbal with the implication that nothing 
substantive is at issue would certainly be met with resistance. Do we 
misunderstand how this dispute works or is there a significant difference to the 
obvious cases of merely verbal disputes discussed earlier?  
One initially promising line of thought is that verbal disputes in 
philosophy are likely to be only partly verbal whereas the obvious cases 
discussed above are wholly verbal. Recall that parties to a partly verbal dispute 
misunderstand each other, but there is also a residual actual disagreement. 
What A and B mean by uttering S and not S respectively does not conflict; A 
means that p and B that not q such that possibly p and not q. However, at least 
one party has a belief that conflicts with what the other party means. B believes 
that not p or A believes that q. If the dispute about terrorism were partly 
verbal, this would explain why we are reluctant to declare it as merely verbal. 
There is a residual actual disagreement that needs to be tackled. However, the 
fictitious dispute is clearly wholly verbal. By hypothesis, A and B do not have 
beliefs that conflict with what the other party means by their utterance. As a 
result, even though I suspect that many verbal disputes in philosophy might be 
only partly verbal, this does not explain the apparent difference between the 
wholly verbal dispute about terrorism and the obvious cases of wholly verbal 
disputes discussed above.  
The difference, it seems, has to do with the linguistic confusion over 
the term “terrorism”. Like in the obvious cases, parties to the dispute mean 
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different things by uttering this term, that is, the utterers’ meanings diverge. 
However, the lack of clarity besetting the utterance meaning of “terrorism” is 
different; more precisely, the lack of clarity besetting the timeless meaning of 
the utterance-type “terrorism” as opposed to what it means when uttered on a 
certain occasion (applied timeless utterance meaning) or what a speaker means 
by uttering it (utterer’s meaning). Unlike in the biweekly dispute, there is not a 
simple and well-known ambiguity involved; and unlike in the beamer dispute, it 
is not obvious that one party makes a linguistic error. Because A and B make 
explicit what they intend to refer to with “terrorism”, the utterer’s meaning is 
clear. However, it remains unclear what “terrorism” means in their linguistic 
community in some sense. It is unclear what the linguistic community usually 
uses the term to refer to and, as I have argued in Chapter 3, the question arises 
of what it should be used to refer to (timeless meaning of the utterance-type). 
Expressed in a more Gricean way, it remains unclear what “basic procedure” 
the linguistic community has and, moreover, should have in their “repertoire” 
for the term “terrorism”. 
One might object that this lack of clarity does not pose a problem 
because the utterer’s meaning is made explicit. Hence it is clear what A and B 
mean by uttering “terrorism”. However, what remains unclear due to the 
unclear utterance meaning is, as I will argue, not just the subject matter of this 
particular dispute, but of every dispute in which the term “terrorism” is used. 
A and B suggest different clarifications of the term and thus bring different 
conceptions of the subject matter of terrorism into play. Therefore, even if it is 
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clear what subject matter each intends to address, it remains unclear whether 
any of them addresses the subject matter that generally is or should be 
addressed under the heading of “terrorism”. This issue needs consideration 
and affects an ongoing more general debate. Hence, the verbal dispute about 
terrorism is not pointless in so far as it is a manifestation of a more general 
substantive problem, namely, how to conceive of the subject matter of 
terrorism.  
In order to explain what the subject matter of a dispute is, I will draw 
again on Lewis’s (1988) account of the subject matter of a statement. Jenkins 
(forthcoming, 12) briefly considers the prospects of using Lewis’s notion of 
the subject matter of a statement for an account of the subject matter of a 
dispute and predicts a problem that I will address in section 4.4. I have 
introduced Lewis’s account of the subject matter of a statement in Chapter 1 
and I will only summarize the main points here.  
On Lewis’s account, the subject matter of a statement is whatever its 
truth-value supervenes on. When evaluating the truth-value of statements 
about the subject matter of knowledge, we only need to consider how things 
could be with respect to knowledge. All other aspects of reality and how they 
could be are irrelevant. Therefore, we can lump together all possible ways the 
world might be that are exactly alike as knowledge is concerned. Because 
“being exactly alike as x is concerned”  is an equivalence relation, this subject 
matter gives us a partitioning of logical space into mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive regions. The worlds in each region are exactly alike with 
 146 
respect to knowledge. Every statement about knowledge has the same truth-
value at all worlds within the same region.  
Recall the consideration that motivates this notion. What do all 
statements about a subject matter like knowledge share? Obviously, they do 
not all have the same content or truth-value. Moreover, as I have set forth in 
Chapter 1, they do not all mention the same thing. However, what all these 
statements do share is that their truth-value at a world supervenes on how 
things are with respect to knowledge at this world.  
Importantly, a statement always has several subject matters in the 
Lewisian sense.49 “Most students meet their supervisor biweekly” is about 
students, but also about the frequency of supervision meetings, about whether 
students meet their supervisor biweekly and so on.  
We can use the Lewisian notion of the subject matter of a statement 
for a first attempt at an account of the subject matter of a dispute. Thus, the 
subject matters of a dispute over a statement S are the subject matters of S. On 
this account, the subject matter of the dispute between Peter and Paul over 
“Most students meet their supervisor biweekly” has such subject matters as 
whether most students meet their supervisor biweekly, the frequency of 
supervision meetings or supervision meetings. These are aspects of the world 
or of possible ways the world could be on which the truth-value of S 
supervenes. That is, if we consider a possible way our world could be, in order 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 As noted in Chapter 1, Yablo (2012, lecture 1) criticises this aspect of Lewis’s account, but 
he does not provide an argument. He merely insists that a statement must have one unique 
subject matter. I think that, to the contrary, it is a natural assumption that a statement has 
several more or less general subject matters.  
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to determine the truth-value of S, it suffices to know how everything is with 
respect to supervision meetings or with respect to the frequency of supervision 
meetings or with respect to whether most students meet their supervisor 
biweekly.  
To say that one of the subject matters is whether most students have 
supervision meetings biweekly is, in fact, ambiguous due to the ambiguity of 
“biweekly”. Two subject matters could be referred to that partition logical 
space differently. One divides possible worlds according to whether most 
supervision meetings take place fortnightly and the other according to whether 
they happen twice a week. Hence, a statement can also have several subject 
matters corresponding to different possible interpretations. A dispute about it, 
it seems, only inherits those subject matters that correspond to interpretations 
that are relevant in the given context. Thus, we could say that the subject 
matters of a dispute over S are the subject matters of S given what S means on 
this occasion (applied timeless utterance meaning). 
The deferential case shows, in addition, that the utterer’s meaning 
matters. On the first account, one of the subject matters of the dispute over 
“John bought a beamer” is whether John bought a beamer. If we only take into 
account what S means on this occasion, we do not capture the subject matter 
Muriel actually intends to invoke, namely, whether John bought a video 
projector. This subject matter arises from the utterer’s meaning, that is, from 
what Muriel meant by uttering the statement. Hence, it seems useful to 
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distinguish between the utterance subject matters and the utterer’s subject 
matters of a dispute.   
We are now in a position to spell out how far parties to a verbal 
dispute do not disagree on the subject matters of their dispute as Jenkins 
suggests. As I have argued in the last section, it is not necessary to refer to 
subject matters in order to account for the lack of disagreement in verbal 
disputes. However, I will use the idea that parties to a verbal dispute do not 
disagree on the subject matter at issue in order to explain what is special about 
verbal disputes in philosophy.  
In a substantive dispute, parties disagree on the subject matters at issue. 
Each expresses a belief that represents the world as being a certain way and 
these possibilities cannot both be actual. The subject matters raised partition 
logical space, that is, they divide all possible ways the world might be into 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive regions. The beliefs expressed by 
parties to a substantive dispute locate the actual world in different regions of 
these partitions.  
For a dispute to be wholly verbal, it is required, as noted earlier, that 
parties do not actually disagree on the utterer’s subject matters of the dispute. 
Importantly, not all utterer’s subject matters are relevant. Parties only need to 
lack actual disagreement on what might be called, following Yablo (2012, 
Lecture 1), the smallest such subject matters.50 The smallest subject matter of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 It might seem prima facie more obvious to talk of the most specific subject matter. 
However, this is only appropriate as long as we consider the description of the subject matter. 
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verbal dispute over a statement S is whether S. Accordingly, the smallest 
utterer’s subject matter of the dispute over the statement “Most students meet 
their supervisor biweekly” is whether most students meet their supervisor 
biweekly. More precisely, there are two smallest utterer’s subject matters in this 
case. One is whether most students meet their supervisor every other week and 
the other one is whether most students meet their supervisor twice a week.  
Why are only the smallest subject matters relevant? Paul does not 
believe that most students do not meet their supervisor every other week. 
Hence, he does not locate the actual world in a different region than Peter in 
the partition Peter invokes by uttering S. Moreover, Peter does not believe that 
most students do not meet their supervisor twice a week. Hence, he does not 
locate the actual world in a different region than Paul in the partition Paul 
invokes by uttering not S. By contrast, Peter and Paul might have all kinds of 
conflicting beliefs (in the above specified sense) about bigger subject matters 
of their dispute; for example, the frequency of supervision meetings. Maybe 
Peter believes that the frequency of supervision meetings is too high whereas 
Paul thinks that it is not. This would not affect the status of their dispute over 
the statement “Most students meet their supervisor biweekly”.  
The fact that only the smallest subject matter of S is relevant explains 
why we do not need to refer to subject matters in order to account for the lack 
of disagreement in verbal disputes. The smallest subject matters partition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It seems awkward as soon as we consider the partition of logical space it effects and notice that 
it is a very rough partition into only two regions.  
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logical space into two regions, one with worlds at which S is true and the other 
one at which S is false. Hence, they correspond to the propositions parties 
intend to express by uttering S and not S respectively. Because it only matters 
whether these proposition conflict with each other or with other beliefs parties 
hold, the lack of disagreement can be explained by reference to these 
propositions. To refer to subject matters introduces an unnecessary 
complication. However, as I will show in due course, this complication is 
helpful in order to shed light on verbal disputes in philosophy.  
We are now also in a position to spell out Balcerak Jackson’s idea that 
there is no question parties to a verbal dispute disagree on. On one popular 
view, the content of a question is a partition of logical space where the possible 
worlds in each region agree on the answer to the question.51 On the Lewisian 
notion of subject matter, the subject matters partition logical space as well, 
such that the worlds in each region are exactly alike with respect to the subject 
matter. Based on these views, we can say that a question introduces a subject 
matter or that each subject matter corresponds to a question. In consequence, 
if parties to a verbal dispute do not disagree on any of the subject matters of 
their dispute, there is no question that they attempt to answer and disagree on. 
As argued above, this is presumably not the case for all subject matters of a 
dispute over S. It is only required as regards the smallest subject matters. 
Notably, these are the subject matters of a dispute that are most easily stated as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Partition semantics for questions have been suggested by, e.g., Higginbotham and May 
(1981) and Belnap (1982). See also Ch.1. 
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questions, e.g. whether John has bought a BMW or whether most students 
meet their supervisor every other week. These questions also appear to be the 
ones parties attempt to answer. Other subject matters can be expressed as 
questions as well. However, these questions are more general and parties do 
not attempt to answer these more general questions. The subject matter of 
supervision meetings partitions logical space into worlds that are exactly alike 
with respect to supervision meetings. A question with the same content could 
be something like “How is everything with respect to supervision meetings?” 
or “What is the whole truth about supervision meetings?” However, Peter and 
Paul do not seem to attempt to answer this question in their little dispute.   
The foregoing considerations also allow us to explain the widely shared 
intuition that parties to a wholly verbal dispute talk past one another. This is 
the case because each party gets wrong which subject matter the other one 
intends to invoke by uttering S or not S respectively, helped by the fact that 
they use the same utterance-type S with different utterer’s meaning.  
Let us now turn to verbal disputes in philosophy. Like in the other 
cases, parties to the philosophical dispute about terrorism invoke different 
smallest subject matters by uttering the same utterance-type. Philosopher A 
invokes the subject matter whether victims of terrorismA are always non-
combatants and philosopher B invokes the subject matter whether the victims 
of terrorismB are always non-combatants. Moreover, A and B do not have 
conflicting beliefs about where to locate the actual world in those two 
partitions. The difference to the other cases is that it is not a simple ambiguity 
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or an obvious linguistic error that leads to an unclarity over which subject 
matter the other party invokes and that is limited to this particular dispute. The 
utterance meaning of “terrorism” is unclear. As a result, it is unclear for every 
dispute about terrorism what the partitions are that can or should be invoked.  
As suggested in Chapter 1, we could say that the subject matter of our 
debates about terrorism is unclear because there is a range of partitions 
corresponding to the range of possible clarifications of the utterance meaning 
of “terrorism”. Suppose that at one of two possible worlds, there were 20 cases 
of terrorismA, 22 cases of terrorismB, and 19 cases of terrorismC in 2011. At the 
other world, there were 20 cases of terrorismA, 20 cases of terrorismB, and 19 
cases of terrorismC in 2011. Are these two worlds exactly alike with respect to 
terrorism? There are at least three partitions that correspond to the subject 
matter of terrorism given the three clarifications of the term “terrorism”. The 
two worlds could be in the same region of the partition corresponding to the 
subject matter of terrorismA or terrorismC, but they cannot be in the same 
region of the partition corresponding to the subject matter of terrorismB.  
Importantly, it does not suffice to rely for every dispute on the utterer’s 
meaning even if every utterer made their utterer’s meaning explicit like 
philosopher A and B.  This could lead to frequent changes in subject matter 
such that philosophers appear to address the same subject matter, namely, 
terrorism, but are actually invoking different ones using the same utterance-
types. Hence, the more general problem of which the verbal dispute is a 
manifestation is which subject matters we need to address, given the ongoing 
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debate and our aims for the future. Put differently, which are the salient 
features of worlds regarding terrorism; on which features should the truth-
value of claims about this subject matter supervene? Note that the question is 
not so much which particular partition goes with the label “terrorism”, but 
rather more generally which partitions we need to be able to invoke in our 
shared language and hence need some label for. As a result, the wholly verbal 
dispute between philosopher A and B does not seem to be merely verbal; 
something important is at issue and requires consideration. It seems more 
accurate to classify disputes such as this one as vital verbal disputes.  
It might well turn out that there is a sliding scale between vital verbal 
disputes and merely verbal disputes rather than a sharp boundary. After all, 
that the meaning of a term is unclear is a matter of degree. Moreover, whether 
this unclarity is a matter for consideration and hence whether a verbal dispute 
is vital is likely to depend to some extent on the context, e.g. parties’ aims and 
standards. One factor that seems to be relevant for philosophical verbal 
disputes is whether the confused expression that gives rise to the dispute is 
philosophically relevant. Moreover, a need to consider this confusion in the 
given context arises only if the expression is central to the current dispute. 
Suppose “semantic” and “pragmatic” are used in a philosophical dispute 
outside the philosophy of language and that this dispute is wholly verbal due to 
some confusion regarding the expressions “pragmatic” and “semantic”. In this 
case, it is presumably not a vital verbal dispute even though these terms are of 
wider philosophical significance. The reason is that they are not central to the 
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dispute at issue. Put differently, the dispute at issue is not part of the more 
general debate concerning the semantic/pragmatic distinction. 
I mentioned in the beginning that certain disputes over the ontology of 
material objects are under the suspicion of being merely verbal. This is a 
difficult case and I will not be able to do justice to it here. However, it is 
possible to sketch some lines of inquiry that arise from the considerations in 
this chapter. Take a dispute in which ontologist A claims S “There are tables” 
and ontologist B objects not S “There are no tables, only particles arranged 
tablewise”. This dispute would be verbal if A and B meant something different 
by uttering S. A currently debated possibility (e.g. Dorr 2005) is that parties to 
disputes such as this one use “there are” or the existential quantifier with 
different meaning. If this is the case and the dispute is merely verbal due to a 
linguistic confusion regarding the existential quantifier, the dispute is likely to 
be vital verbal. The existential quantifier is a core metaphysical term. The 
question of how to use this term and, at the same time, how to conceive of the 
subject matter of metaphysics would be a core issue of metaphysics.52  
Before closing, I should mention that verbal disputes outside 
philosophy can also be vital in my sense. A dispute between two politicians 
about the statement “Some US attacks on Iraq in the aftermaths of 9/11 were 
acts of terrorism” might under certain circumstances be a vital verbal dispute. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Note that even if a dispute like this one is not verbal, this does not mean that it could not be 
flawed in some other way. It could still be the case that even though parties are not talking past 
each other, what they claim does not actually conflict because there is no fact of the matter 
whether there are tables or only particles arranged tablewise.  
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4.4 The Subject Matter of a Dispute: An Objection Answered 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss a problem Jenkins predicts for a 
Lewisian approach of the subject matter of a dispute. She (forthcoming, 12) 
cautions that we cannot conceive of the subject matter of a dispute 
straightforwardly as the subject matter of statements uttered in the course of 
the dispute for three reasons: (i) Some statements are uttered in order to 
support or criticise a view, but they are not supposed to introduce new subject 
matters (even if the subject matters of these statements could be the subject 
matters of a subsequent dispute). (ii) Some subject matters are taken for 
granted in a context and not expressed by any statement uttered in the course 
of the dispute.  Jenkins provides the example of a dispute where one party 
claims “Scepticism is mistaken” and the other one objects “Unless a subject 
can rule out all not-p possibilities, his position with regard to p is epistemically 
defective. Scepticism is not mistaken.” For the sake of argument, we are 
invited to assume that this dispute is wholly verbal and only arises due to 
parties’ differing understanding of “knowledge”, a term that is notably not 
used in the dispute. (iii) Parties might well take back statements that, on 
reflection, do not seem to express their view adequately.  
Let me answer each reason in turn. In response to (i), I do not see why 
we should not simply accept that every statement in support of a view 
contributes to the subject matters of the dispute. Since these statements are 
likely to be relevant to the contested statements, they are likely to share some 
subject matters with them. Supporting statements might even clarify to some 
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extent what subject matters a party invokes; this point will become clearer 
when I consider reason (ii) below. If a party utters a statement that is not 
relevant to the contested statement, she will probably be criticized for changing 
the subject, for raising a subject matter that does not fit with the ones under 
debate thus far. These considerations also suggest that reason (iii) does not 
really pose a problem. It seems fairly natural to assume that what sometimes 
happens in a dispute is that parties introduce subject matters that appear to be 
relevant to a more general subject matter or specifications of a subject matter 
already at issue that they take back on reflection – just as parties sometimes 
make claims that they later give up.  
Jenkins’s reason (ii) is more serious. It raises the worry that even 
though the sketched dispute is verbal, it does not classify as verbal given the 
Lewisian account of the subject matter of a statement. By hypothesis, the 
dispute arises because parties use “knowledge” with different meaning. 
However, this expression is not used in the dispute. As a result, parties invoke 
the same smallest subject matter, namely, the subject matter of whether 
scepticism (understood as the view that unless a subject can rule out all not-p 
possibilities, his position with regard to p is epistemically defective) is 
mistaken. They locate the actual world in different regions of this partition and 
hence actually disagree on this subject matter. The dispute appears to be 
substantive. But this is clearly false. By hypothesis, parties would agree on the 
truth-value of “Scepticism is mistaken” if they were to mean the same by 
“knowledge”.  
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However, contrary to first appearances, parties are not invoking the 
same subject matter (utterer’s subject matter). By hypothesis, parties do not 
mean the same by “knowledge”. Let us suppose that the party who thinks that 
scepticism is not mistaken thinks that “knowledge” only applies to a belief that 
p if we can rule out all not-p possibilities (henceforth knowledgeA). The other 
party takes “knowledge” to apply to a belief that p even if we cannot rule out 
all not-p possibilities (henceforth knowledgeB). This confusion regarding 
“knowledge” carries over to “epistemically defective” and “scepticism”; this is 
how the dispute must be construed in order to be wholly verbal. Hence, what 
the relevant party means by uttering “Scepticism is not mistaken” is actually 
that knowledgeA does not require ruling out all not-p possibilities. The other 
party, by uttering “Scepticism is mistaken”, means that knowledgeB requires 
ruling out all not-p possibilities. By hypothesis, neither party has a belief that 
conflicts with what the other party means by uttering their statement. As a 
consequence, parties are invoking different partitions and they do not actually 
disagree on where the actual world is in each of these partitions. Carefully 
analyzed, the dispute comes out as verbal. 
Another problem with Jenkins’s reason (ii) is that is seems to 
presuppose that the subject matters of a statement are limited to those that can 
be described using the expressions that occur in the statement. Hence, 
amongst the subject matters of the statement “Scepticism is mistaken” are 
scepticism and whether scepticism is mistaken, but not how much certainty is 
required for knowledge or, more generally, knowledge. However, this is not 
 158 
the case on the Lewisian notion of subject matter. A statement has a certain 
subject matter if its truth-value supervenes on the relevant aspects of a world; 
that is, if the statement has the same truth-value at every world within the same 
region of the relevant partition of logical space. Whether the partition can be 
characterized using the expressions in the statement is irrelevant. The truth-
value of “Scepticism is mistaken” supervenes on how things are at a world 
with respect to knowledge. Hence, knowledge is a subject matter of this 
statement and of the dispute about it on the initial Lewisian notion.  
Jenkins is right in so far as it is not always obvious that there is a 
statement S such that one party endorses it and the other rejects it. This 
simplifying assumption is part of most accounts of verbal disputes, including 
mine. Many disputes seem more complex and messy. Nevertheless, it seems 
possible in many cases to extract such an S. Moreover, even if an account is 
somewhat simplifying and hence does not apply comfortably in more complex 
cases, it might provide helpful steps towards understanding these cases. 
Conclusion 
Many disputes in philosophy have at some point been under the suspicion of 
being merely verbal and hence pointless. In the present chapter, I have first 
argued for the advantages of a Grice-inspired account of the two core features 
of verbal disputes: the linguistic confusion that gives rise to them and the lack 
of actual disagreement. I have, secondly, developed an account of the subject 
matter of a dispute, drawing on the Lewisian notion of subject matter used in 
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earlier chapters. On this basis, I have proposed an explanation of what is 
special about verbal disputes in philosophy. Even though they share the core 
features of merely verbal disputes, this does not automatically warrant the 
common belittling attitude. Something of substance can depend on the 
linguistic confusion involved, namely, how to delineate the subject matters of a 
more general debate to which the verbal dispute in question belongs. Where 
this is the case, the dispute is more accurately described as a vital verbal 
dispute. 
These considerations lend further support to the view on the role of 
words in first-order inquiry developed in earlier chapters. Words matter and 
need to be studied when the subject matter of a philosophical debate is unclear 
and needs to be settled. In the case of verbal disputes, we need to resolve the 
linguistic confusion that gives rise to the verbal dispute in order to settle the 
subject matter of this dispute or even a more general debate. The task for the 
next chapter will be to discuss ways to resolve verbal disputes. I will argue that 
the broadly Carnapian method to clarify terms by revising them, developed in 
earlier chapters, is the appropriate method to resolve vital verbal disputes. 
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Chapter 5 
Resolving Verbal Disputes 
This chapter picks up where the last one left off. The core issue is claims to the 
effect that some dispute in philosophy—about the ontology of material 
objects, about free will or about the semantic/pragmatic distinction—is merely 
verbal and hence pointless. In the last chapter, I offered accounts of two core 
features of verbal disputes, the linguistic confusion that gives rise to them and 
the lack of actual disagreement. Moreover, I argued that even though some 
disputes in philosophy might well display these core features, this does not 
automatically warrant a belittling attitude. Typically, verbal disputes in 
philosophy are not pointless in the same way as the obvious non-philosophical 
examples. Something important is at issue, namely, how to conceive of the 
subject matter of a more general debate to which the dispute belongs. My 
notion of the subject matter of a dispute draws on David Lewis’s (1988) notion 
of the subject matter of a statement. 
 The focus of this chapter is how to resolve verbal disputes. The 
diagnosis of a dispute as merely verbal has important methodological 
consequences. The appropriate treatment for such pointless disputes is to 
smooth them out and focus on the actual, substantive issues (if any) that 
remain. David Chalmers (2011, 526–534) has recently suggested a “method of 
elimination” to do just this. However, as I will argue, this method does not 
suffice to resolve vital verbal disputes because it neglects the more general 
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problem of how to conceive of the subject matter that this dispute shares with 
a more general debate. The appropriate treatment for vital verbal disputes is 
not elimination, but explication, the broadly Carnapian method to revise terms 
developed in earlier chapters. This method helps settle the subject matter of 
the more general debate. My considerations in support of this conclusion will 
also shed light on what considerations are involved in settling the subject 
matter of a debate that make this issue vital.  
 The last section will be an addendum that deals with a last objection to 
the methodological approach defended in this inquiry. Thus, if we adopt the 
views of a Carnapian revisionist, disputes that are clearly substantive come out 
as merely verbal. 
 The results of this chapter will refine and reinforce the view developed 
and defended in earlier chapters. To revise terms in the light of our aims is a 
promising way to settle the subject matter of a debate and adapt our 
terminology accordingly. Moreover, this chapter sheds some light on the 
substantive issues that are involved. 
5.1 The Shortcomings of Chalmers’s Method of Elimination 
In this section, I will discuss Chalmers’s (2011) method of elimination to deal 
with verbal disputes and identify some shortcomings. The most important 
shortcoming for this inquiry is that it does not suffice to resolve vital verbal 
disputes, that is, verbal disputes as they typically occur in philosophy.  
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In the previous chapter, I have suggested that the linguistic confusion 
that gives rise to a verbal dispute about a statement S consists of parties 
meaning different things by uttering the same expression E in S (utterer’s 
meaning). This invites the suggestion that in order to resolve a potentially 
verbal dispute, parties simply need to explain what they meant by uttering S 
and not S respectively. If Muriel told Hanna that what she meant was that John 
has bought one of those devices that can be used to project films onto a wall, 
their dispute would be resolved. If Peter told Paul that what he meant was that 
most supervision meetings take place every other week, the dispute would be 
resolved. Unfortunately, many cases, most notably in philosophy, are not that 
simple. Even if we grant the controversial assumption (see Ch. 4) that speakers 
do have (tacit) beliefs about the meaning of the utterances they make, it seems 
plausible that speakers cannot always explicitly explain the meaning of the 
utterances they make in other words (see Chalmers 2011, 526; Jenkins 
forthcoming, 8). 
Chalmers (2011, 526–530) has recently proposed a method that avoids 
this problem: the method of elimination.53 Elimination can be used to diagnose 
a dispute as wholly or partly verbal and, at the same time, treat the linguistic 
confusion that gives rise to it. The key idea is to eliminate the expression that is 
suspected to be responsible for the verbal dispute and see whether any 
substantive issue remains to be discussed. This method avoids the problems 
with the initial suggestion because parties need not spell out what they mean by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The rough idea can also be found in Sidelle (2007, 89). 
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their utterance. It suffices that they state aspects of their view on the issue at 
hand without using the potentially problematic expression E. More precisely, 
the aim is to find a statement S’ that parties actually disagree on such that S’ 
does not contain E and the dispute over S’ is part of the dispute over S. If 
there is no such S’, the dispute is wholly verbal and can be put to an end. If 
there is such an S’, the dispute is only partly verbal. Parties can now focus on 
the issue they actually disagree on; the dispute is at least clarified.  
It is crucial that the dispute over S’ is part of the dispute over S. Only 
actual disagreement that is directly relevant to the dispute over S counts against 
the dispute over S being wholly verbal. To specify the relevant sense of “part 
of” is a difficult matter. Chalmers (2011, 528) offers instead a helpful 
counterfactual gloss (with the pertinent reservations regarding counterfactual 
glosses): A dispute over a sentence S’ is part of a dispute over a sentence S 
when (i) if parties were to agree that S’ is true, they would, if they are 
reasonable, agree that S is true, and (ii) if parties were to agree that S’ is false, 
they would, if they are reasonable, agree that S is false.  
I will criticise Chalmers’s method of elimination in two steps. The first 
step will be to identify several shortcomings of Chalmers’s account of 
elimination. The second step will be to argue that even if we manage to fix 
these problems, the method does not suffice to handle vital verbal disputes, 
that is, verbal disputes as they are likely to present themselves in philosophy.  
My example for the first step will be the beamer dispute introduced in 
the previous chapter. A summary of the main features is thus in order. Muriel 
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claims “John has bought a beamer” and Hanna objects that this is certainly not 
true. However, the dispute is verbal. Muriel, a German speaker, erroneously 
takes “beamer” to refer to video projectors whereas Hanna, an American, 
takes it correctly to apply to BMWs. This is a deferential case. Just because 
Muriel takes “beamer” to refer to video projectors does not change this 
expression’s meaning in English. Thus, Muriel and Hanna are actually 
expressing conflicting views, namely, that John has bought a BMW and that he 
has not. More precisely, what their utterances mean on the relevant occasion 
(applied timeless utterance meaning in Grice’s sense) conflicts; the 
propositions they intend to express cannot both be true. Nevertheless, Muriel 
and Hanna are not actually disagreeing because what they mean by uttering S 
and not S respectively does not conflict (utterer’s meaning in Grice’s sense). 
Moreover, either party holds a belief whose content is incompatible with what 
the other party means. Muriel means that John bought a video projector, which 
Hanna does not believe not to be the case. Hanna means that John did not buy 
a BMW, which Muriel does not believe to be the case.  
The first shortcoming of Chalmers’s method of elimination is easily 
fixed. We should drop condition (i) of the counterfactual gloss on the idea that 
the dispute over S’ has to be part of the dispute over S. Thus, the dispute over 
S’ is part of the dispute over S when (i) if parties were to agree that S’ is true, 
they would, if they are reasonable, agree that S is true. This condition is too 
strong. There could be another sentence S’’ on whose truth-value parties 
actually disagree and the dispute over S’’ could also be part of the dispute over 
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S. In consequence, parties could agree that S’ is true, but still have a reasonable 
disagreement on whether S is true because they disagree on whether S’’ is true. 
Take a partly verbal dispute in which Hanna utters S “John hasn’t got a car”. 
Suppose Muriel confuses “car” and “cat” and, by uttering “John does have a 
car”, means that John has a cat. The dispute is only partly verbal because 
Muriel actually thinks that John has just bought a BMW. If Hanna restates her 
view and utters S’ “John doesn’t have his Toyota anymore”, Muriel might 
agree with Hanna that S’ is true. And yet it is perfectly rational for her to 
disagree that S is true even once she corrects her linguistic error because she 
thinks that John has just bought a BMW. Therefore, a dispute over a statement 
S’ can be part of a dispute over S even if it does not meet condition (i).  
The second shortcoming concerns deferential cases and it is more 
difficult to fix. Suppose the beamer dispute is only partly verbal because Hanna 
believes that John did not buy a video projector either. Suppose moreover that 
Muriel and Hanna have found some S’ that they actually disagree on such that 
their dispute over S’ is part of the dispute over S, e.g. “John bought one of 
those devices that allow you to project films onto a wall”. It would be wrong 
to say, as the counterfactual gloss wants it, that if Muriel and Hanna were to 
agree that S’ is true, they would, if reasonable, agree that S “John has bought a 
beamer” is true. “Beamer” just does not mean video projector in English, but 
BMW, and Muriel and Hanna do not believe that John has bought a BMW. 
Hence they should not agree that “John has bought a beamer” is true. We 
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might be able to fix this problem by speaking about the utterer’s meaning of S, 
but I am not sure about how exactly this would work.  
The third shortcoming is again easy to fix. Thus, we should exclude S’ 
that are about the meaning of S or E in S; more precisely, the timeless 
utterance meaning in Grice’s sense. An S’ of this sort does not need to give an 
analysis of S. It could express some simple belief a party has about the meaning 
of S or E in S. Hanna might clarify her view by uttering S’ “A ‘beamer’ is a 
kind of car”. Muriel would disagree with her and their dispute about S’ would 
be part of their dispute over S. However, this should not count towards the 
dispute over S being only partly verbal. Otherwise, too many disputes would 
be wholly verbal, namely, all disputes where the timeless utterance meaning is 
unclear in some sense, either because one party gets it wrong or because it is 
unclear to both parties and maybe in general. The beamer dispute would be 
only partly verbal on this view, no matter whether Muriel and Hanna actually 
disagree on whether John bought a BMW or a video projector.  
Instead, we might want to allow statements S’ of a different sort not 
mentioned by Chalmers, namely, statements S’ such that S is part of S’. This 
seems to be a quite natural and straightforward thing for parties to do. What 
Muriel is quite possibly able to find is an S’ such that S is part of S’, e.g. “John 
has bought stuff for his home cinema”. Admittedly, such statements as S’ do 
not allow for a direct diagnosis of a dispute as wholly or partly verbal. 
However, it might be a helpful heuristics to clarify which subject matter each 
party takes to be at issue and whether they might be talking past one another. 
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Note that the account of the subject matter of a dispute developed in 
the previous chapter might afford a way to specify when a dispute over a 
statement S’ is part of a dispute over S. Thus, we could say something along 
the following lines. The dispute over S’ is part of the dispute over S when the 
subject matters of S and S’ are related in a certain way.  Namely, the smallest 
subject matter of S’ has to be part of the smallest subject matter of S. This is 
the case when all worlds that are in the same cell of the partition invoked by S 
are in the same cell of the partition invoked by S’ but not vice versa.54  
Let me now turn to the second step of my criticism. Thus, even once 
we fix the noted shortcomings, the method of elimination does not suffice to 
fully resolve vital verbal disputes, that is, verbal disputes as they are likely to 
occur in philosophy.  
The claim established in the last chapter is that vital verbal disputes 
share the core features of merely verbal disputes and they can be wholly verbal. 
Nevertheless, they are not pointless in the same way because a vital issue is 
involved. The basic idea is that it is not only unclear which subject matter 
parties to the dispute at issue intend to invoke. Rather, the subject matter of a 
more general debate of which this dispute is an instance is unclear. The reason 
is that the linguistic confusion that gives rise to a vital verbal dispute is of a 
particular sort. It is not a simple ambiguity or an obvious linguistic error that 
leads to an unclarity over which subject matter each party invokes in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 On the issue of when one subject matter is part of or included in another, see also Lewis 
1988, sec. IX; Yablo 2012, lecture 1. 
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particular dispute at issue. The utterance meaning of an expression E, for 
example “terrorism”, in the disputed statement S, for example “The victims of 
terrorism are always non-combatants”, is unclear such that the subject matter 
of every dispute that involves this expression is unclear. Given the unclear 
meaning of “terrorism”, it is unclear which aspects of reality the truth-value of 
statements that contain this expression supervenes on. Accordingly, there is a 
range of partitions corresponding to the range of possible clarifications of the 
utterance meaning of “terrorism” that could be at issue. 
As noted earlier, this problem is not resolved if every utterer makes 
their utterer’s meaning explicit like philosopher A and B, that is, if they make 
explicit what subject matter they intend to invoke on a particular occasion. 
This could lead to frequent changes in subject matter such that philosophers 
appear to address the same subject matter, but are actually invoking different 
ones using the same utterance-types.  
This account of vital verbal disputes makes obvious why the method of 
elimination does not suffice to resolve them. The core of elimination is to get 
rid of the problematic expression for the context of the dispute and thus avoid 
any unclarity besetting it. This is a move in a specific interchange between two 
parties, but not a move in the more general debate of which this verbal dispute, 
if vital, is a part. Hence, it remains unclear in what terms this debate should be 
continued and thus the subject matters of this debate remain unclear. As a 
result, the potential for vital verbal disputes that are part of this general debate 
remains high. 
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5.2 The Issue That Renders a Verbal Dispute Vital 
The appropriate method to resolve vital verbal disputes depends on our 
understanding of the unclarity involved. At least two questions regarding the 
unclear expression could be at issue. One question is what the expression does 
actually mean and, correspondingly, what the subject matters at issue actually 
are. The other question is what the expression ought to mean and, 
correspondingly, what subject matters the dispute ought to target. In this 
section, I will argue that it is the second question that renders a verbal dispute 
vital.  
Note that most of those who write about verbal disputes concede that 
words sometimes matter (Chalmers 2011, 516–517; Sidelle 2007, 101; Sider 
2011, 73; Sundell 2011, 12–13). Three cases have been pointed out. Firstly, 
words matter when they are the explicit focus of a debate; for example, in 
philosophy of language (Chalmers 2011, 516). Secondly, it has been highlighted 
that there is sometimes an important question about what words ought to 
mean (Chalmers 2011, 542; Sidelle 2007, 93; Sundell 2011, 12–13). Thirdly, it 
has been suggested that words matter when they play a role in practical 
contexts such that whether or not we use a particular word can make an 
important practical difference (Chalmers 2011, 516–517; Sidelle 2007, 101). 
What I will suggest is that, in vital verbal disputes, words matter in the sense of 
the cases two and three. 
Let me first turn to the alternative suggestion that the unclarity 
involved in a vital verbal dispute is what the unclear expression actually means 
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and, hence, what subject matters are actually at issue. On this view, when 
parties to such a dispute make their utterer’s meaning explicit (what they mean 
by uttering E) like philosopher A and B, it remains to be settled whether any of 
the utterer’s meanings in play reflect the actual timeless utterance meaning of 
the expression. It is a matter of current controversy what the appropriate 
method is to resolve such a problem. Some suggest doing conceptual analysis; 
others recommend empirical research on how people are inclined to apply 
expressions when presented with cases. There are further options. However, it 
does not matter for my argument which option we choose. 
Note that this first view fits well with the idea that verbal disputes in 
philosophy are often vital. After all, the actual meaning of many core 
philosophical terms appears to be contested. Take again the fictitious verbal 
dispute between philosophers A and B about the statement S “The victims of 
terrorism are always non-combatants”. Recall that philosopher A who utters 
“S” uses “terrorism” explicitly to refer to violence against non-combatants for 
political purposes; for the sake of clarity, I’ll use the label “terrorismA”. 
Philosopher B who utters “not S” uses “terrorism” to refer to violence against 
some with the intent to spread fear in a wider community for political 
purposes; henceforth labelled “terrorismB”. I have construed the dispute such 
that it comes out as wholly verbal on my account. Thus, A and B do not have 
beliefs that conflict with what the other one meant by uttering S and not S 
respectively. B does not believe that the victims of terrorismA are not always 
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non-combatants and A does not believe that victims of terrorismB are always 
non-combatants.  
One might object that this dispute comes out as only party verbal when 
applying Chalmers’s method of elimination. However, this is not actually the 
case if we take a refinement into account that I have not mentioned thus far. 
When applying the method of elimination to the dispute between A and B and 
even if we make the amendments that I have suggested, we are likely to find 
some S’ that fulfils the relevant conditions. A and B might well actually 
disagree on S’ “The victims of 9/11 are all non-combatants”. Moreover, the 
dispute over S’ would plausibly be part of the dispute over S. If A and B were 
to agree that S’ is false, they were to agree that S “The victims of terrorism are 
always non-combatants” is false.55 This suggests that the method of elimination 
misdiagnoses this dispute as merely verbal.  
However, this is not actually the case. Chalmers (2011, 528) mentions 
this sort of case and refines his method of elimination accordingly. He (2011, 
528) proposes that in such a case the dispute over S’ would not count against 
the dispute over S being wholly verbal because the relation between these 
disputes is “metalinguistically mediated”. Roughly, the dispute over S’ does not 
impact directly on the dispute over S, but mediated via its impact on how A 
and B decide to use the term “terrorism”. If A and B were to agree that S’ is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Admittedly, it could also be vice versa such that the dispute over S is part of the dispute over 
S’. In this case, if A and B were to agree that S “The victims of 9/11 are all non-combatants” is 
false, they were to agree that S’ “The victims of terrorism are always non-combatants” is false. 
For my argument, it only matters that we can construe the dispute such that the dispute over S’ 
is part of the dispute over S. 
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false, that is, that the victims of 9/11 are not all non-combatants, they would 
not use “terrorism” in the sense of terrorismA and therefore agree that S is 
false, that is, that the victims of terrorism are not always non-combatants. S’ 
are only relevant for the diagnosis of a dispute as merely verbal if the disputes 
over S and S’ are not linguistically mediated in this sense. 
The question of primary concern in this section is what issue renders a 
wholly verbal dispute like the one between A and B vital. More precisely, in 
what sense is the expression “terrorism” unclear such that the subject matter 
of terrorism is in general unclear. The first view, which I aim to reject, is that 
the actual meaning of “terrorism” is unclear and hence the subject matter that 
is actually at issue in our debates about terrorism. To be clear, I grant that this 
unclarity besets the expression “terrorism” and our debates about terrorism. 
However, I disagree that this is the issue that renders the dispute over S vital 
and that needs to be resolved.  
Suppose that we attempt to resolve this issue by settling what 
“terrorism” actually means. For the sake of argument, let us assume that we 
arrive at the conclusion that “terrorism” actually means terrorismA. In 
consequence, A and B, if rational, would agree that S is true. However, this 
would not settle a number of important issues. Is terrorismA actually the most 
salient subject matter to address? Does it draw the most salient distinctions? Is 
terrorismB a more salient or an equally salient subject matter? Is terrorismA a 
precise and refined enough subject matter? Is it distorted by prejudice? In 
short, we are left with the normative question of what “terrorism” ought to 
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mean and what subject matter we ought to address in the debate about 
terrorism. Note that the problem is not so much what we ought to attach this 
particular label to and what subject matter should be discussed under this 
heading. Rather, the question is what we should be able to refer to in our 
shared language independently of which label we use, what subject matters we 
should be able to raise in our shared language. 
Admittedly, some might object that such normative questions about 
language are obsolete. Our actual language does already draw the most salient 
distinctions; the only problem is our insufficient and flawed understanding of 
what we refer to. However, as argued in Chapter 1, even someone like 
Theodor Sider (2011), who would defend such a view as regards some terms, 
would grant the usefulness to ask normative questions about some terms. 
Moreover, as I have argued in Chapter 2, it is advisable to ask normative 
questions if we are not certain that the actual meaning of an expression is 
already perfect. Because if it is, the method to revise terms that I advocate 
would likely reveal its actual meaning rather than pointing us towards a less 
suitable alternative.  
As a result, the issue that renders verbal disputes vital and that deserves 
consideration is the normative issue of what the unclear expression involved 
ought to mean and precisely what subject matter(s) we ought to address in our 
debate about terrorism.  
Notably, I am not claiming that the question of what “terrorism” 
actually means in English could not be an important question in certain 
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contexts; for example, where we are concerned with ordinary language and 
how it distorts the debate about terrorism. The point is that it is not the 
question that renders a verbal dispute vital and that needs to be resolved in 
order to fully resolve the verbal disputes. 
5.3 Explicating Away Vital Verbal Disputes  
The aim of this section is to argue that the appropriate method to resolve vital 
verbal disputes is the method to revise terms that I have developed and 
defended in previous chapters, an heir to Carnap’s method of explication.56 
This will also afford a deeper understanding of the vital issues involved in 
these verbal disputes and what depends on them.  
The conclusion so far is that elimination is a remedy for the linguistic 
confusion in the specific dispute between philosopher A and B, but it is not a 
move in the more general debate about terrorism to which this dispute 
belongs. More specifically, what remains to be settled is in what terms this 
debate should be carried out and, accordingly, how we should conceive of its 
subject matter. The method of explication or terminological revision that I 
have developed and defended in previous chapters is designed to answer such 
normative questions about terms and thereby settle the subject matter of 
debates to which they are central. Therefore, it is the appropriate method to 
resolve vital verbal disputes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This proposal is, in fact, sympathetic to Chalmers’s approach; in his “Carnapian conclusion” 
(2011, 564), he points out that his pragmatism about conceptual frameworks is Carnapian and 
explicitly mentions Carnap’s method of explication. 
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 Recall that explication, as I conceive of it, serves to improve a pre-
theoretic term guided by relevant theoretical (and sometimes practical) aims. 
One useful way to identify relevant aims (see Ch. 1) is to specify the kind of 
theoretical questions or issues we hope to address using the term in question. 
In order to avoid unmotivated subject change and exclude outlandish 
explications (see Chs. 1, 3), we should not use the term we are explicating in 
our specification. An aim that could guide a philosophical explication of the 
term “terrorism” could be to assess whether there is a morally distinctive 
category in the vicinity of cases of politically motivated violence such as 9/11 
(see Ch. 3). Such a theoretical aim helps identify desirable improvements. A 
core improvement is to decide which distinctions a term should track given 
our aims and adjust its conditions of application to actual and hypothetical 
cases accordingly. Other common improvements are to render the term more 
precise by settling unclear cases of application and to specify the term in a way 
that promotes simplicity of the overall theory (see Ch. 1).  
I have also argued (Chs. 1, 2) that explicating a term either precisifies 
the subject matter of a debate or, where necessary, adjusts it to our (negotiable) 
aims. On this basis, we can specify the more general challenge underlying a 
vital verbal dispute: We need to settle what the most salient referents are given 
the questions that we hope to answer and, accordingly, what subject matters 
we need to raise in the context of our broader interests.  
If this is on the right track, parties to the fictitious dispute about 
terrorism should ask how to best explicate the term “terrorism” and whether 
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account A or B might provide good explications. There are a number of 
possible outcomes depending on a number of issues philosophers A and B 
would need to address. Examining these issues in more detail will disclose 
what exactly is at issue in a vital verbal dispute and what depends on it. I will 
argue that the choice of a terminology and thus of a subject matter has 
epistemic, ethical and practical aspects.57 The relevant issues to be considered 
fall into two groups. One group comprises issues that arise for every 
explication and impact on it, but they are less directly terminological in 
character; these should be familiar from discussions in previous chapters. 
Issues in the other group concern terminology more directly, namely, the 
choice of a label; they arise for every explication as well, but I have not 
addressed them so far. 
The first group comprises two closely related issues, namely, what aim 
the term in question should serve and, accordingly, what distinctions it should 
trace. As regards the term “terrorism”, philosophers largely agree that the term 
should pick out, if possible, a morally salient form of politically motivated 
violence in the vicinity of such cases as 9/11 (see Ch. 3). In other cases, the 
aim is more controversial. In the debate about human rights, Rawls and others 
hope to use the notion of a human right to settle the boundaries of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This might reveal another difference to Carnap’s form of explication. Carnap is often read as 
suggesting that explication is a purely pragmatic matter concerning what is most convenient 
and useful, whereas I submit that epistemic and ethical considerations matter as well. This 
reading of Carnap is a starting point for one of Quine’s (1951b) notorious criticisms, namely, 
the one that concerns the distinction between choosing a language and choosing a theory. My 
considerations suggest this criticism. However, I do not want to take a stance on how to best 
interpret Carnap (or Quine).    
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international toleration; others pursue aims that are closer to the historical idea 
of a right that every human being has simply by virtue of being human (see Ch. 
1). Moreover, epistemology has fairly recently rediscovered the significance of 
asking why we value knowledge (see Pritchard and Turri 2012) and thus a 
theoretical aim that could guide an explication of “knowledge”.   
The impacts of this issue on our terminology and the subject matters it 
invokes is particularly pronounced if, as I have argued in ch 1, different 
theoretical aims can require tracing different distinctions in the vicinity of how 
a pre-theoretic term is used. Thus, aims in legal theory might prompt a 
different explication of the term “terrorism” than moral concerns. If this 
should turn out to be the case, we would need to split the term. Within moral 
theory, the aim is fairly uncontroversial (see Ch. 3). Moreover, in the actual 
debate about terrorism, accounts that are not unlike A and B are discussed as 
competing accounts of terrorism (see Ch. 3). The main disagreement is on 
what the morally salient distinctions are in the vicinity of what we ordinarily 
apply the term “terrorism” to and whether there actually is a referent that 
differs in morally salient ways from other forms of political violence. These are 
vital issues for moral theory that impact on our choice of terminology and 
subject matter. 
The second group of vital issues that are involved in an explication are 
more overtly terminological; they concern the choice of a label. By “label”, I 
mean the sequence of sounds or letters that carry the meaning. I have not 
addressed these issues so far; hence, what follows will also afford some 
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refinements of my account of explication. When we eliminate the term 
“terrorism” in order to resolve the verbal dispute between philosopher A and 
B, we also dispose of the label.58 By contrast, an explication of the term 
“terrorism” forces us to choose a label. In some cases, we keep the initial label 
and only revise a term’s meaning. However, sometimes adjustments are called 
for. An obvious case is where we split a term because we discover that there is 
more than one interesting referent in the vicinity. Thus, the question is not so 
much what to attach the initial labels to. Rather, the question is what we need 
labels for in our terminology and which labels. Some might think that this is 
merely a problem of coordination; it does not matter much which label we 
choose so long as we agree on something. However, I am inclined to think that 
the choice of labels ideally involves epistemic, pragmatic and ethical 
considerations.59  
The first consideration is what we need labels for in our shared 
language. How we answer this question impacts on what subject matters can 
easily be raised and made progress on. This has epistemic and ethical 
relevance.60 A nice illustration of what I have in mind is Orwell’s Newspeak in 
his 1984. Newspeak is an impoverished version of English that does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Admittedly, Chalmers (2011, 532) proposes a convenient interim solution, the “subscript 
gambit”. I have actually been using it above. Thus, we do not simply eliminate the term 
“terrorism”, but introduce replacement terms such as “terrorismA” and “terrorismB” that are 
stipulated to refer to what A and B use “terrorism” to refer to respectively. However, this is 
hardly a long-term solution for moral theory and debates about political violence in general. 
59 The idea that what label we choose matters is somewhat inspired by Peirce’s idea of an 
“ethics of terminology” (see also Chalmers 2011, 542). However, it is not entirely clear what 
Peirce takes the ethics of terminology to be. For some illuminating considerations, see Haack 
(2009).  
60 Fricker’s ([2007] 2010) notion of “hermeneutical injustice” captures a problem that can arise 
if this issue is neglected or decided in an epistemically and ethically problematic way. 
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contain labels for such things as freedom or resistance, promoted by the 
totalitarian state in order to prevent consideration and discussion of contrary 
political views. This example discloses the difference of this consideration to 
issues in the first group. The first group of issues concerns what interesting 
distinctions there are to be drawn. The consideration at issue here is which of 
those distinctions we want to track with our terminology. 
This first consideration has two aspects. Firstly, what distinctions our 
terminology traces has an impact on what subject matters are easily raised, that 
is, what partitions are easily invoked. Take the current debate in philosophy 
about whether we need the label “race” (see also Ch. 2).61 Eliminativists argue 
that we should eliminate the label entirely because its traditional extension is 
empty; there are no fundamental biological differences between the people that 
allegedly belong to different races. Retaining this label would perpetuate the 
misguided and discriminating idea that the term refers to something in the 
actual world. Others argue that we should keep the label and have it trace the 
distinctions that are actually there—e.g. social roles based on superficial traits 
such as skin colour—in order to be able to discuss problems due to the 
misguided idea of human races. Put in terms of subject matters, the argument 
of the latter group is that, without a convenient label, it will be much harder to 
raise such a subject matter as racism. The subject matter of racism is a partition 
of logical space into worlds that are exactly alike with respect to racism. What 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Haslanger (2006) provides a good overview of the different methodological approaches that 
have been proposed. 
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we mean by “racism” determines which distinctions are relevant for this 
partition and thus what it is for a statement to be about racism. Put differently, 
it settles what distinctions we treat as relevant for the evaluation of statements 
in a dispute. If we do not have a label ready to invoke a certain evaluative 
background for a dispute, we can describe it instead and thus create an ad hoc 
label. After eliminating the label “terrorism”, we could have used such a label 
as “political violence against non-combatants for political purposes” in order 
to initiate a discussion about this form of political violence. However, this 
makes it much harder and less straightforward to invoke the subject matter, to 
make yourself understood by others and to convince them that the subject 
matter you are raising is worth their while.  
Secondly, which distinctions our terminology traces fosters progress on 
certain subject matters. An explication is guided by theoretical or practical 
aims. Thus, an explication of “race” could be guided by the theoretical aim to 
examine moral issues concerning racism or the practical aim to reduce racism 
in different social contexts such as the job market. In the light of these issues, 
we decide which distinctions the term should trace. Moreover, different 
distinctions can be relevant for different issues. Hence, the resulting term is 
particularly useful to address certain issues, but not others that might be 
relevant in some context and for someone. As I have argued in Chapter 1, the 
aims that guide an explication also introduce a subject matter that we hope to 
address. Accordingly, we can say that what distinctions our terminology traces 
has an impact on what subject matters we can more easily make progress on.   
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Whether we can raise a subject matter easily and make progress on it 
easily has epistemic as well ethical relevance. It influences which issues we are 
more likely to gain knowledge on and whose concerns are more likely to be 
addressed.  
The second consideration when choosing labels is which labels to 
choose. This consideration has practical, pragmatic as well as epistemic 
relevance. It has practical relevance because (see Chalmers 2011, 516–517; 
Sidelle 2007, 101) some labels, such as “terrorism”, are intertwined with 
practices, and the choice of a certain label rather than another can then have 
important practical consequences. Even if there is no doubt that a patient’s 
brain has stopped working, it is of great practical significance whether or not 
we use the label “dead”; such decisions as whether to discontinue life-support 
depend on it (this is in practice the case; the decision need not depend on the 
use of this label and could be made without invoking it).  
It might be objected that these practical concerns are primarily relevant 
outside philosophy and hence do not support the idea that verbal disputes in 
philosophy are often vital. Even though philosophers often start with words 
that are commonly used, they often give them a more specific meaning in the 
context of their theories. These theoretical terms are not those that are 
intertwined with our practices. I have provided an answer to this objection in 
Chapter 3. Thus, philosophical terms might rarely be used as such in practical 
contexts. Nevertheless, it is well possible (and, as I am inclined to think, 
desirable) that philosophical considerations and terminology influence the 
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terminology used in the wider society. If this is the case, philosophers need to 
keep potential practical consequences in mind where they use labels that are 
used outside philosophy as well.  
The second consideration has a pragmatic aspect in so far as there are 
more or less convenient labels. It is, for example, preferable to have short 
labels rather than long-winded descriptions for things that we often refer to. It 
would be quite inconvenient to use a label like “violence against non-
combatants for political purposes” in a theory that focuses on this form of 
political violence.  
There is also an epistemic aspect because labels are not only 
intertwined with practices, but also with theoretical disputes. If we simply 
eliminate a label that is central to such a dispute (for example, the label 
“terrorism”) the connection with these disputes might be unclear and we might 
even appear to have dropped the subject matter altogether.   
To sum up, the vital issue involved in vital verbal disputes is what the 
core terms of a more general debate should refer to and, accordingly, how we 
should conceive of a core subject matter of that debate. I have argued that this 
is a task for explication, the method to revise terms in the light of our 
theoretical or practical aims developed and defended in previous sections. 
Moreover, I have attempted to show that the task of explicating terms involves 
pragmatic, epistemic and ethical considerations. What depends on it are such 
things as what subject matters we can easily raise and make progress on and 
whose interests are catered for. 
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Importantly, parties to a vital verbal dispute might not be in a position 
to resolve the vital issue involved. This is typically difficult, and others who are 
involved in the more general debate have a say as well. Moreover, parties might 
not even be in a position to contribute to a resolution. Someone who is 
involved in composing a law that employs the term “biodiversity” is in a better 
position to influence the development of this term than a random person who 
happens to worry about biodiversity. Furthermore, the more general debate 
might require more or less clarity on the issue at hand. Finally, parties can care 
more or less about the more general debate and its clarity. However, 
philosophers are likely to be in a good position to contribute to the resolution 
of their vital verbal disputes. They typically care about the clarity of their 
debates and are in a position to propose terminological improvements. 
5.4 Addendum: Turning Substantive into Merely Verbal Disputes 
The discussion in this chapter allows me now to respond to a last objection to 
the methodological approach defended in this inquiry. Thus, if we accept the 
views of a Carnapian revisionist, disputes that are clearly substantive come out 
as merely verbal (e.g. Cohen MS, 1; Jackson [1998] 2008, 31; Sider 2011, 74–
75; Sundell 2011, 14–15; Weatherson 2003, 13). In the following, I will first 
offer what I take to be a particularly convincing way to spell out the criticism 
based on Sider’s account of mere verbalness. I will then develop a response 
based on considerations in this chapter.   
 184 
 As discussed in the last chapter, Sider’s (2011, Ch. 4) account of mere 
verbalness—or, as he calls it, non-substantivity—explains the linguistic 
confusion that gives rise to a verbal dispute in terms of charitable 
interpretations.  
Recall that charitable interpretations are interpretations that render a 
statement true. In order to exclude random “crazy” interpretations, we need to 
restrict admissible charitable interpretations. One restriction is typically that an 
interpretation should accord with the use (suitably understood) of the 
problematic term by a party or their linguistic community. Sider claims that this 
does not suffice and that the world, which he argues to be objectively 
structured, is another limiting factor. Thus, different charitable interpretations 
of a term that accord with its use in a linguistic community—“meaning 
candidates” as Sider calls them—are only admissible if none of them is more 
joint carving than the others. The motivating idea is that objective joints in 
nature function as reference magnets such that they outweigh errors, variations 
and indeterminacies in use. Even if the use of two speakers differs to some 
extent, the term has the same referent provided that there is only one joint 
carving referent in the vicinity. As a result, a dispute between these speakers 
might seem to be merely verbal, but it is not because they are not actually 
referring to different things with the same expression.  
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This leads Sider (2011, 49) to the following account of non-
substantivity62 (I simplify somewhat): A dispute over a statement S is non-
substantive if and only if, for at least one expression E in S, there are different 
candidate meanings such that S comes out true on some candidate and false on 
some other, and none of the candidates is more joint carving than the others. 
Note two crucial differences between this account and my view 
developed in the previous chapter. Firstly, I have rejected accounts in terms of 
charitable interpretations. Hence, in my view, a dispute can be merely verbal 
even if both parties are making false claims “in their own language”. Sider’s 
account excludes this possibility. The core idea of his account is that in a 
merely verbal dispute, both parties say the truth when charitably interpreted.  
Secondly, in my view, what matters is utterer’s meaning rather than 
utterance meaning in a Gricean sense. Hence, even if what the uttered 
statements mean in a shared language conflicts, the dispute might still be verbal 
given that what parties mean by their utterances does not conflict with the 
other parties’ beliefs. On Sider’s account, charitable interpretations play a role 
and hence to some extent what parties mean by their utterances. However, 
admissible charitable interpretations and hence what speakers can mean by 
their utterances are strictly limited, namely, by the objective structure of the 
world. In consequence, this account does not allow for the possibility that 
what speakers mean by an utterance about objective features of the world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Sider’s account of non-substantivity is designed to also cover questions etc., but only 
disputes matter for my purpose.  
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diverges from what this utterance means in a shared language; for example, 
because they misunderstand the meaning of a term. Or, at any rate, this does 
not affect the status of the dispute, presumably because the content of parties’ 
beliefs is taken to depend on the content of their statements and not vice versa 
like on the Gricean account.  
Take the following notorious case in order to illustrate the difference 
between the two accounts as well as the criticism that I hope to address in this 
section. In the early nineteenth century, “fish” was still commonly applied to 
whales. A dispute ensued over the statement “Whales are fish” when some 
people started to appeal to the emerging scientific taxonomy.63  
This dispute is clearly substantive on Sider’s account. I will call those 
who applied “fish” to whales traditionalists and those who used the new 
scientific taxonomy progressivists. Given how traditionalists and progressivists 
use “fish”, there are two meaning candidates for the expression “fish” in the 
disputed claim such that one (fish including whales) renders the disputed claim 
true and the other one (fish excluding whales) renders it false. However, one of 
these candidates is more joint carving, namely, the one on which the claim 
comes out false. Therefore, in Sider’s view, we cannot charitably interpret 
traditionalists as referring to a different set of animals. They are referring to the 
very same set as progressivists and simply make more errors when they use the 
term due to a lack of relevant scientific knowledge. The much greater eligibility 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 In his Trying Leviathan, the historian of science D. Graham Burnett (2007) describes an 
infamous trial that took place in Manhattan in 1818. At that time, there was a tax on fish oil 
and a jury had to determine whether a whale was a fish in order to determine whether whale oil 
was subject to taxes. A sensational pubic debate ensued.  
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of this referent outweighs the differences in use and, in particular, 
traditionalists’ errors.64 As a result, the dispute over “Whales are fish” was not 
verbal, but substantive. Moreover, progressivists were right and traditionalists 
wrong about this empirical matter. This is an intuitively appealing diagnosis. 
Whether whales are fish clearly seems to be an empirical matter. How could it 
fail to be substantive?  
However, the views of a Carnapian revisionist seem to render this 
dispute merely verbal. This revisionist finds it likely that the term “fish” does 
not have the same referent when used by traditionalists and progressivists. The 
term progressivists use was revised for scientific purposes upon the discovery 
that the class of “fish” share much more biologically salient features if we 
exclude whales. Moreover, the anti-realism often ascribed to Carnap (see 
Eklund 2013) suggests that this revisionist rejects the idea of joints in nature. 
She maintains that revisions are guided by pragmatic considerations about 
usefulness alone. If these revisionist assumptions are true, the dispute between 
the ancients and us classifies as verbal on my account as well as on Sider’s.  
On Sider’s account, it is verbal because, if the revisionist is right, there 
really are two meaning candidates involved. Each renders one party’s statement 
true and none is more joint carving than the other. The contents of the uttered 
statements do not conflict. Traditionalists claim that whales belong to the class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 It is important that the traditionalists’ and the progressivists’ use of “fish” is similar enough 
such that the same more joint carving referent is in the vicinity and is thus a meaning candidate 
for the term “fish” as used by traditionalists and progressivists. This allows the Siderian to 
argue that it is, in fact, the referent of the term for both parties such that their dispute is 
substantive.    
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of all animals that have fins and live in the water. Progressivists insist that 
whales do not belong to the class of animals that science classifies as “fish”. 
On my account, the dispute is verbal because each party plausibly does not 
have beliefs that conflict with what the other party means by uttering the 
disputed statement. Thus, progressivists did not believe that whales do not 
belong to the class of animals with fins that live in the water and traditionalists 
did not believe that whales have the features scientific theories ascribe to fish; 
they plausibly did not know or care what scientific theories said about fish.  
As a result, if we adopt the views of the Carnapian revisionist, whether 
fish are whales depends on which terminology we find more convenient to 
adopt. Matters of truth and facts appear as mere matters of stipulation.  
 The revisionist can answer this criticism in two ways, depending on 
what metaphysical and semantic assumptions she adopts. One option is to 
accept Sider’s assumption that the world has a certain objective structure. I 
have shown in Chapter 1 that revisionism is compatible with Sider’s 
metaphysical assumptions. Such a revisionist, call her the Siderian revisionist, 
rejects the accusation that the revisionist does not accept joints in nature and 
that revisions are only guided by pragmatic considerations. If reference 
magnetism turns out to be true, revisions of such terms as “fish” are not 
actually terminological revisions; we only revise our understanding of its 
meaning as we gain more knowledge of the biological nature of its referent. 
Since the meaning does not change in this case, the Siderian revisionist urges 
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that the dispute over “Whales are fish” does not classify as verbal on Sider’s 
account.  
 If reference magnetism turns out to be false, a possibility Sider (2011, 
74) acknowledges, the revision of “fish” based on scientific findings is an 
instance of terminological revision that changes the referent. Whereas whales 
are in the extension of “fish” as used by traditionalists, they have been 
excluded from the extension by scientists due to empirical findings suggesting 
that this would render the term much more useful for science. This revision, 
the Siderian revisionist highlights, has rendered the term more joint carving.  
It is not entirely clear what we should say about the status of this 
dispute because even though one candidate meaning is more joint carving, 
there are nevertheless two meanings involved; this is a scenario Sider’s account 
does not envisage. If we decide to classify it as verbal because there are two 
meanings involved and each party’s statement comes out true on one of them, 
the Siderian revisionist could insist that the dispute is not merely verbal. It is 
vital verbal in the sense that there is an important question about how to 
conceive of the subject matter of biology where animals living in the water are 
concerned. Moreover, progressivists are in a stronger position because they 
have identified the more joint carving way to conceive of the subject matter 
and adapted the term accordingly. Hence, even though what traditionalists say 
might be true given their terminology and conception of the subject matter of 
fish, progressivists better capture the objective structure of the world and 
address a more joint carving subject matter.  
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 As regards terms where joint-carvingness is not available even on 
Sider’s view, such as “beautiful” (2011, 57), the Siderian revisionist points out 
that revisions do not pose a problem. On Sider’s account, disputes involving 
these terms are not substantive anyway.   
 I am inclined towards a more pragmatic revisionism that needs to be 
defended in a different way. The more pragmatic revisionist thinks that even if 
the world is objectively structured on a fundamental level, there is much room 
for choice on less fundamental levels on where to draw terminological 
boundaries depending on our theoretical (and sometimes practical) interests. 
Moreover, she rejects reference magnetism. The world can play a role in 
determining reference, but only if we decide that this is the case, for example, 
by deciding that “fish” refers to whatever biologically interesting class there is 
in the vicinity of the class of animals that live in the water and have fins.65 
Terminological revisions, in this view, are mainly actual revisions where we 
adjust the meaning of our terms to our theoretical (or practical) aims.  
Sider’s account of mere verbalness is not acceptable for the pragmatic 
revisionist because it is based on assumptions she rejects. By contrast, my view 
of verbal disputes fits well with pragmatic revisionism. As regards the dispute 
between traditionalists and progressivists, it is not entirely clear whether it 
classifies as verbal or not. In my view, this depends on what traditionalists and 
progressivists meant by uttering “Whales are fish” (utterer’s meaning). Suppose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In his recent criticism of reference magnetism, Schwarz (forthcoming, sec. 7) calls this 
“illusions of magnetism”. 
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traditionalists used “fish” to refer to a biologically interesting class of animals 
that typically live in the water and have fins. On this assumption, they 
misapplied the term to whales given their own standards due to a lack of 
relevant empirical knowledge. What they meant by “Whales are fish” is then 
that whales belong to the biologically interesting class of animals that typically 
live in the water and have fins. This would clearly conflict with what 
progressivists believed and the dispute would not be verbal; there would be 
actual disagreement.  
Alternatively, traditionalists might have used “fish” to refer to the class 
of animals that live in the water, have fins and are profitable goods. On this 
assumption, what they meant by “Whales are fish” is presumably that whales 
belong to the class of animals that live in the water, have fins and are profitable 
goods. This does not conflict with what progressivists believed, namely, that 
whales do not share certain newly discovered features with other animals that 
live in the water and have fins. Moreover, traditionalists might not have held 
any beliefs that conflicted with what progressivists meant by uttering “Whales 
are fish”, namely, that whales do not belong to the class of fish as defined by 
science. Hence, the dispute comes out as verbal. However, the dispute is 
plausibly a vital one and hence not pointless.  
 The dispute is a vital verbal dispute because “fish” was part of an 
ongoing legal and a scientific debate. Confusion over it affected these ongoing 
debates and not only one particular dispute between two parties on a given 
occasion. The question at issue was which distinctions the term “fish” at the 
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core of these debates should trace given scientific and legal purposes and, 
accordingly, how to delineate the subject matter of these debates. Answering 
this question involves substantive issues such as whether the scientifically 
salient distinctions are also legally salient.  
On this interpretation of the dispute between progressivists and 
traditionalists, it would not have been rational for progressivists to tell 
traditionalists that they were wrong. However, it would have been rational to 
urge that they use the term “fish” in a way that cuts across scientifically salient 
distinctions. The rational reaction for traditionalists would have been to 
consider whether they had respectable—for example, legal or moral—interests 
that supported the need for a different terminology. In that case, they could, 
for example, have settled on splitting the term into “biological fish” and “legal 
fish” or on describing the relevant legal category not as “fish”, but as “fish plus 
whales”. 
The upshot is that if we adopt the views of the pragmatic revisionist, 
some disputes come out as verbal that might appear to be substantive. 
However, they do not come out as merely verbal, but as vital verbal disputes. 
As such, they share the structure of merely verbal disputes, but they do not 
share their pointlessness; substantive issues are involved.  
Conclusion 
This chapter is complementary to the last one. The core concerns in both 
chapters were claims to the effect that a certain dispute in philosophy—about 
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the ontology of material objects, about free will or the semantic/pragmatic 
distinction—are merely verbal and hence pointless. 
In the previous chapter, I have offered accounts of two core features 
of verbal disputes, the linguistic confusion that gives rise to them and the lack 
of actual disagreement, and I have argued that disputes in philosophy that have 
these features are likely to be what I call vital verbal disputes. The vital issues 
involved concern a more general debate of which the verbal dispute in 
question is a part, namely, what a core term—such as “terrorism” or 
“knowledge”—should refer to and, accordingly, how we should conceive of a 
core subject matter of that dispute—such as the subject matter of terrorism or 
knowledge.  
In this chapter, I have addressed the methodological challenge posed 
by verbal disputes. If a dispute is merely verbal, the appropriate treatment 
seems to be to straighten it out and focus on the substantive issues, if any, that 
remain. Chalmers has recently suggested a method to do so—the method of 
elimination. I have identified several shortcomings of this method. Moreover, I 
have argued that, even once these are fixed, the method is ill-suited to resolve 
vital verbal disputes because it neglects the vital issue involved that concerns a 
more general debate. My proposal was that the method to revise terms that I 
have developed and defended in previous chapters, an heir to Carnap’s method 
of explication, is the appropriate method to resolve vital verbal disputes. More 
specifically, it is not only more suitable than elimination, but also more 
appropriate than conceptual analysis or empirical research on what a term 
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actually means. A discussion of considerations that influence terminological 
revision as I conceive of it has also provided a deeper understanding of what 
depends on it. As a side product, these considerations have led to a refinement 
of the account of terminological revision developed thus far, namely, as 
regards the choice of a label. When revising terms, the choice of a label—
whether we keep the initial label, modify it or choose a new one altogether—
requires practical, pragmatic and ethical considerations. 
  The last section was an addendum in which I have addressed a final 
criticism against my methodological recommendation in this inquiry, namely, 
that if we adopt the views of a Carnapian revisionist, disputes that are clearly 
substantive come out as merely verbal. I have argued that the disputes that 
come out as verbal rather than substantive come out as vital verbal disputes. 
These share the structure of merely verbal disputes, but they do not share their 
pointlessness; substantive issues are involved.  
The considerations in this chapter reinforce the view defended in 
earlier chapters. Attention to words is required in order to settle the subject 
matter of first-order inquiry. However, in a number of philosophically 
important cases including vital verbal disputes, to examine the current meaning 
of terms is not the best way to do so. It is more fruitful to revise current 
terminology in light of our aims and findings and thus determine the subject 
matter we ought to focus on. As the considerations in this chapter show, this 
endeavour involves epistemic, ethical as well as pragmatic considerations.
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Final Words 
How much do words matter in philosophy? Is it necessary to examine what the 
terms “knowledge” or “terrorism” really mean in order to settle the subject 
matter of a debate about knowledge or an inquiry into terrorism? I have 
examined how this question arises in a number of contexts such as the location 
problem whose resolution, according to Frank Jackson, requires conceptual 
analysis; contested evaluative terms like “terrorism” that hinder normative 
debates; and merely verbal disputes in which parties talk past each other. 
Approaches to these issues fall roughly into two camps. Some 
acknowledge the need to examine the actual meaning of terms in order to 
settle the subject matter of first-order inquiry, either by doing conceptual 
analysis or using empirical methods. Others argue that studying the 
phenomena at issue rather than the meaning of terms settles the subject 
matter; analysing the meaning of terms is therefore unnecessary.  
I have argued that an updated version of Carnap’s method of 
explication can be a promising method to settle the subject matter of inquiry. 
On this approach, we revise pre-theoretic terms guided by our aims. In the 
contexts considered, this approach is more promising than extant alternatives. 
The approach has considerable advantages over traditional as well as more 
recent forms of conceptual analysis. Intuitions play only a very modest role. In 
consequence, my approach avoids influential objections to conceptual analysis 
due to its heavy reliance on intuitions. Moreover, it is less vulnerable to 
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criticism due to counterexamples and it does not make our theories hostage to 
pre-theoretic language. Finally, it promotes considerations on important 
terminological matters that are underrated by opponents of conceptual 
analysis.  
The upshot is that it does not matter much what the core terms of 
philosophical inquiry mean in ordinary or pre-theoretic language. However, it 
matters what they ought to mean given our aims and, accordingly, how we 
ought to delineate the subject matter of a debate or theory. How we answer 
this question is of epistemic, ethical and pragmatic significance.  
The account of terminological revision that I have developed is an heir 
of Carnap’s method of explication, updated in order to accommodate recent 
themes and challenges. In particular, it is not committed to the controversial 
semantic assumption that terms have intensions or the metaphysical anti-
realism often ascribed to Carnap. However, I retain Carnap’s pragmatism. 
How we ought to delineate a subject matter and design our terminology 
depends on our aims. Notably, I part company with Carnap where linguistic 
tolerance is concerned. I hold that there are important ethical and epistemic 
restrictions on what aims are respectable and hence on the freedom to choose 
a language. I also agree with Carnap’s naturalism regarding explication. 
Explication or terminological revision is commonly used in the sciences; to 
promote its use in philosophy is to promote a certain continuity with the 
sciences. 
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 Another important influence for my inquiry was David Lewis’s account 
of the subject matter of a statement. It is the most promising of the few 
accounts on offer. I have used it to get a clearer view on what the subject 
matter of a debate is.  
 From a historical point of view, my inquiry engages with the ideal of 
clarity that has always been a core value of analytic philosophy. Philosophers 
who took the linguistic turn in the first half of the twentieth century promoted 
clarity understood as a thorough understanding of what the terms we use really 
mean. This was supposed to fully answer or resolve philosophical questions 
about the world. In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, 
analytic philosophy developed a new self-image in which the study of concepts 
and terms plays a bit part. The theme was “Clarity is not enough”. In 1998, 
Frank Jackson revived the idea that close attention to what our terms actually 
mean is indispensable, even though it is only a first step and does not fully 
answer philosophical questions about the nature of things. The upshot of my 
inquiry is that attention to terms is, indeed, crucial in order to settle the subject 
matter of first-order inquiry. However, it does not matter much what the terms 
actually mean in ordinary or pre-theoretic language. Rather, the crucial 
question is what they ought to mean given our aims and findings. The 
linguistic turn went too far, but it was not a wrong turning altogether. 
 The scope of my main claim is limited. Terms only require attention 
when they are unclear to an extent that compromises a debate. The 
considerations in this inquiry suggest that the problem is not so much an 
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insufficient understanding of what such terms as “knowledge” or “terrorism” 
actually mean in ordinary or pre-theoretic language. These terms require special 
attention because they are not well suited to our theoretical aims of an inquiry. 
There can be different reasons for this, such as that a term is too 
indeterminate, contested, ambiguous or does not trace the distinctions that are 
most relevant for the sort of question that we hope to address. Some of the 
problems such shortcomings induce are unclear entailments of basic findings, 
verbal disputes, failure to address the relevant subject matter, contested subject 
matters and parties to a debate talking past one another. 
What are the consequences of adopting my approach for philosophical 
practice? Intuitions about the application of a term to actual or hypothetical 
cases play a much more modest role than they often do in practice and despite 
notorious objections to this practice and conceptual analysis more generally. 
These intuitions disclose at most a starting point. As we go along, we should 
be prepared to give up any particular intuition if this promises to make the 
term more useful for our aims and more suitable in the light of our findings.  
Similarly, counterexamples lose some of their power. They are 
commonly treated as evidence against an account. On my approach, they only 
pose a problem if they cannot be justified as part of a terminological 
improvement. 
Definitions come within reach. It is commonly agreed that if explicit 
analyses are attainable at all, they will not take the form of a definition in terms 
of a small number of necessary and sufficient conditions. Terminological 
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revisions do not need to take the form of a definition, but they could. The 
objections to definitions as a result of conceptual analysis do not apply to 
definitions as a result of terminological revisions. 
What gains importance on my approach are questions about our 
theoretical (and sometimes practical) aims. Which aims are significant? Which 
ones are respectable? These questions require epistemic, ethical and pragmatic 
considerations and need to be negotiated within a debate in order to agree on a 
terminology. 
Finally, on my approach, clarifying terms and hence subject matters, 
somewhat paradoxically, is not a merely terminological issue. It relies on 
substantive assumptions and decisions. Accordingly, it cannot be done prior to 
addressing any substantive issue in a debate. Rather, it happens as we go along. 
Note that this does not imply that the distinction between terminological and 
substantive issues is in general blurred.   
 To close, let me sketch some future lines of inquiry that emerge from 
this study.  I have claimed that linguistic tolerance has limits because not every 
aim that could guide terminological revision is respectable. However, I have 
not said much about what makes an aim respectable. The answer will be 
different for theoretical and practical aims. Theoretical aims can be formulated 
in terms of questions and issues that we hope to address. Whether these aims 
are respectable will presumably depend on whether a relevant question or issue 
is significant enough and more significant than rival aims. The very general 
question arises of which theoretical issues are worth pursuing. The assessment 
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of practical aims as to their significance and respectability includes considering 
such issues as what is wrong with the aim to depict the actions of a perceived 
enemy as particularly reprehensible in order to justify extreme actions against 
them. This raises intricate ethical as well as practical and often also legal 
matters. 
Another matter for further exploration is the use of explication outside 
philosophy. One of many interesting examples is the term “mental illness”. 
Which clusters of symptoms and suggested diagnoses should be officially 
acknowledged as a mental illness is in many cases contested in medical, 
political and legal contexts. The method of explication might provide a useful 
framework to discuss relevant political, legal and ethical aims—for example, a 
right to sick leave or avoiding stigmatisation—their relative significance and 
how they influence the classification of a suggested diagnosis as a mental 
illness. 
 In Chapter 1, I have argued that it is not entirely clear whether we need 
a hyperintensional account of the subject matter of statements and disputes. 
This issue needs further consideration.  
I have provided a Gricean account of the lack of disagreement in 
verbal disputes. It would be interesting to consider this suggestion in the 
broader context of current debates about disagreement in semantics, 
metaethics and epistemology. Moreover, we could assess whether some 
disputes in philosophy are actually merely verbal or vital verbal—for example, 
metaphysical disputes. 
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Finally, I have focused on a particular role for language in philosophy. 
This does by no means exclude the possibility that it plays other roles as well. 
One other possible role has, for example, emerged from my critique of 
Jackson’s solution to the location problem. Thus, a theory of vagueness and 
ambiguity might be required in order to assess the truth-value of certain 
substantive statements. Such other roles for language in philosophy should be 
examined in order to provide a fuller picture of how much language matters 
almost a century after the linguistic turn. 
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